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ABSTRACT
To what extent have refugees in Ulyankulu settlement, Tanzania, developed a sense of be-
longing and de facto citizenship through their agency despite government control? This
question forms the basis of the research design of this thesis. Refugees have lived in pro-
tracted exile in many countries. The aim of this thesis is to assess such a situation by
theorising and empirically unravelling refugees’ practices of belonging in a rural settle-
ment. While studies within forced migration literature have been mostly empirical, some
theoretical ones suggest that camps are spaces of exception that turn refugees into vic-
tims without agency, or spaces of myth-making.
Acknowledging these theorisations, this thesis develops a conceptual framework in
which, despite control by governments and international agencies, refugees’ agency in de-
veloping a sense of belonging and claiming de facto citizenship is underlined. Ultimately,
this understanding also suggests important recommendations for policy.
Taking the case study of Burundian refugees in Tanzania, who arrived in the 1970s,
this research is based on qualitative field research methods using techniques such as par-
ticipant observation and interviews with refugees, Tanzanian citizens, agents of human-
itarian organisations and the government in Ulyankulu settlement and Dar es Salaam in
2012. It analyses discourses concerning the naturalisation of Burundian refugees, and
it evaluates practices and narratives of first and second generation refugees concerning
their experiences of waiting for citizenship, and everyday negotiations of belonging.
This thesis aims at contributing to forced migration literature, and by its considera-
tions of spatiality and temporality to human geography. As a theoretical contribution, it
oers a conceptual framework examining the interplay between exclusion from citizen-
ship and a sense of belonging in the space of refugee camps. Empirically, it analyses the
various forms of control over refugees, and sheds light on their interactions with refugees’
‘pragmatics of belonging’ and ‘pragmatics of waiting’ for citizenship.
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FOREWORD
When I think back to when I started my PhD and trace the process until now, the refugee
situation in Tanzania changed dramatically. In 2010, the President of Tanzania emphati-
cally announced the issuing of citizenship certificates to a select number of 749 Burundian
refugees, who had come in the 1970s, in Dar es Salaam. In 2011, the naturalisation and
relocation policy, which had been formulated in 2007, was put on hold, leaving the rest
of the 162,000 refugees in Ulyankulu, Katumba and Mishamo settlements in a state of
heightened uncertainty during my time of fieldwork in the year of 2012. They had al-
ready registered for Tanzanian citizenship, were referred to as NNTs (Newly Naturalised
Tanzanians) by international organisations and had revoked their Burundian citizenship.
From being quasi-citizens already, they became liminal, stateless beings in reality. It was
not clear to any actor involved when this period of uncertainty would end. After the fi-
nal submission of my thesis in September 2014, it was then surprising but relieving to
see that the President Kikwete had ultimately decided to hand out the long-awaited cit-
izenship certificates to the (former) refugees in the settlements, without requiring them
to relocate to other hosting regions in Tanzania. The naturalisation ceremony occurred
as a symbolic action on Nyerere Day, 14 October 2014, which marked the 15th Anniver-
sary of the founding father of the nation Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, who was known for
welcoming refugees as guests. This decision was first announced by a representative of
the United Republic of Tanzania at the 65th session of UNHCR’s Executive Committee
held in Geneva, 29 September to 3 October 2014 (meetings 676 and 680). The represen-
tative stressed that the state would need support to renew the aging infrastructure and
socioeconomic institutions in the settlements in order to facilitate the local integration of
these refugees. While this decision ended the period of uncertainty for these Burundian
refugees in Tanzania, and indeed ended one of the most protracted refugee situations on
the African continent, this thesis aims at contributing to understand refugees’ every-day
lives, motivations and challenges during a period of complete legal uncertainty - a con-
dition that most refugees face at some point or indeed permanently during their time
in exile. This thesis therefore does not deal with the final naturalisation and its conse-
quences but with the period that led up to this critical juncture. In hindsight, one could
say that by developing a sense of belonging to the Tanzanian nation, the former refugees
indeed played an important role in achieving what they were striving for: de facto and de
jure citizenship.
19 April 2015
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ABBR EV I AT IONS
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CHADEMA Chama cha Demokrasia wa Maendeleo (Party of Democracy and
Development)
COSTECH Commission of Science and Technology
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PMO–RALG Prime Minister’s Oce – Regional Administration and Local Gov-
ernment
PRS Protracted Refugee Situation
REDESO Relief to Development Society
REPOA Policy Research for Development
TANCOSS Tanzania Comprehensive Solution Strategy
TCRS Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service
TZS Tanzanian Shillings
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNHCR United Nation High Commissioner of Refugees
UPRONA Parti de l’Unité pour le Progrès Nationale (Union for National
Progress)
VETA Vocational Education and Training Authority
6
GLOS SARY
Chagga An ethnic group in the North of Tanzania, living predominantly in
Kilimanjaro region
Dada Sister; term used for relatives and unmarried female friends
Diwani Ward Representative
Ha An ethnic group based in Kigoma Region
Halmashauri District Council
Hutu An ethnic group in Burundi, predominantly farmers; considered
lower social class than Tutsi especially in colonial times
Jadi Ancestral Tradition
Kabila Tribe / Ethnic group
Mama Mother; used to address mothers and married women in general,
mostly in combination with the name of the first born child or the
last name (clan name) – e.g. ‘Mama Neema’, ‘Mama Mwanga’
Mfasiri Translator
Mkimbizi Refugee
M-Pesa A mobile-banking service oered by Vodacom
Mtafiti Researcher
Mwanafunzi Student
Mwenyeji Insider, somebody belonging to a place
Mwiko Taboo
Mzungu White person
Mgeni Guest or foreigner
Nchi Country
Ngoma Tanzanian dance
Nyamwezi An ethnic group in the North-West of Tanzania, living predomi-
nantly in Tabora region
Nanenane ‘Eight eight’; national farmers’ holiday on August 8th
Pimbwe An ethnic group based in Rukwa Region
Sabasaba ‘Seven seven’; national holiday on July 7th to commemorate the
founding of TANU, and (more recently) to celebrate the Dar es
Salaam International Trade Fair
Serikali Government
Shemeji Sister in law
Sukuma An ethnic group in the North-West of Tanzania, living predomi-
nantly in Mwanza and Tabora regions
Tutsi An ethnic group in Burundi, predominantly pastoralists; formerly
favoured by Belgian colonialists
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Uhamiaji Immigration
Uhuru Freedom
Ujamaa na
Kujitegemea
Socialism and self-reliance – an ideology promoted by President
Julius Nyerere after independence in 1962
Ukoo Clan
Utamaduni Culture – a term promoted under President Nyerere
Uraia Citizenship
Kaswa Centre village of Ulyankulu settlement
Ikonongo Village in Ulyankulu settlement, in the west of Kaswa
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1
I N TRODUCT ION
1.1 Background
“[...] Population movements in response to demographic growth, climatic change and
the development of production and trade have always been part of human history. War-
fare, conquest, formation of nations and the emergence of states and empires have all
led to migrations, both voluntary and forced” (Castles and Miller, 2003: 70). However,
the systematic care for refugees by international agencies only started after World War
II with the advent of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
The organisation, founded in 1950, aimed to help the one million people who still found
themselves uprooted from that conflict. While first envisaged as an agency with a three-
year mandate, there has been a proliferation of refugee situations since the 1950s, which
destined the agency to keep operating until today. Notably in the 1960s, intra-state war in
post-colonial settings in Africa produced refugee movements. Since then, conflicts have
continued to cause people to leave their homes and flee to another place or country. In
2013, the UNHCR classified 11.7 million refugees as people of concern (UNHCR, 2013).
However, what is striking is not the number of refugees, but the duration in which these
people remain labelled as ‘refugees’ and thus are forced to live in camps and settlements.
All in all, in 33 developing countries worldwide, situations exist in which a group of more
than 25,000 refugees have stayed for at least five consecutive years in the host country,
without the possibility of returning to their home countries. They lack rights enjoyed by
citizens and other migrants. These situations have been referred to as “protracted refugee
situations” (UNHCR, 2006: 107).
Refugee camps and settlements have been established in many countries in Africa, as
a result of people fleeing from post-colonial conflicts. Sudanese and Somali refugees in
Kenya, Sudanese in Uganda and Sahrawi refugees in Algeria, for example, have stayed in
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the host countries for several decades. One of themost protracted situations exists in Tan-
zania, where Burundians, who fled from ethnic conflict, have stayed in settlements since
the 1970s. This first wave of refugees was settled by the Tanzanian government with help
of the UNHCR in three rural settlements: Mishamo, Katumba and Ulyankulu. A second
wave of Burundian refugees, who came in the 1990s, was hosted in several camps, mainly
in the west of the country. Besides Nyarugusu camp, all of these camps are now o-
cially closed and the refugees have returned to Burundi. While in the formerly mentioned
protracted situations in other countries there has been no change, in 2007/08 Tanzania
proposed a policy of naturalisation and relocation which oered Burundian refugees citi-
zenship, but also forsaw the closure of the settlements and the dispersal of the Burundians
within Tanzania – a process that was supposed to be completed by 2014. However, this
initiative was put on hold in 2011 and was indefinitely suspended at the time of fieldwork
in 2012. The process of local integration through naturalisation was the starting point
of interest for this thesis but research questions were eventually adapted according to the
policy environment.
Despite the presence of protracted refugee situations, forced migration is a challeng-
ing theme to study because it is normally a temporary phenomenon. Changes can occur
suddenly and unexpectedly in accordance with government policies, and in relation to
newly erupting wars. Possibly this is the reason why much of the literature on the topic is
empirical rather than theoretical. While this study principally aims to make a theoretical
contribution in order to “make social life intelligible”, it also aims to “make it better” by
pointing towards some recommendations for policy (Gregory, 1994: 10, original empha-
sis). By carefully contextualising the case of the Burundian refugees in space and time,
and by theorising the space of refugee settlements afresh, this research aims at a new
framework for understanding and evaluating protracted refugee situations, in light of
empirical findings from the case of Ulyankulu settlement (see location of this main field
site in Figures 1.1. and 1.2).
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Figure 1.1: Map of Tanzania showing Location of Refugee Camps and Settlements
Source: UNHCR (2014k)
This ap shows refugee camps and settlements still open in 2014: Ulyankulu (circled in
red), Mishamo and Katumba (here: ‘Mpanda’) settlements for Burundian refugees who
arrived in 1972, Nyarugusu camp for Burundi and Congolese refugees arriving in the
1990s and Kanembwa camp, from which refugees are resettled in the USA. Further, the
map shows the location of UNHCR oces in the country.
1.2 Policy and Conceptual Gaps
1.2.1 The policy gap in humanitarian approaches to refugees
There is a clear gap in policy regarding what should happen to refugees who are stranded
in legal limbo in refugee camps for decades. ‘Local integration’, which the UNHCR envis-
ages as a durable solution next to the options of repatriation and resettlement has only
happened in a planned manner in a few cases – and those cases, on the African conti-
nent, are limited to refugees of ethnically similar groups to the ones prevailing in the host
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country. A successful case of local integration including citizenship of a camp refugee
population on a mass, rather than on an individual scale, is thus far lacking. This is why
the Tanzanian casewas of considerable interest to the research on forcedmigration. How-
ever, since that the policy was ocially on hold during field research in 2012, the focus
of interest in this case shifted towards why the policy failed and how people have been
dealing with t e uncertainty that remained. A number of studies were commissioned by
the UNHCR to shed light on some cases of protracted refugee situations1. Later the or-
1Liberian refugees in Côte d’Ivoire, Sudanese and Somalis in Kenya, Sierra Leoneans in Guinea, Liberi-
ans in Ghana, Sahrawis i Algeria, Sudanese in Uganda and Guatemalans in Mexico (Kuhlman, 2002).
19
1.2 policy and conceptual gaps
ganisation selected five situations to focus on illustratively2. However, the organisations’
conclusions have yet been tentative, stating that “there is no one-size fits all approach to
PRS” (ibid.: 16) and that it will not be easy to “unlock” these situations (cf. ibid.: 28).
1.2.2 Conceptual gaps in forced migration literature
Refugees, control and exclusion from citizenship
Conceptually, refugees have often been portrayed as being both victims of violence in their
countries of origin as well as of being subject to host states’ and international organisa-
tions’ control whilst in refugee camps. At the same time, refugees are often seen by the
host nation and the international community as perpetrators of violence and as threats
to security. In essence, this paradoxical logic explains why states consider it necessary to
control refugees in the first place: camps oer the dual possibility to care for and control
refugees in order to exclude them from citizenship.
Rather than taking control as a given however, it is necessary to disaggregate various as-
pects of control and its rationales both theoretically and empirically. It will be discussed to
what extent the camp can be said to be a ‘space of control’ functioning to exclude refugees
from de jure citizenship as well as potential processes of de facto citizenship. Further, tan-
gible eects of this control on refugees’ and Tanzanian citizens’ day-to-day lives but also
mitigating and transforming local processes will need to be empirically scrutinised.
Refugees, agency, citizenship, belonging and waiting
While the agency of refugees has been depicted as violent in most refugee settings and in
refugee literature, agency also needs to be conceptualised in terms of building a sense of
belonging in a ‘space of agency’ within the camp. The literature on forced migration in
general and on refugee camps in particular lacks a discussion about belonging in relation
to both first and second generation refugees. One might take it for granted that second
generation refugees have integrated into the host society to a higher degree than the first
generation, and that they experience less of a longing to go back to their parents’ country
2Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan, the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, Bosnian and Croatian
refugees in Serbia, Burundian refugees in Tanzania and Eritrean refugees in eastern Sudan (Milner and
Loescher, 2011).
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of origin. However, in the spatial set-up of a settlement, such integration is assumed and
thus might not correspond to reality. This thesis introduces the concept of ‘pragmatics of
belonging’ to show how refugees can become de facto citizens. Furthermore, the thesis
presents the concept of the ‘pragmatics of waiting’ to explain how refugees deal with
waiting during a time of uncertainty and legal limbo in the space of the camp.
1.3 The Argument
This thesis argues that on the one hand, while treating refugees as legal, spatial and tem-
poral “exceptions” (Agamben, 2005), the state creates a ‘space of control’ and thereby
excludes refugees from citizenship in the refugee camp justified by the claim that refugees
are security threats. However, refugees are neither purely perpetrators nor victims. Over
time in protracted exile, refugees develop a sense of belonging to the host nation, which
I call the ‘pragmatics of belonging’, in order to reduce uncertainty. This sense is created
by feeling at home, by interacting with citizens and by claiming de facto citizenship on
an eclectic basis. The camp becomes a ‘space of agency’ in which this de facto citizen-
ship is lived day to day. As an inherent feature of living in uncertainty within this space
of agency, refugees also enact a ‘pragmatics of waiting’, which reconceptualises waiting
as an instrumental part of everyday life. In this protracted situation, there is also an
emergent day-to-day sense of conviviality between some local government ocials and
refugees. Functioning as a mutual benefit, the rules of the ‘space of control’ are not al-
ways enforced.
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1.4 Choice of Research Context
Tanzania has been chosen as a case study for a protracted refugee situation for several
reasons.
Main refugee hosting country in Africa
Tanzania has, by far, hosted the most refugees in the history of the Great Lakes region.
Reasons for this include the lack of large-scale warfare since the country gained inde-
pendence in 1962. Furthermore, it oered support to fellow Africans in a spirit of pan-
Africanism, and to members of national liberation movements in the 1960s, 70s and 80s.
The country has been lauded by the UNHCR as a benevolent host of refugees for many
decades. However, a more nuanced look at history shows a trajectory from a welcom-
ing attitude to a more restrictive one over time. For this study, it was envisaged that the
changing reputation of the Tanzanian state would oer fertile ground for clarification
along with possibly unexpected research results.
Most protracted refugee case in Africa
The situation of the Burundian refugees is also one of the most protracted in Africa and
would therefore be a suitable example. Without making claims to generalisability, this
case could be a prototype of how such a situation can arise. While this study emphasises
the need for contextualising the refugee situation at hand, international organisations
such as the UNHCR have promoted universal solutions for refugees. Insights into this
case may therefore infer ideas for other such situations – or, indeed, may infer the main
idea that a unique solution needs to be found for each protracted case.
Unique, unprecedented case: Mass naturalisation and relocation
Research on forcedmigration in Tanzania provided unique insight both in place and time,
since the recent oer of naturalisation to Burundian refugees currently constitutes the
only process of that scale in Africa. It is also the only example that proposes mass reloca-
tion and dispersal in a host country as a solution for a protracted refugee situation. The
proposal of this research evolved from the initial aim of analysing the implementation
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and the eects of the naturalisation process, towards analysing practices, discourses and
feelings of refugees, the state and international organisations during a time of uncertainty.
The latter was a non-obvious but in itself intriguing turn in the subject of inquiry.
The wider scale: Aftermath of ethnic strife in the Great-Lakes Region
The situation of the Burundian refugees in Tanzania portrays a part of the aftermath of
ethnic strife in Burundi. The conflicts between theHutu andTutsi in the post-colonial era
have left an imprint not only on Rwanda and Burundi but also on neighbouring countries
like Tanzania. The Great Lakes region has struggled with various refugee movements, in-
cluding refugee militarisation, evident for example in the case of Tutsi Rwandese refugees
in Uganda (Mamdani, 2001), and Rwandese in the Kivu regions in the Republic of Congo.
The situation of refugees in Tanzania, who came as early as the 1970s, is less well doc-
umented. On the other hand, there are several seminal works to draw on in relation to
refugees in Tanzania (Malkki, 1995a; Sommers, 2000; Turner, 2010); and it is one of the
aims of this thesis to assess the situation of the second generation of these refugees.
Personal and practical considerations
In terms of practical feasibility of the study, Tanzania is known to be a peaceful coun-
try and research about this country has proliferated in various disciplines during the last
decades. However, gaining permission to do research on refugees has become more re-
strictive. Although it was not clear whether I would be granted access by the Tanzania
Commission of Science and Technology (COSTECH) and the Director of Refugee Ser-
vices of the Ministry of Home Aairs, I took the risk of possibly being rejected to enter
the settlements. As an alternative to locating the research in the settlement(s), I originally
planned to conduct research with urban refugees instead. Luckily, however, my research
project was not rejected.
The choice of Tanzania also had a personal reason – I had spent about a month in the
country to do a publically funded cultural exchange between my home city Berlin and
Iringa in the southern highlands of Tanzania in 2006. SevenTanzanian students took part
in a reverse programme and came to Berlin in 2007, and a group of students, includingme,
supported them during that time. Other guests from Tanzania also came to visit Berlin
in previous and subsequent years, and my family hosted them. Furthermore, hearing
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from volunteers who went to Tanzania to support local NGOs increased my interest in
the place. Hence, knowledge about Tanzania, anity towards and contacts to the place
were reasons to locate the study in that country.
1.5 Research Questions
The topic outlined above led to the following research question:
To what extent have refugees in Ulyankulu settlement, Tanzania, developed a sense of
belonging and de facto citizenship through their agency despite government control?
The answer to this question aims to make a contribution to empirical knowledge, and
to theory, on the long-term eects of forced migration, on understanding life in refugee
camps and on the process of developing a sense of belonging and of becoming citizens of a
marginalised group of people. In terms of empirical material, it focuses on a specific rural
field site in Tanzania, Ulyankulu settlement, on which there exists little research. Theo-
retically, this question requires the conceptualisation of notions of belonging, citizenship,
waiting, control and agency; and the interactions between these concepts in the given con-
text. Finally, through this in-depth analysis, the question aims to give recommendations
of how to deal with protracted refugee situations in the future.
The main research question stated above can only be answered by clarification of some
descriptive elements. These include especially historical and spatial ones.
The first question should be:
How has the area of Ulyankulu settlement been governed before and after the arrival
of refugees and how has it developed economically?
A local perspective on Ulyankulu settlement before and after the refugees’ arrival is
important in order to understand the broad transformations of the area in terms of inte-
gration into the wider Tanzanian governance and economy. The governance of the settle-
ment elicits on the one hand the extent and ways in which refugees have been excluded
from citizenship but also potential ways in which they may have been included in a pro-
cess of becoming citizens. Economic transformations elicit elements of refugees’ agency
within the settlement, and the interaction with people and places outside of it. Chapter
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4 – using both literature and interview material – will shed light on the question above.
This chapter will also deal with the following question:
How has the Government of Tanzania, in collaboration with international organisa-
tions, dealt with refugee influxes over time?
An historical elaboration on this question shall clarify especially the changing content
of refugee policies and functions of refugee governance over time both in terms of domes-
tic politics and foreign policy. This question will be answered by recourse to secondary
literature. The answer to the two questions above serves to contextualise the following
question:
What elements of control have been employed to exclude refugees in the settlement
from citizenship by the government and international organisations and why; what are
the eects of this control and how has it been mitigated and transformed locally?
Material collected via qualitative methods will flesh out details in order to answer this
question in Chapter 5. The final part of this thesis emphasises the perspective of the
refugees and aims to tackle the question:
In what ways has the settlement oered the possibility for first and second genera-
tion refugees to develop a sense of belonging and to claim de facto citizenship to Tan-
zania/Ulyankulu?
Chapter 6 deals with an empirical answer to this question before this study reaches an
overall answer to the question and a conclusion to the thesis in Chapter 7.
1.6 Organisation of the Dissertation
This dissertation is divided into eight chapters. This chapter, Chapter 1, forms the in-
troduction to the thesis as a whole. It explained the background and rationale of the
study, the problem that was encountered and deemed necessary for further research; and
it formulated research questions.
Chapter 2 develops a theoretical framework in order to analyse the situation at hand.
Previous theorisations have framed refugee camps either as supportive or as prison-like
spaces. Some have focussed on camps as spaces of myth-making or of politicisation. The
current analysis is departing from these previous theorisations and maintains that camps
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function to exclude refugees from citizenship but they can also oer space to manoeuvre
and develop a sense of belonging. This exclusion is supported by the fact that refugees
in Africa do not always belong to an ethnicity of the host nation. Camps are sometimes
invisibilised or even abandoned by host governments, which can perpetuate the refugees’
exclusion. On the other hand, refugees often find ways to deal with the situation in pro-
tracted exile – they develop a ‘pragmatics of belonging’, which consists of three dimen-
sions: a relational one of integrating with the host community, of feeling at home and
of claiming citizenship rights. In times of uncertainty, it is argued, refugees engage in
a ‘pragmatics of waiting’, a way of dealing with the suspended time in future-oriented
ways.
Chapter 3 spells out the research design and methodology used for this study. It ex-
plains the rationale for choosing a qualitative research strategy in Tanzania, and more
specifically Dar es Salaam and Ulyankulu as research sites; it discusses the main research
methods used for data collection, participant observation and interviews. It also recounts
methods and stages of data analysis, detailed research proceedings, and critically assesses
the ethics in the field and the positionality of the researcher.
Chapter 4 endeavours to explain the spatial history, economic situation and local gov-
ernance within and beyond Ulyankulu settlement. Historically, the settlement has been
implicated in nation-wide population movements before and after the arrival of refugees.
Economically, productivity has risen disproportionately in Ulyankulu settlement com-
pared to the areas around through the labour of the refugees. In terms of governance, the
area used to be ruled by local Nyamwezi chiefs before the arrival of refugees. From 1972
the Ministry of Home Aairs (MHA) and international organisations were in charge of
the camp until from 1985 onwards, Ulyankulu was embedded in the local Tanzanian gov-
ernment structure. With the onset of the naturalisation initiative for Burundian refugees,
the MHA and the UNHCR renewed their presence in the settlement from 2007 onwards
– a period of non-maintenance followed. This chapter also provides an overview on the
changes in refugee policy in Tanzania over time since the country’s independence. From
an open-door policy under President Nyerere, the country introduced more restrictive
policies in the 1990s. Naturalisation, proposed in 2007, therefore came as a surprise.
Chapter 5 examines the idea of the camp as a ‘space of control’, which functions to
exclude refugees from citizenship. It shows how refugee policies have excluded refugees
from de jure citizenship but also how these have hindered them from de facto integrating
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in the host community. These policies are in tension with processes of citizen-making on
the ground. Through the narratives of government ocials, one understands that exclu-
sion from citizenship and control are based on concerns with security as well as purity
of the nation With respect to Ulyankulu settlement these security concerns, however, are
not based on actual higher crime rates than elsewhere in the country. While eects of
the control exerted can be unfavourable for the refugees involved, they have also been
transformed and mitigated by processes of conviviality.
Chapter 6 shows that while refugees are indeed restricted in their freedom ofmovement
and do not enjoy citizenship rights, they have used their own agency not only to develop
the area economically but also to develop a sense of belonging. They have interacted with
Tanzanians inside and outside of the settlement, and most of the refugees feel Tanzanian
nowadays. Over time, they have developed creative ways of claiming de facto citizenship
through a ‘pragmatics of belonging’ and a ‘pragmatics of waiting’ to reduce uncertainty.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes by spelling out empirical and theoretical contributions,
by formulating tentative recommendations for policy and by introducing some ideas for
further research.
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“Spatialising the camp, understanding how it is constituted and functions spatially, is a way of
grounding geopolitics in the everyday: understanding the small moments and acts that negotiate
and constitute broader geopolitical architectures in the spaces of the camp and beyond.”
— Ramadan (2013)
Hundreds of thousands of refugees today find themselves in protracted refugee situa-
tions (PRS). These are defined as a refugee population of 25,000 refugees or more who are
in exile for five or more years in a developing country (UNHCR, 2006: 107) – and most
of these populations live in camps or rural settlements. These specific situations have
arisen due to a complex interplay between host state and state of origin, the refugees,
local population and international organisations, most notably the UNHCR.
My analytical framework shows by which mechanisms of control and for what reasons
refugees are excluded from de jure citizenship but also how they, on the other hand, can
develop a sense of belonging and de facto citizenship. First, it is necessary to unpack
various forms of state control in refugee camps and settlements since they essentially
function to exclude refugees from de jure citizenship and can hinder forms of de facto
citizenship as well. However, the camp should not only be seen as a ‘space of control’
since refugees have dealt with the actual control imposed and have resisted, negotiated
and transformed it through their own agency. In this ‘space of agency’ refugees are often
able to both attain a form of de facto citizenship seen as a process as well as partial de
jure citizenship by making claims to certain rights otherwise reserved to citizens. These
forms of incipient citizenship can also be supported by local government ocials and
host community citizens in a rising sense of conviviality, so that the borders between
government’s policies of exclusion and refugees’ attempts to belong to the nation/host
community become blurred.
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The first part of this chapter shows that in rural refugee camps in Africa, the host state
is creating a controlled space, which functions to exclude refugees from de jure citizen-
ship and hinders them from attaining de facto citizenship as well. Why is naturalisation
not normally oered to refugees? Among those in power, there is a deeply-rooted anxiety
about newcomers. Exclusion from citizenship is tied to a belief in a notion of citizen-
ship that is contingent on a primordial belonging to the (host) nation. At the outset, the
designated spaces of camps and settlements are designed to be ‘legible’ to the outsider
i.e. to central government ocials and international organisations’ aid workers. This
legibility is created in order to control and manage the newly arrived population in phys-
ical and social ways. In order to exclude refugees from citizenship over long periods of
time, states eventually often invisibilise and abandon refugee settlements. Since refugees
are not believed to be part of the nation, the state finds ways to postpone decisions on a
permanent legal status and thereby exclude refugees from the citizenry in temporal ways.
Elaborating these multiple ways of controlling and excluding refugees from citizenship
control expands the debates about the governance of refugee camps, why and how exclu-
sion from citizenship is transformed and maintained over the course of several decades.
The second part of this chapter concerns the refugees’ agency in dealing with these
problems of state control and exclusion from citizenship in spatial, legal and temporal
ways. It is argued that they develop a ‘pragmatics of belonging’ in order to reduce uncer-
tainty. This has three dimensions: first, refugees often subvert the given spatial structures
bothwithin and outside of the camps and settlements and can thereby develop a relational
form of belonging to the host community. Second, they can develop a sense of home in
the settlement by performing their every-day life tasks there. Third, they may also find
ways claim rights without formally holding de jure citizenship. By integrating in this
way and by developing a feeling of belonging despite the given structures, they become
de facto citizens. While waiting for citizenship, their time is used in creative ways and
the temporal control is thus not felt in a solely restrictive way. It is argued that refugees
thereby develop a ‘pragmatics of waiting’. Theoretically, this part of the framework con-
tributes to conceptions of refugee agency, citizenship and belonging, as well as on notions
of waiting.
Refugees are subjected to being excluded from citizenship in controlled, and some-
times invisibilised, spaces. Through their ‘pragmatics of belonging’ and ‘pragmatics of
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waiting’, refugees negotiate their belonging and attain de facto citizenship while waiting
for governmental decisions despite the control exerted.
2.1 Existing Theorisations of the Refugee Camp
Inwhatways are protracted refugee situations created and lived in camps and settlements?
The UNHCR tends to represent settlements as supportive institutions, where people in
need can take refuge and receive aid, thanks to generous international donors and the
host country. By contrast, some scholars see them as prison-like places where rights to
freedom of movement, political rights and also access to education and employment are
denied to refugees via a mechanism of control and containment (cf. Kaiser, 2006; Malkki,
1995a). Humanitarianism thereby sees refugees as innocent victims (ibid.) without a past
and without political identities. Through the daily practice of caring, the refugees are
treated as “bare life”, which Agamben terms zoe (1998: 1), outside the national order of
things without political agency, or bios (Agamben, 1998: 1; Turner, 2010). According
to Agamben (2005: 24), the camp is the structure in which the “state of exception”, as
a suspension of the law, is “permanently realised”. Exceptions, in this case refugees, are
only included in the nation state through their exclusion (cf. Ramadan, 2013).
While an analogy to Agamben’s theory of camps is therefore useful in some ways, it
is necessary to point out that there are important dierences between the concentration
camps that were part of the holocaust on Jews during World War II in Germany about
which he wrote, and the refugee settlements or camps that are the subject of this analysis.
The “state of exception” that Agamben (2005) refers to is Schmitt’s (1985) Ausnahmezu-
stand (German: state of exception), which applies to the temporary suspension of law in
a state due to a military coup, for example. In World War II Germany, however, this state
of exception was created voluntarily for a sustained period of time in order to increase
Hitler’s power. As Agamben (2014: 1) maintains, “the entire Third Reich can be consid-
ered as a state of exception which lasted twelve years”. Within this “state of exception”,
the concentration camps paradoxically created an exception within the exception. With
relation to contemporary African refugee hosting countries, they are not normally in a
“state of exception”. Moreover, Agamben (1998) argues that people, as homines sacres
(sacred men) in concentration camps could on the one hand be killed but on the other
they could not be sacrificed – an idea that stems from Roman law. Refugees, by contrast,
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can neither be killed nor sacrificed and the camps in place aim to support them and not
to extinguish them. Refugee camps can, however, become remote “spaces of invisibility”
(Hammond, 2008: 517, see also Section 2.2.2), in which care for refugees is eventually
abandoned. Depending on the situation, this can have detrimental eects on the refugee
population. Gregory (2006) furthermoremaintains in relation toGuantánamoBay, where
Agamben (2005: 87) detects the “maximum worldwide deployment” of the state of ex-
ception, Agamben’s theory does not take into account international law nor does it give
space to political struggle or resistance. If the “Sovereign is he who decides the exception”
as Carl Schmitt (1985: 5) explained, the sovereign in the case of refugee camps is not only
the host state but international agencies and policies as well, which influence it. As this
thesis shows, the creation of a “space of exception” is not the end but the starting point
of analysis, which needs to consider political struggle within it.
In the case of protracted refugee situations inTanzania, it is adequate to say that the law
applied to citizens is suspendedwhen it comes to refugees, as maintained above. However,
is the camp only a “space of exception”? What kind of power is exercised within it; in
what way is life political within the camp? According to Agamben (1998: 166), in the
case of Germany during World War II, the most absolute conditio inhumana that has
ever existed on earth was realised. This was possible due to the general state of exception
in the Third Reich but also due to the secluded and fenced spatiality of the camps. If
borders in today’s refugee settlements in Africa are not fixed or closed, how is the “space
of exception” enforced and how do refugees and local Tanzanians react to it? Agamben’s
(1998) “space of exception” does not deal with the question of how people inside of it
relate to people outside, how people relate to the state or international organisations
within it and how they may be influenced by politics in other countries.
Related to amore contemporary issue, Agamben (2014) discusses state power inAthens,
arguing that nowadays state violence and control is sanctioned by security reasons that
constitute a permanent technology of government – for example with reference to bio-
metric and genetic data collection of citizens. Furthermore, he argues that there is a
paradoxical convergence today of an absolutely liberal paradigm in the economy with an
unprecedented and equally absolute paradigm of state and police control. The state in-
creases control because it aims to deal with eects and not with causes. The state thereby
moved from the sovereign state, the Ancien Regime, towards a disciplinary state (Fou-
cault, 1979) and finally towards a control state. Control is more relevant in this context
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than discipline since management and control do not necessarily coincide with order and
discipline (Agamben, 2014: 6). Concerning refugees, security is often the main reason to
extend state and police control to refugees (cf. Daley, 1991; Turner, 2010). The state in-
deed aims to control the refugee influx as a consequence of warfare in another country –
the causes are not and cannot be dealt with by the host state. In the following Sections
(2.2.1 – 2.2.4), it will be discussed how and why, in theory, the legal state of exception is
enforced by various control measures over the refugees by the government and humani-
tarian actors. These, it is argued, function to exclude refugees from citizenship.
It should not be assumed that power in camps is only exercised by the state and humani-
tarian agencies. In some cases refugee camps have been “security islands”, referring to the
fact that Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon are not under Lebanese state authorities
but are ruled by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) legitimised by the 1969
Cairo Agreement (Ramadan, 2009b: 157-159). In Africa, similar examples exist, for ex-
ample the Mozambiquan camps in Tanzania in the 1960s and 70s, which harboured and
were controlled by the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) (see also Section
4.2.2 below). However, in most refugee camps in Africa a basic governmental structure is
given by the host state and international organisations. As will be seen in Chapters 5 and
6 below, the nature and extent of control can vary considerably over time even within one
settlement.
Emphasising the relationship between refugees and host communities, with relation
to Palestinian refugees, Ramadan (2008) suggests that camps can also be seen as spaces
of hospitality, in which refugees are hosted until they return home but in which refugees
can also become hosts themselves. This occurred when Lebanese displaced citizens from
the war between Israel and Hizbullah in 2006 moved to the Palestinian refugees camps
in southern Lebanon, becoming “the guests’ guests” (ibid.: 662). As a consequence, the
refugees could negotiate the terms of hospitality but, as Ramadan maintains, the hospi-
tality oered to the refugees by Lebanon was relatively circumscribed whereas the hos-
pitality oered to the Lebanese guests was relatively generous (ibid.: 663). Even though
some refugee camps in Africa have been placed in remote areas, refugees have over time
often developed contact with the surrounding societies, which have either passively or
actively participated in ‘hosting’ the refugees. Positive interactions with the host society
are crucial for successful integration, as examples show (see Sections 2.3.1 below). Below,
it will be argued that these interactions with the host community also serve to build a
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sense of belonging to the host nation amongst refugees. In general, one can say that suc-
cessful cases of refugee integration have been invisibilised in forced migration literature
(Polzer, 2008). One reason for this is that where refugees had actually obtained citizen-
ship (as happened with the Rwandans in Tanzania) many decided to repatriate (Gasarasi,
1990) and could thus not be researched. Furthermore, self-settled refugees in Africa (e.g.
Malkki, 1995a; Sommers, 2000) are not seen as cases of ‘local integration’ since most of
them are undocumented or work illegally.
Some authors have also discussed camps as spaces of identity preservation or formation.
Due to the secluded nature of the camps they studied, they focus more on dynamics of
identity formation between refugees in camps as well as their relationship to Burundi,
and less between refugees and their hosts. Malkki, for example, argues that refugees
in Mishamo settlement in Tanzania created standardised versions of history in order to
come to terms with their own violent pasts (Malkki, 1995a). Refugees also did so in
everyday ways, such as through gossip and rumours (Turner, 2010). Both Turner (ibid.)
and Malkki (1995a) thus looked at how refugees relate to the past conflict in Burundi,
and how their own accounts made them who they were. Malkki (1995a: 153) argues that
self-settled refugees in towns (near Kigoma in Tanzania) have not created such mythico-
histories but rather employed a “pragmatics of identity” in order to adjust to their new
lives in exile (see below, Section 2.3.1).
With reference to Tanzania, Turner (2010) maintains the exceptional space of the camp
is not only outside of the law of all nation states but also linked to a reality inside Burundi.
Turner (2010) argues that refugees react to changes in the political field in Burundi. The
concept of political field is attributed to Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991), who
contends that a political field is like a game in which politicians gain a ‘practical sense’
and learn how to comply with unwritten rules of the political field in which they are po-
sitioned strategically (cf. Turner, 2010: 110). Turner (ibid.) argues that the camp of his
research was divided by invisible lines – refugees in fact built emerging political spaces
of Lukole A and Lukole B as political agents. In these spaces, dierent political factions
within the camp struggled to define which version of the past should dominate. Semi-
educated young men acted as political entrepreneurs, who combatted the depoliticised
space of the camp that the humanitarian regime imposed on them. They established net-
works through political alliances and party allegiance, linked to Burundi. The politics
of the camp in Turner’s account in Lukole in the 1990s mark a contrast with Malkki’s
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research in Mishamo settlement in the 1980s. As Turner (2010) maintains, the popula-
tion in refugee camps can become hyperpoliticised – in relation to politics in the home
country – and non-political – by the imposed rules of humanitarian agencies in the host
state – at once. Turner (2010: 18) also argues that refugee camps are a parenthesis in
time and place, a “waiting room” where refugees are meant to kill time before returning
to “normality”. He relates this experience to a suspension in time “between the past of
one’s memories in Burundi – sweet as well as bitter – and one’s dreams of a future Bu-
rundi” (ibid.). Along similar lines, Ramadan (2009a) refers to camps as spaces of identity
formation and preservation, in which a sense of Palestinian identity is produced and re-
produced, as temporary spaces drawing meaning of a time-space from their country of
origin (Ramadan, 2010).
Considering these theorisations, in the third part of this chapter it will be discussed
how refugees, in various generations, are not apolitical beings but are in fact in a ‘space
of agency’, inwhich they challenge the spatiality and temporality that constitute the camp
and develop a sense of belonging and de facto citizenship.
2.2 Exclusion from Citizenship in a `Space of Control'
2.2.1 Refugees' exclusion from citizenship and spatial legibility
Asmentioned above, in Agamben’s view, camps (and settlements) are spaces of exception,
in which the law is suspended. In these controlled spaces, refugees are excluded from de
jure citizenship of the host nation. The de jure citizenship referred to here is “a status
bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are
equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed” (Marshall,
1983 [1950]: 253). Following Marshall, the most common interpretation of that political
community remains the nation-state (Lazar, 2013: 12). However, in early modern Europe
the point of reference was the city, and today some of the most relevant political com-
munities operate on a supra-national scale (ibid.). Recently, in new analyses of the ‘right
to the city’, originally formulated by Lefebvre (1968), the city has re-emerged as a focal
point for citizenship. People can havemultiple and overlapping forms of citizenship due to
membership in various scales of community (such as citiy and nation-state). These mul-
34
2.2 exclusion from citizenship in a ‘space of control’
tiple forms denaturalise the automatic association of citizenship with the nation-state.
Marshall’s liberal de jure formulation of citizenship based on individual rights has been
challenged in a number of ways. Citizenship, as Aristotle maintained, is not only a formal
status but amembership, associated with a “set of practices associated with participation
in politics.” Furthermore, he argued that political subjectivity cannot be assumed to exist
but is something that must be created (ibid.: 2). Therefore, following Ong’s formulation
(1996: 737), citizenship is both a “process of self-making and being-made”, i.e. a process
showing how the state (or the community in question) makes citizens and how people
make claims of the state (or community). This process can be called de facto citizenship.
One way for the state to make citizens is through schooling: national schooling systems
have indeed long been recognised as key institutions for the development of national iden-
tity and civic commitment (Gellner, 1983). Another way is taxing the citizens. However,
the processes of subject construction are not only top-down – citizens’ and non-citizens’
agency is often used to claim citizenship or to claim ‘better’ citizenship (Lazar, 2013:
11). An example of such agency are the rights to housing and land titles in peripheral
neighbourhoods of Sao Paolo claimed by residents in a process of ‘insurgent democratic
citizenship’ (Holston, 2008). Holston (ibid.) argues that dierential and contradictory
realisations of citizenship are a global phenomenon.
In fact, the use of de jure citizenship in the host state as the ultimate solution in African
countries has so far been limited since the practice of granting it was often only promoted
where there were pre-existing cultural or ethnic anities (Long, 2010). Due to their cul-
tural anities, 3,000 Somali Bantu refugees were granted citizenship in Tanzania in 2003
(UNHCR, 2010b), Angolans in Namibia used to be privileged through their refugee sta-
tus in contrast to forced migrants with other nationalities, who are merely asylum seek-
ers,1 and 400 Sierra Leonean refugees were assisted to integrate in urban areas in Guinea
(Fielden, 2008)2.
The question remains how and why host states exclude refugees from de jure and even
from de facto citizenship. By putting refugees in camps and settlements, a border is
created, which constitutes the separation line not only between states and geographical
spaces but also between the ‘us’ and ‘them’, the ‘here’ and ‘there’, ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’
1In 2012, however, the Angolan refugees’ status in Namibia ceased (UNHCR, 2013).
2A table in Annex 1 summarises collected information on the state of local integration of refugees, their
current location in camps and settlements and their countries of origin and destination for selected African
countries.
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(Newman, 2006), as well as between citizens and refugees. Depending on how well po-
liced or how porous this border is in practice, refugees are excluded not only from de jure
but potentially also from de facto citizenship as a process of self-making. The reason for
this is that such a border can hinder them from interacting and integrating with the host
community.
The border between refugees and citizens is created by the assumption that refugees
in general stay only for a limited amount of time. They are not awarded the individual
option of attaining citizenship as other immigrants are granted. Even their children, who
are born in the host country, are treated like exceptions and are normally not allowed to
naturalise. This is the case even in countries like Tanzania where citizenship is normally
purely given on the basis of being born on the soil (‘jus soli’) in comparison to countries
that grant citizenship by descent (‘jus sanguinis’) (Manby, 2010). Only in a few countries
like Senegal, Mozambique and South Africa individual applications for naturalisation
by refugees are permitted (Manby, 2010). Due to the temporary nature of the refugee
status, the idea of granting of citizenship seems at first unnecessary and paradoxical,
which might be the reason for not automatically including refugees in general migration
laws.
In a setting where refugees live in peace for several decades, are self-sucient and can-
not return home – what is the rationale for not granting them citizenship? Xenophobic
attitudes towards refugees and their children could go back to a more general hostility
between ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’. As Mamdani (2001) maintains, most histories of geno-
cide go back to a struggle between natives and settlers: first, the genocidal impulse of
the native by the settler, for instance colonial violence, and second the native impulse to
eliminate the settler. The reasons for the struggle between natives and settlers are dif-
ferentiated in various contexts. With relation to refugees in Africa, state actors fear to
naturalise refugees and their children due to a belief in an essentialised notion of identity,
in which belonging and loyalty can only be expressed to one nation, or more broadly a
“fixed home” in one place (Geschiere, 2009: 2-6). This essentialised vision of identity is
based on a theoretical framework, which takes the nation state as the main unit of anal-
ysis. Migrants are seen as a threat to the nation-building process within this framework.
According toWimmer and Glick-Schiller (2002), modern nationalism fuses four dierent
notions of people-hood that had developed separately: the people as a sovereign entity,
which exercises political power by means of democracy; the people as citizens of a state
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holding equal legal rights; the people as a group of solidarity, like an extended family, and
the people as an ethnic community united through common destiny and shared culture.
The problem for migrants and refugees is that citizenship is contingent on belonging to
the nation, which, in Africa, often also includes belonging to certain recognised ethnic
communities within the nation. Citizenship becomes conflated with nationality and ulti-
mately with (local/ethnic) notions of belonging. A politics of belonging resurged in the
recent emphasis on autochthony (Geschiere, 2009: 2), rooted-ness in the soil, promoted
by ethnic groups or the state in various African countries. In fact, by claiming that cer-
tain groups and individuals ‘do not belong’, they were discriminated against and even
had their citizenship taken away – for example as experienced by Northerners in Cote
d’Ivoire and Asians in Uganda (Manby, 2009).
Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2002: 302-308) criticise this view as “methodological na-
tionalism”, in which policy-makers seem to take national discourses, agendas, loyalties
and histories for granted without problematising them in sucient depth. The solutions
currently propagated for refugees as well as their children, I argue, rule out imminent pro-
cesses of belonging and ignore local ways of living de facto citizenship by the ‘refugees’
themselves (as discussed in Section 2.2.1). Since refugees are seen as problematic for the
concept of nationalism, they are also not allowed to be involved in politics in the host
country. If at all, they have been allowed to assume some responsibility within camps
and settlements – an extreme case constitutes the rule of the PLO in camps in Lebanon
(Ramadan, 2008). In Tanzania, for example, refugees have been in charge of electing vil-
lage leaders, who have to report to the settlement ocer. In literature on other countries
such as Côte d’Ivoire and Uganda, refugee leaders are mentioned as well but they are not
institutionalised as in Tanzania (Kuhlmann, 2002; Kaiser, 2006 and 2010).
While excluding refugees from citizenship, states take various measures to care and
control refugees within settlements from the outset of choosing these designated spaces.
The design of camps and rural refugee settlements is reminiscent of what Scott (1998)
explains in relation to large-scale social engineering projects, such as in Soviet collectivi-
sation projects and the ujamaa village campaigns under President Nyerere in Tanzania.
In these cases, society in these spaces was made “legible” by (1), a belief in a rational de-
sign or social order related to high modernist ideology (2), a coercive authoritarian state
(3) and a civil society which lacks the capacity to resist such plans (4) have led to “a full-
fledged environmental and economic disaster” (ibid.: 4). In many camps and settlements,
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these points, especially the first three, can be applied. Tanzania’s rural refugee settlements
were built at the same time as Nyerere’s ujamaa villages and a similar logic pertains to
them. However, in the refugee settlements, a central field for communal activities was
not planned and plots for cultivation have varied in size across settlements. Refugee set-
tlements were built in dierent designs – according to evolving experience with refugee
settlements (Armstrong, 1990). Speaking of the Tanzanian context, refugee settlements
were made “legible” by instructing refugees to live in a grid-like pattern, which was ei-
ther been arranged in a nucleated or clustered form, a linear grid pattern or a modular
grid (Armstrong, 1990). Each of these forms is understandable for outsiders and allows
easy access for the allocation of goods and services, confirming Scott’s first point above
(ibid.). Oftentimes, districts and regions were chosen, where refugee settlements had al-
ready lived previously, since local administration was already familiar in dealing with
them (ibid.). Not all settlements in Africa conform to a strict rational design though:
Ugandan refugee settlements, for example, have been more spread out without an under-
lying grid-structure (Payne, 2006). Within Tanzanian settlements, the society was made
“legible” (Scott, 1998) by grouping people of the same nationality together (Armstrong,
1990). In Uganda, by contrast, some settlements allowed a mix of ethnicities (Payne,
2006). According to Payne (ibid.), this was not advantageous since people avoided inter-
acting across ethnicities. Camps and settlements’ structures do seem to support a rational
order, which stems from a fear of losing control as it is manifested in violence and chaos.
This fear is not entirely unfounded as the many cases of violence and refugee militarisa-
tion have shown (see above; Bariagaber, 2006; Turner, 2010; Mogire, 2011).
The state and international agencies thus do operate in an authoritative or paternal-
istic way (compare Harrell-Bond, 1985): they decide upon where refugees live and how
much land they obtain, what types of houses they can establish, who else can live in the
settlement, whether and how they can leave the settlement (e.g. only with permits), when
they are supposed to repatriate or when a settlement is closed. Although international
agencies and the state do often struggle over these questions (e.g. about plot size, see
Payne, 2006), the outcome for refugees is one of control. Especially before reaching self-
reliance, humanitarian actors reduce refugees to innocent victims (Turner, 2010), who
are in a vulnerable state and thus less likely to resist authoritative plans.
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2.2.2 Exclusion from citizenship by invisibilisation and abandonment
As a control measure in order to exclude refugees from de jure citizenship and from be-
longing to the host nation over long periods of time, they are not only put in refugee
camps but are also often invisibilised as a group. Hereby, it is important not only to
discuss who or what is invisible but invisible to whom, in what ways and why (Polzer
and Hammond, 2008). Invisibility is essentially relational and its impacts depend on the
power relations and interests between thosewho see and thosewho (not) to be seen (ibid.).
Those in power can decide who receives resources, who has the legitimacy to make their
voices heard, or who can be harmed or ignored without consequences.
One can note that, on the one hand, once refugees have arrived in the host country,
their continued labelling and visibility as refugees is facilitated by keeping them in spa-
tially segregated controlled places, in refugee camps or settlements. Governments and
international agencies welcome such settlements because they increase refugee visibility,
which attracts foreign aid and helpswith claims of burden sharing (Kaiser, 2006: 598). Set-
tlements also help overcome problems of logistics and distribution of aid since refugees
are concentrated in a limited space (Bariagaber, 2006). While visibility in camps and
settlements is an advantage for refugees and the government alike, it also encourages a
situation in which control is possible (see discussion on ‘legibility’ above), and it is not
necessarily a route to empowerment (Polzer and Hammond, 2008).
On the other hand, refugees can become increasingly invisible since camps are nor-
mally located in isolated, rural areas at a reasonable distance, e.g. about 50 km, away
from the border to be eligible for UNHCR assistance (Bariagaber, 2006). The main rea-
son cited for choosing remote sites is to ensure the refugees’ own security but these loca-
tions can also function to invisibilise them. Furthermore, it has been argued that when
refugees live in camps, competition with the local community is avoided (Mupedziswa,
1993). Furthermore, settlements decrease the ‘risk’ that refugee populations will be in-
distinguishable from the host population through integration, failing to repatriate when
conditions change in the home country. Such refugee settlements can move from being
invisible to being abandoned in cases where the state or other institutions are not present
or powerful enough to ‘see’ all aspects of social life, or do not consider these aspects
important enough to regulate (Scott, 1998, cited in Polzer and Hammond, 2008). While
such abandonment can reduce state control and oer space for freedom ofmovement and
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claiming de facto citizenship to the refugees, it does not reverse the lack of legal status.
Instead of being an unintended consequence, invisibilty can also be a deliberate attempt
to exclude refugees from certain rights because they do not fit into the legal categories
used to define inclusion (Polzer and Hammond, 2008).
There are important dierences but also similarities between camps and settlements.
In case of an emergency, the first response by the UNHCR is to build a ‘care-and-
maintenance’ camp, oering basic food supplies as well as health care and sometimes
education to the people concerned. This type of camp is visible from the outside. Food
and other supplies are sometimes flown in by an air-lift to the people in need (such as
to the displaced Sudanese in Chad). A refugee camp aims at humanitarian short-term
emergency relief. The shelter or refuge that the displaced people find here often consists
of tents; more permanent structures are normally forbidden (cf. Sanyal, 2011). Some
African governments (e.g. Uganda, Zambia, Ghana and Tanzania) have designed more
permanent options of settlement. Within large rural areas, they have given refugees plots
of land to cultivate in order to reach self-suciency. As acknowledged at UNHCR’s Ex-
Com 2004, a ‘self-reliance strategy’ (SRS) fits into UNHCR’s wider global strategy of
Development Assistance to Refugees (DAR). SRS is defined by the UNHCR as a situa-
tion where refugees are enabled “to gain the economic and social ability to meet essential
needs on a sustainable and dignified basis” (UNHCR, 2005: 3). In the long term, this
option is cheaper than care-and-maintenance camps (Armstrong, 1990). The ‘settlement
option’ has been considered where land was abundantly available and where repatriation
could not be carried out speedily (Payne, 2006). While the main dierence between camp
and settlement is the possibility of self-reliance for refugees in settlements, a lack of hu-
man rights, i.e. freedom of movement and citizenship, is present in both cases.
The danger especially in this variant is that self-reliance is seen as a solution in itself
– refugees, who are continuously subject to restrictions on freedom of movement and
lack citizenship rights, are easily forgotten and invisibilised after reaching that stage. In
this case, invisibilisation relates to the state, which has the power to see but does not
choose to see those who lack the power to demand or be seen (cf. Polzer and Hammond,
2008). Refugees may, however, be complicit in their own invisibilisation (ibid.). Crisp
and Jacobsen (2008)maintain that refugees often create camp-like settlements themselves
before humanitarian actors enter the scene for reasons of safety. Some authors also note
(e.g. Bascom, 1998) that rural refugees do welcome such settlements because they allow
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them to maintain their social practices and hierarchies during exile, and minimise the
sense of loss associated with displacement. Furthermore, refugees may seek invisibility
where they hide and obscure activities that the state prohibits. They may hide in spaces
outside refugee camps or settlements that are normally not accessible to them as non-
citizens. Such was the case with refugees in Dar es Salaam who constantly lived in fear of
being discovered since they did not possess ocial work permits (Sommers, 2000). Here
they used their invisibility as a shield since they lacked legal protection. As Polzer and
Hammond (2008) point out, however, refugees can also subvert or resist their invisibility.
Invisibility can be used by the host state to hide the problem of harbouring popula-
tions on state territory, who are excluded from de jure citizenship. At the same time, the
remote spatiality, lack of support and protection can also function to rule out any inclu-
sion in society in terms of de facto citizenship. However, from the perspective of refugees,
invisibility can also serve to attain inclusion in the nation, both in terms of de jure citi-
zenship as claims-making and de facto citizenship as a process. The way how refugees
have been invisibilised by the government and international actors, and how refugees
have used and/or subverted their invisibility will be further substantiated below and in
the following chapters.
2.2.3 Creation of ethnicities, the exclusion from national belonging and citizenship of refugees in
Tanzania
In contrast to primordialist and instrumentalist accounts of ethnicity, in which ethnic-
ity or tribes are perceived as ‘given’ or as a false consciousness by self-interested elites,
a constructivist approach dominates among scholars of African studies. They see eth-
nic groups as socially constructed imagined communities (Anderson, 1983; Lynch, 2013).
With reference to Tanzania, the Swahili word for ‘tribe’ or ‘ethnic group’, which is still
used today, is kabila. This term signifies a people with the same culture, i.e. the same
ancestral traditions or jadi, the same language and usually some kind of social organisa-
tion.3 This organisation is based on clans (koo, pl.; ukoo, sg.), which in turn builds on
kinship ties. Clans can dier in their taboos or mwiko (Jerman, 1997). These kabila are
labelled according to varying principles: they can denote a general location, an activity
3This was not always the case in pre-colonial times (Jerman 1997).
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or a religious aliation. The dierent kabila are part of an nchi (land), which means a
social space that comprised people with the same ethnic consciousness.
An nchi did not refer to a territory with borders in pre-colonial times. Under colonial-
ism, however, a new state system was introduced, which contrasted with local concep-
tualisations. Under German colonialism (1886-1916) political and administrative bound-
aries acquired significance and ethnicmaps included new ethnic categories (Jerman, 1997:
61). The German colonialists invoked a system with 19 civil districts (for example Tab-
ora), twomilitary districts (Iringa,Mahenge), and three provinces or residencies (Ruanda,
Urundi and Bukoba). A policy of racial discrimination divided the people into ‘whites’
and ‘coloureds’. Coloureds in turn included ‘natives’ and ‘non-natives’. This principle
of ‘divide and rule’ of the people was supposed to ‘maintain order’ in the districts. In-
formation on the dierent tribes residing in the districts was coded in a system citing
various characteristics in a colonial handbook. During this time, Swahili was adopted
as the administrative language. The education policy favoured Swahili at the expense of
the vernaculars (ibid.: 209). Under British colonialism (1920-1961), some functions in
the administrative system changed and some ethnicities were created or redefined (Ilie,
1979).
According to Ilie (1979) Tanzania comprises about 120 tribes or ethnicities. However,
a map of 1958, aiming to show the ethnic situation on the territory in the end of the 1800s,
included only 40 “ethnic groups” (Jerman, 1997). In the Census of 1931, the number of
“tribes” amounted to 137 in total, whereas in the Census of 1948 it dropped to about 120
tribes – a number, which corresponds to the figure cited above. The last census recording
ethnicity was conducted in 1967 after independence.
The number of reported ethnicities on Tanzanian territory has thus fluctuated over
time, which reflects processes of redefining ethnicities by the people themselves. In fact,
in several African countries’ histories, immigrant groups have changed their collective
ethnic identity, based on a re-interpretation of their histories (Lynch, 2013), or after an
emancipatory struggle to belong to the nation (Hahonou, 2011). These kinds of redef-
initions have occurred in Tanzania as well, where people of dierent foreign ethnicities
have become part of the Tanzanian nation (e.g. slaves from Burundi in Chief Mirambo’s
kingdom or a group of Somali refugees (UNHCR, 2010b)).
After independence in 1962, President Nyerere contributed to decreasing the power of
ethnic demarcations by using state administrators to rule locally, instead of chiefs. Forced
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villagisation and the strengthening of Swahili as a common language further amalga-
mated ethnic dierences within the Tanzanian nation (Green, 2011). Nyerere’s party, the
Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), which was born in July 1954, took uhuru
(freedom) from British rule as its primary objective. It stressed national unity at the ex-
pense of African unity (Jerman, 1997: 258).
The created national unity means that some ethnicities might never become part of
the nation since they do not belong to what Wimmer (2006: 336) calls the ethnonational
core in the nation state. As Wimmer (ibid.) maintains, analytical horizons often stop at
what happens within the borders of a national state, obscuring the process of boundary-
making and its exclusionary nature towards ethnic groups who are seen as not belonging
the core4. According to that exclusionary logic, the main ethnic groups from Tanzania’s
neighbouring countries, such as the Kikuyu, Luo and Kalenjin in Kenya, as well as the
Hutu and Tutsi from Rwanda and Burundi are seen as belonging to other nations. These
ethnicities are considered to be alien to the Tanzanian nation, even though the monarchy
of Burundi, for example, used to be part of previous colonial territories, i.e. German
East Africa in the late 19th century (Austen, 1969). Furthermore, having been implicated
in war, these ethnicities are feared due to their “violent subjectivities” (Das et al., 2000).
The ideas of exclusionary ethnicities and of violent subjectivities influence the construc-
tion of Hutu refugees as dierent, even where they have settled in the host country for
generations.
In Tanzania, citizenship can be understood in terms of Yuval-Davis’ (1999) notion of
the ‘multi-layered citizen’, which explains that people’s rights and obligations towards
the state are mediated and often dependent on their membership of an ethnic, racial, reli-
gious or regional collectivity. As Manby (2009: 22) says, belonging and the right (or lack
of it) to make claims on any particular community “go far beyond the strictly legal or
ocial, and operate at local and regional as well as national levels, and in terms of larger
units as well (...) Individuals and communities at the margins of African states may find
these structures far more important – for good or ill – than the state itself”. According to
Mamdani (1996), the creation of ethnicities encouraged a two-tier conception of citizen-
ship that distinguished between national and local citizenship, wherein understandings
of who is really ‘local’ tied the relevant demos with a spatially fixed ethnos. In Tanzania,
4The primary question discussed here is not whether nations are modern inventions (Gellner, 1983) or
rather rest on pre-modern ethnic foundations (Smith, 1981). The focus here lies on the eect of the creation
of a nation state on those who are excluded from it.
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however, possibly due to President Nyerere’s villagisation policies, ethnicities nowadays
are only loosely fixed spatially and belonging to one ethnicity can change through inter-
marriage and populationmovements. While Tanzanian local and national citizenship are
compatible in this context, it is dicult for refugees to achieve multi-layered citizenship
since they lack the local belonging to a Tanzanian ethnic group.
2.2.4 The camp as waiting room: temporal control
Refugees are not only legally and spatially excluded from citizenship, waiting for the out-
come of government decisions can also be seen as a temporal way of suspending the rule
of law applied to citizens. Although time and space should be thought together and not
be separated (Massey, 2005), temporal ways of exerting control deserve a separate men-
tion. Indeed, most refugees find themselves in a waiting situation – either they wait for
an improvement of the situation in the home country or they are waiting for decisions by
the host government on their repatriation, resettlement or local integration, for example
by naturalisation.
Bourdieu (2000: 228) explains the link between time and power in his book Pascalian
Meditations: “it follows that the art of ‘taking one’s time’, of ‘letting time take its time’,
as Cervantes puts it, of making people wait, of delaying without destroying hope, of ad-
journing without totally disappointing, which would have the eect of killing the waiting
itself, is an integral part of the exercise of power”. Bourdieu (ibid.) continues, “[W]aiting
is one of the privileged ways of experiencing the eect of power, and the link between
time and power – and one would need to catalogue, and analyse, all the behaviours asso-
ciated with the exercise of power over other people’s time both on the side of the powerful
(adjourning, deferring, delaying, raising false hopes, or, conversely, rushing, taking by sur-
prise) and on the side of the ‘patient’ as they say in the medical universe, one of the sites
par excellence of anxious, powerless waiting.” While Bourdieu is referring to dierent
actors in power, such as teachers, professors, doctors and government ocials, waiting
in a protracted refugee situation is the eect of the state controlling the refugees’ time.
As Bourdieu (2000) suggests, both the practices of delaying and adjourning on the side
of the powerful, i.e. the central state and international organisations, as well as the eects
of waiting on refugees should be analysed. How and why does the state make refugees
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wait? I argue that bureaucracy can have unintended side eects (cf. Ferguson, 1990) and
that the refugees’ plight might simply not be a priority of the state – leading to slow
decision-making. Furthermore, sometimes state actors make decisions ‘too fast’, which
are publically announced and later questioned by other state (and non-state) actors. Dis-
agreements between dierent powerful actors as well as changing political and economic
priorities may thus lead to a situation of waiting on the side of the subjects. Finally, how-
ever, especially considering the reluctance of granting citizenship, the state is intentionally
adjourning decisions of integration. It is this adjourning, which leads to the impasse of
the many protracted refugee situations today. In contrast to Turner’s (2010: 18) concep-
tion of the camp as “waiting room” (see above), refugees are seen here not as waiting for
normality in the home country (i.e. Burundi). They are waiting for the future as citizens,
a future most probably realised in the host state.
2.3 Pragmatics of Belonging and Waiting within and beyond the Camp as a `Space of
Agency'
Despite refugees’ exclusion from ‘ordinary’ spatialities, temporalities and lack of citizen-
ship, they are not really stripped of all agency. While Turner (2010) maintains that camps
produce ‘bare life’ and constitute spaces of exception, he argues that refugees themselves
manoeuvred in this temporary space, and that they created pockets of sovereign power
outside the reach of the state or international organisations. They were not paralysed
by the various attempts of control made. The UNHCR, he maintains, never succeeded
in creating apolitical beings and history and politics would “strike back” (Turner, 2010:
9). Furthermore, he argues that the breakdown of class, gender and age hierarchies pro-
duced a liberating space for some groups and an ‘amoral’ space of opportunities; and that
they were constantly working on constructing their own political subjectivities (ibid.).
Ramadan similarly (2013: 71) argues, “far from producing silenced and disempowered
homines sacri in Agamben’s terms, the camps have proven to be active arenas of agency
in which refugees organise and resist their marginalisation, in military and far more mun-
dane ways”.
An agent, as consistent with practice theory, is here seen as a body/mind, who “carries”
and “carries out” social practices, which make up the social world (Reckwitz, 2002: 252).
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Furthermore, an agent is seen as a personwho can define his or her life choices and pursue
their own goals, even in the face of opposition from others (Kabeer, 1999). In order to
achieve these goals, the person will also need the resources necessary to carry them out.
Agency can be unconscious or intentional, in which the agent has direct control over her
or his behaviour. Agency can refer to decision-making but also to negotiation, deception,
subversion and resistance; and it can be individual or collective (ibid.; Scott, 1985). As
will be shown in the empirical analysis in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, agency on the side of
refugees can be in resistance to the state but it can also work with the state either overtly
or in a hidden way. This conception of agency is thus multifaceted. Another form of
agency is “conviviality” following Nyamnjoh (2007: 73), who uses the term as denoting
a spirit of collaboration and togetherness between the state and individuals or particular
groups. As will be shown in Chapter 5, in defiance of the various ocially enforced
ways of control, a degree of conviviality between refugees, local Tanzanians and some
government ocials has been playing an important role in the negotiation of life in the
settlement.
In the following it will be explained in which ways refugees can act as agents to cre-
ate a pragmatic sense of belonging by overcoming spatial restrictions, by familiarising
themselves with their surroundings and interaction with hosts, and by claiming de facto
citizenship rights. Refugees have also been agents in terms of transforming the space
around them to overcome the ‘suspension’ in time that marks the idea of a refugee camp.
2.3.1 `Pragmatics of belonging' and claiming de facto citizenship
While reaching self-suciency, refugees can attain a high degree of integration in the
host region in part by eroding the governments’ provisions of care and control. The host
population, i.e. the citizens living around the settlement, are usually not isolated from it
but have a lively interaction (cf. Whitaker, 1999; Landau, 2001). Integration occurs from
both sides: citizens from adjacent places come to settlements and refugees go to places
outside.
Malkki (1995a: 4) explains that displacement and deterritorialisation in the contem-
porary order of nations presents at least two logical possibilities. The first is that the
liminal collectivity of refugees tries to make itself “fit” into the overarching national or-
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der, by becoming a “nation” like others. One of their main concerns was purity of their
nation. Refugees in Mishamo refugee camp in the 1980s heroised a single collective iden-
tity, a Hutu nation in Tanzania. This can also imply a diasporic sense of belonging to the
nation of the country of origin. The second possibility entailed an insistence on another
order to liminality, a refusal to be fixed within one and only one national or categorical
identity, with only one historical trajectory. Malkki (ibid.: 153) calls this subversion of
identification the “pragmatics of identity”. Among the town refugees in Kigoma, the abil-
ity to “lose” one’s identity and to move through categories was for many a form of social
freedom and even security.
However, there is at least one other, third, possibility: a claims-making on the state
and to membership of the host nation as a form of agency, which I call the ‘pragmatics
of belonging’. This does not constitute a subversion or refusal of identity but in fact
identification or an emerging feeling of belonging to the host community and/or the host
nation. Belonging in this sense is not a noun-verb, an end-state of group aliation but
an unfinished process, which changes over time.
I argue that this feeling of belonging comes about by at least three dimensions: a rela-
tional dimension of interacting with the host community, i.e. by gaining a degree of trust
(Calhoun, 2003) and by being recognised, as maintained below; a second dimension of
feeling at home, including the main notions of familiarity, haven and heaven (Duyvendak,
2011); and a third dimension of a pragmatic and eclectic form of claiming de facto citizen-
ship rights on an individual basis according to arising needs and life choices. However,
the regularity and scale at which individual refugees relate to their hosts, feel at home and
claim rights creates a collective phenomenon of belonging.
All three dimensions imply a degree of agency on the part of the refugees since they have
chosen to relate to Tanzanians, to familiarise themselves with the surroundings through
their daily activities and through claiming citizenship rights. As pointed out in the con-
text of women’s empowerment (Kabeer, 1999) agency does not carry meaning unless the
people in question could actually choose, i.e. they had an alternative. Indeed refugees
could have chosen to remain linked to the political field in Burundi (Turner, 2010) and
to remain a separate Hutu nation (Malkki, 1995a). However, they chose to relate to
Tanzanians and to familiarise themselves with their surroundings e.g. by trading even
far outside of the settlement, which happened at their own initiative and in resistance to
government control. While not being hyperpoliticised as in Lukole (Turner, 2010), Ul-
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yankulu’s refugees’ claiming of de facto citizenship is a political act (cf. see also “acts of
citizenship”, Isin and Nielson, 2008).
Gaining a sense of belonging through the aforementioned dimensions is “pragmatic”
in the sense of pragmatism developed by John Dewey (1929) – belonging is a practical
achievement, it is useful for the future of the refugees in an instrumental way in order
to reduce uncertainty and to reduce the social distance to the host society, which can
help to claim rights normally reserved for citizens. This sort of ‘pragmatics of belonging’
is likely to develop where refugees are in protracted exile, since they assume that their
future will be spent in the host country. While not able to control their legal status as
de jure non-citizens, they do not accept this unfortunate ‘certainty’ and rather exercise
future thinking through a sense of belonging in order to maintain hope. This strategy
is reminiscent of what Whyte (1997) calls the “pragmatics of uncertainty” to respond
to adversity broadly defined (death, disease such as HIV/AIDS, infertility, matrimonial
problems).
Pragmatics of belonging: the relational dimension
The first dimension of the pragmatics of belonging is a relational one. Refugees develop
a sense of belonging to the host community and nation by interacting with citizens, i.e.
by gaining a degree of trust (Calhoun, 2003) and by being recognised. Relating to the
host community is also an important step towards become de facto citizens. According
to Sassen (2003), there are two types of citizens, which do not have full citizenship: those
who are ‘unauthorised yet recognised’ and those who are ‘authorised yet not recognised’.
This implies that citizenship also means recognition not only by the state but by other
citizens belonging to the nation-state or community in question. Refugees are not legally
authorised to be citizens but they can be recognised as such by the host community. As
mentioned above, refugees usually are not entirely isolated from the host community. This
is because the state is often not able to control refugees’ agency in the space as envisaged.
In the case of Ulyankulu settlement, for example, the state lost some control over plan-
ning of the settlement when an increasing number of refugees came to settle on the edges
of the grid structure, creating an uncontrollable “sprawl” (Armstrong, 1990: 199) and
thereby also possibly more interaction with the local population. In Guinea, for exam-
ple, most refugees have lived in small scale and self-reliant settlements close to the border
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to Liberia and Sierra Leone, pursuing farming and cooperating with the host population
(Fielden, 2008: 8). In Ghana, some camps are near to Ghanaian villages and are not
isolated from rural Ghanaian life, as is often assumed of rural settlements (Dick, 2002).
Liberian refugees from Buduburam Camp, for example, have spread beyond the camp
to live in the adjacent village and surrounding areas in Gomoa District. Refugees have
generally lived peacefully alongside with Ghanaian villagers, renting houses from them,
trading with them, intermarrying and socialising together. They have sold to one another
at the market established by the refugees located at the camp entrance. Ghanaians and
Liberians have set up businesses in and around the camp, promoting economic growth in
what was once a quiet rural village (Dick, 2002). Some refugees have purchased or leased
land from Ghanaian people, even though it is not clear whether they are entitled to do
so. In Uganda, while Sudanese refugees who arrived in the country in 1983 have lived in
a succession of transit camps, settlements and non-settlement locations, later Ugandan
settlements5 have also been integrated into rural society since the late 1990s – they are
ruled by local government structures instead of the UNHCR (Kaiser, 2006). The govern-
ment has pursued a self-reliance strategy (SRS), even though that has not been completely
successful. Furthermore, Sudanese refugees who started crossing the border to Uganda
in August 1993 due to a war between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudanese
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) lived in proximity with their host population around
Ikafe and later Imvepi settlement, Rhino camp and others. Oxfam ocer Payne notes
(2006: 110) that people in the immediate environment benefited from markets within the
settlement, and the trading links between the two communities were vital to the spon-
taneous and informal integration. A relational dimension can also come about when
camps become spaces of hospitality, in which refugees become hosts themselves to inter-
nally displaced citizens. As mentioned before, this happened with Lebanese citizens who
were hosted in Palestinian refugee camps (Ramadan, 2008). Lastly, it needs to be men-
tioned that the relational sense of belonging can also imply government ocials. Where
local government ocials live their everyday life in a refugee settlement or in their vicinity,
it is likely that they develop a form of ‘conviviality’ (Nyamnjoh, 2007, see above) together
with the refugees and citizens over time. By such forms of conviviality, the border between
refugees and citizens can become blurred.
5Uganda hosted large numbers of Sudanese and Zairian refugees in the 1960s, hosted Sudanese again
in the 1980s and Congolese as well as Sudanese refugees in the 1990s. Ugandans from the northern border
region have themselves also been refugees – many fled to the West Nile in the 1970s (Kaiser 2006, Payne
2006).
49
2.3 pragmatics of belonging and waiting — the camp as a ‘space of agency’
Pragmatics of belonging: feeling at home
As a second dimension of the pragmatics of belonging, refugees can develop a sense of
home in the settlement and the nation especially in protracted refugee situations. This,
according to Hammond (2004: 83), could be called “emplacement” – a process of nam-
ing and particularising space but also of emplacing the environment in such a way that
it feels like a home. With relation to returnee refugees in Ethiopia, Hammond (ibid.)
explains that this involved the interworking of place, identity, and practice in a way to
generate a relationship of belonging between person and place. This is an on-going pro-
cess of gradually expanding the places that people consider to be familiar and safe from
a space that was once unfamiliar and dangerous. The dangerous was transformed by use,
visitation and interaction instead of mere perception. Emplacement can be dierentially
experienced by various groups of society; it can be individual but also a shared, social
experience (ibid.).
The notion of ‘emplacement’ builds on an understanding of home that is subjective
and hybrid. Whereas particularists believe that home means an attachment to a partic-
ular material place, universalists describe people as being “homeless” in today’s mobile
world; people become increasingly disembedded from local places (Duyvendak, 2011: 8-
10). However, both of these positions agree on the importance of home and only disagree
over what kind of places can be ‘home’: whether these places are private or public, par-
ticular or generic (ibid.: 28). The latter position allows for home to be mobile: instead of
emphasising roots, it accentuates ‘routes’. It shows that some people literally “dwell in
travel”, which invokes a notion of deterritorialised geographies of home. Home does not
need to be material, it can also be virtual or a sense of belonging to a community, such as
the Muslim umma (ibid.: 36). Overall, Duyvendak (2011: 38) maintains that among nu-
merous works on the concept of ‘home’, three aspects are recurring: home as familiarity,
home as a safe haven and home as a “heaven”, a place where one feels publicly free and
independent. However, some scholars disagree: feminists such as Betty Friedan, for ex-
ample, have shown that home can also be hell, instead of a haven (cf. Blunt and Dowling,
2006: 15). Home therefore has a multiplicity of meanings for dierent people. To “feel at
home” is a plural and layered sentiment that can be attached to the individual household,
the workplace, the neighbourhood and the nation (Duyvendak, 2011: 38). For refugees,
‘home’ can thus be multi-scalar, referring to the domestic sphere, the refugee and host
communities in the settlement, or even the host nation. It can also refer to their country
50
2.3 pragmatics of belonging and waiting — the camp as a ‘space of agency’
of origin, their host country or both countries. Some first generation refugees may only
consider a specific region, city or village within their country of origin as their ‘home’
(Mercer et al., 2008).
According to the aforementioned importance of familiarity, refugees can make their
new surroundings ‘home’ through their everyday lives over time. Since ancestors’ graves
are considered of utmost importance for the feeling of belonging in Africa (Geschiere,
2009), a sense of familiarity may be increased if ancestors are buried in the host country.
For second generation refugees, ‘home’ may naturally be in the host country as they do
not have another point of reference. For them, a sense of familiarity and safety is not built
over time in exile; it is what they learn from their childhood onwards – just like citizens
of the host country.
Refugees’ feelings of home may also hinge on the other two aspects mentioned above,
i.e. of being safe and at ease both in private (home as a haven) and in public (home as
a heaven). In terms of safety, newly acquired feelings of ‘home’ in the host country can
be un-settled when violence occurs there. Feelings of safety may change considerably de-
pending on events and the situation in the settlement and the host country. To illustrate
a few examples of insecurity that was either caused by or inflicted on refugees in their
host countries, during the past 30 years, Saharawi refugees, who have lived in refugee
camps in Algeria since the state Western Sahara was annexed by Morocco in 1975, have
waged armed resistance against Moroccan rule with the support of the Algerian govern-
ment. The Saharawi military, the Polisario Front, have used the camps at Tindouf as a
base from which to recruit its soldiers (Milner and Loescher, 2005; UNHCR, 2000). In
Guinea, where most refugees from Liberia and Sierra Leone had lived in small camps as
self-sucient farmers near the border since the early 1990s, the refugee populations got
entangled in a sub-regional conflict between factions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea
in the late 1990s. Several cross-border attacks on refugee settlements occurred (Milner
and Loescher, 2005). In Tanzania, after the Burundian government alleged that rebels
were based in Tanzanian refugee camps, relations between Burundi and Tanzania be-
came increasingly strained. In January 2002 three Tanzanian villages close to the border
were shelled by the Burundian army (Milner and Loescher, 2005). In Ghana, national se-
curity concerns were raised when riots broke out at a camp of Liberian refugees inMarch
2001. Police were deployed to stop the violence (Dick, 2002). Refugees’ own security was
threatened when in the 1990s, Somali refugees in camps in the far Northeast of Kenya
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have been attacked by bandits called shiftas, who searched for food and money. Many
refugee women fell victim to rape while looking for firewood outside the camps (Milner
and Loescher, 2005).
The feeling of being at ease in public (home as heaven)may also change according to the
relationship between refugees and government ocials; and according to the freedoms of
self-governance that may be granted to refugees in dierent settings. As could be seen in
Section 2.2.1, although refugees are normally not allowed to be involved in politics in the
host country, they are often permitted to assume varying degrees of responsibility within
camps and settlements. It is argued that considering these various aspects of feeling at
home leads to a more realistic understanding than seeing it as an “essentialised point on
the map” (Malkki, 1995b: 509). The notion of ‘home country’ is therefore a misnomer,
and is replaced by ‘country of origin’ in this analysis.
Pragmatics of belonging: de facto citizenship and claims-making
As a third dimension of the pragmatics of belonging, refugees can become citizens unof-
ficially by claiming citizenship rights despite not holding ocial citizenship certificates
and not being included in de jure citizenship. This is another important step towards be-
coming de facto citizens. With reference to the Tanzanian case, the state contributes to
the process of citizen-making by schooling them according to the Tanzanian curriculum
and by taxing them. However, refugees also sometimes claim certain rights themselves
that are normally reserved to de jure citizens. As will be seen in Chapter 6, in addition to
reaching de facto integration into the host society in economic and socio-cultural ways
(Fielden, 2008), refugees can also informally claim de jure citizenship rights, such as a
right to freedom of movement, a right to work and a right to participate in politics on an
individual and, to some extent, on a collective basis.
In some sense this dimension of the pragmatics of belonging is paradoxical since
refugees claim rights in the host state in order to take part in formal government insti-
tutions (such as schooling/higher education/work) while at the same time subverting the
given legal provisions pertaining to refugees. In order to take part in these ocial insti-
tutions, they are pragmatic and decide to be invisible as refugees by ‘hiding’ their status.
The situation is paradoxical since the state uses its resources to school refugees in the
camps but then does not allow them to take part in further education or in taking part
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in the work force. While already feeling a sense of belonging to the host nation, refugees
therefore have to resort to ‘hiding’ strategies, i.e. ‘hiding’ from the exceptional refugee
laws but not from their fellow citizens who have in many cases recognised them as fellow
citizens already. Hiding is often preferred to organising on a collective basis and calling
for collective/group rights since refugees do not want to risk losing their ‘right to stay’ in
the settlement and the host country. Where refugees form a sense of belonging in the host
state and claim citizenship rights, they want to be accepted as being part of them in order
to ultimately become de jure citizens instead of subverting the given structures.
Refugees’ ‘pragmatics of belonging’ is significant to acknowledge since by relating to
the host society (first dimension), developing a sense of home (second dimension), and
claiming rights that are normally reserved for de jure citizens (third dimension), refugees
indeed become de facto citizens of the host state. This understanding embeds refugees’
identification in interaction with other citizens that spatially extends beyond the camp.
The first two dimensions of the pragmatics of belonging are mostly enacted locally and
encourage integration into the host community. The third dimension is more related to
rights that are sanctioned by the state and thus it is more directed towards belonging
to the wider nation. However, depending on where refugees enact the first dimension
and with whom (for example interacting with citizens outside of the settlements), that
dimension can also stir a national sense of belonging.
2.3.2 `Pragmatics of waiting': waiting as productive space
In various bodies of literature, waiting has been discussed with respect to social and
economic uncertainties of young, unemployed people in India (Jereys, 2010), Ethiopia
(Ralph, 2008) and in comparative perspective (Cole and Durham, 2008). The eects of
waiting in closed spaces have been analysed by Auyero (2011), analysing experiences of
waiting in the main welfare oce of Buenos Aires, Argentina, and by Griths (2013),
looking at waiting experiences of asylum seekers and immigration detainees in Immigra-
tion Removal Centres (IRCs) in the UK. In most of these accounts, waiting has a negative
connotation. Auyero (2011) shows how welfare clients become not citizens but patients
of the state, using Bourdieu’s metaphor of the medical sphere. These people are waiting
because they believe they have no other option than to wait for welfare benefits. Jef-
freys (2010) analyses the waiting experiences of young men frommiddle-class and poorer
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backgrounds in Utar Pradesh, India, highlighting their temporal and spatial anxieties.
He discusses their feelings of temporal rupture, disruption and anxiety linked to unem-
ployment. Griths (2013) adds dierent speeds of time to her analysis, in which asylum
seekers and immigration detainees experience their situation: frenzied time, deceleration
and suspended time. Most participants of her study viewed time dierently in their own
waiting situation than for others: one year could feel like many years to those in a waiting
situation. Griths reaches the conclusion that people in IRCs in the UK suer a dual un-
certainty of time: simultaneous fear of sudden change and never-ending stasis. For those
experiencing a dual uncertainty of time, it becomes dicult to see time as a resource.
However, Griths (ibid.) also suggests that waiting can be a productive space
(Schweizer, 2008), an experience filled with substitute meanings and a meaningful experi-
ence in itself (Gasparini, 1995). Furthermore, temporal change is integral to expectations
of the future and the lived present (Game, 1997) and certain events may be positive breaks
from the past (Griths, 2013). In the case of refugees in rural settlements, how is wait-
ing experienced? I argue that refugees do not only develop a ‘pragmatics of belonging’
but also a ‘pragmatics of waiting’: refugees experience waiting in various ways, includ-
ing as a time to be creative through their own agency. Being able to identify with the
host nation over time, refugees are waiting in pragmatic ways to build their future in the
settlement, for example by resisting the government’s prohibitions and building new per-
manent structures (cf. Ramadan, 2013; Sanyal, 2013), in order to fight for their ‘right to
stay’. By feeling at home in the host nation, some refugees may also deal with the time
of waiting by moving outside of camps or settlements and establish themselves there in a
pre-emptive attempt to forgo decisions by the government, for example to send them back
to their countries of origin. These acts of waiting are individual ones but, as will be seen
in Chapter 6, Section 6.4.3, aspects such as solidarity and faith can play a role in form-
ing a collective waiting experience. Besides, depending on the communication between
central government/ international organisations and local government/local aid workers,
employees on the ground may also be aected by waiting for central governments’ deci-
sions. If they are not immediately informed themselves, they may become less ecient or
credible. Furthermore, supranational actors or donors may as well shift their emphasis
depending on how long decisions are taking.
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2.3.3 The next generation
By looking at the first, second and third generations of refugees, this analysis does not
primarily attempt to scrutinise how these make sense of their past or of the conflict in
Burundi, as Malkki (1995a) and Turner’s (2010) analyses have done. The aim is rather to
disentangle how these refugees negotiate their present belonging in their everyday lives
through their own agency as citizens-to-be of the state of Tanzania. In other words, by
developing a sense of belonging to the host nation through their own agency, de facto
citizenship is claimed and lived. Furthermore, this study interprets the influence of narra-
tives pronounced by state ocials and international organisations and how these relate
to the refugees’ sense of belonging and agency.
The previously analysed contradictions between politicisation in relation to Burundi
and the apolitical stance in Tanzania discussed by Turner (2010) do not necessarily hold
true for refugee settlements in Tanzania today. In Lukole camp, the politicisation relates
to the rift between people from various places of origin in Burundi, who also belong to
dierent social classes (political elite versus farmers) and have dierent party aliations.
Twomain conflictual groups lived in the camps Lukole A and B respectively. In Ulyankulu
allegedly there were also divisions between people from various regions of origin in Bu-
rundi but these were much less pronounced or visible. Furthermore, in contrast to other
settlements, Ulyankulu has been referred to as a place for entrepreneurs before (Turner,
2010: 35), who liked to trade with people in Tabora town from an early stage of living
in exile onwards. Acknowledging these dierences between the settlements/camps at the
outset, however, the point remains that refugees in Ulyankulu are much more directed
towards the host country than towards their Burundian places of origin.
Developing a ‘pragmatics of belonging’ can entail a temporal element: there may be a
shift from the first possibility of belonging elaborated by Malkki (1995a, see above), of
building a separate and ‘pure’ (Hutu) nation in a refugee camp, towards the third pos-
sibility of an emergent ‘pragmatics of belonging’ over time as the refugees’ stay in exile
becomes increasingly protracted and subsequent generations become more and more in-
tegrated. The main dierence between Ulyankulu and Lukole and other previously anal-
ysed camps/settlements, it is argued here, has to do with the fact that most refugees in
Ulyankulu today are in the second generation; almost 80% of them were born in Tanza-
nia. In contrast to other analyses focusing on howmigrants and refugees form a diaspora
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longing for ‘home’, a notion which refers to their country of origin or the places of origin
in their home country (Brah, 1996; Van Hear, 2006; Cohen, 2008; Mercer et al., 2008;
further elabored in Section 6.2.3), it is thus argued here that refugees in their second gen-
eration are more directed towards the place where they are born and raised in a process
of “emplacement” (Hammond, 2004).
Refugees, especially those in the second generation, have created their new lives as de
facto citizens, in which political life is related to life within the camp as well as to the
outside in Tanzania. Life in the camp as part of the host country has long become their
‘normality’. While hierarchies of class and gender have formed, refugees still live in a
space of opportunities and continue to construct their subjectivities (cf. Turner, 2010).
As will be illustrated empirically in Chapter 6, having lived in exile for a long time by
now, refugees have developed a ‘pragmatics of belonging’ to the host nation instead of
continuing to create mythico-histories of their country of origin. By assimilating and
shaping the spatiality more and more within and to its rural surroundings, especially
the new generation has actively engaged in creating this ‘pragmatics of belonging’ and
a ‘pragmatics of waiting’ in a ‘space of agency’ as de facto citizens until they possibly
become de jure citizens of their host state as well.
2.4 Conclusion
Theoretical approaches to refugee camps include Agamben’s notion of the “state of ex-
ception” or rather his “space of exception”, which is here seen as a useful starting point
to analyse refugee camps. It is useful since it shows that the suspension of legal rights can
have a detrimental eect on people’s lives and that it is a paradoxical construct. How-
ever, there are important critiques of this theory, which cannot be overlooked. First, most
African states are not in a permanent “state of exception” as Germany was at the time
of harbouring concentration camps. Second, refugee camps aim to support their inhab-
itants instead of extinguishing them and thus cannot reach the extreme form of treating
people as “bare life”. Third, refugee camps are not merely a creation of the sovereign
nation state but are influenced by international policy (cf. Gregory, 2006), and fourth,
Agamben does not take into account the possibility and importance of political struggle
and resistance within the camps (ibid.).
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Further previous conceptualisations include Ramadan’s idea of a “security island” and
a “space of hospitality”, Malkki’s (1995a) notion of a space of identity formation and
preservation, Turner’s (2010: 18) approach as a site of political struggle linked to the
country of origin, and his idea of a “waiting room”, which is a space in suspension be-
tween a past and a future in the country of origin.
These previous conceptualisations are not adequate to analyse the present case of the
Burundian refugees in Tanzania for simple and yet crucial reasons. Ulyankulu is not a
security island in Ramadan’s sense since it is not ruled by a faction from the refugees’
country of origin, as was the case with the PLO in Lebanese camps. While it is important
to consider Ulyankulu as a “space of hospitality”, this notion only refers to a relational
space between refugees and hosts, without considering aspirations of refugees and strug-
gles among them.
Both Malkki’s and Turner’s approaches are highly relevant but gauged against the re-
ality in Ulyankulu today they overemphasise relations to the country of origin and under-
state involvement in the political field of the host country. The latter is crucial for this
analysis. The dierence between Malkki and Turner’s approaches and this thesis is in
part related to the prolonged time in exile, which refugees in Ulyankulu have stayed in
Tanzania, and to the fact that most refugees are now in the second generation.
A theoretical framework for understanding refugee camps in a protracted situation, it
is argued here, needs to take account of the ways refugee camps are controlled spaces that
function to exclude refugees from de jure citizenship, and the ways in which refugees have
questioned this control through agency in order to develop a pragmatic sense of belonging
and become de facto citizens. It is argued that at the outset of setting up refugee camps,
the host state together with international organisations aim at controlling refugees by
creating a “legible” (Scott, 1999) ‘space of control’, which is understandable to outsiders.
This space functions to exclude refugees from formal citizenship rights but also presents
an obstacle to becoming de facto citizens unocially. This exclusion, it is argued, is
justified by a belief in exclusionary notions of belonging, which are fixed to a home in
one place. States have been hesitant to grant de jure citizenship to refugees also since
they fear a security threat and an erosion of their control. Over time, the exclusion from
citizenship is prolonged by invisibilising and sometimes even abandoning the spaces of
control that were initially created. Such abandonment does not reverse the lack of legal
status. Section 2.2.3 describes how ethnic and national belonging has changed over time
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in Tanzania. It shows that the country has moved towards notions of nationality that
operates at the expense of pan-African solidarity and excludes ethnicities of neighbouring
countries. This development underscores the prolonged exclusion of Burundian refugees
fromTanzanian citizenship. Finally, the reluctance and adjourning of granting citizenship
functions as a temporal control by the state over refugees.
However, while these theoretical ideas are generalisable tomost refugee camps inAfrica,
it needs to be considered how refugees have dealt with the exclusion from de jure through
various types of control. It is suggested here, drawing on literature on agency (Scott, 1985;
Kabeer, 1999; Reckwitz, 2002; Nyamnjoh, 2007; as discussed above), citizenship and be-
longing, that camps can also be ‘spaces of agency’ where refugees develop a ‘pragmatics
of belonging’ and a ‘pragmatics of waiting’, which help them attain de facto citizenship.
Citizenship, it is argued, should be seen both as a process, by which a form of de facto
citizenship (Sassen, 2003) can be achieved, and as a status, also referred to as de jure
citizenship (Marshall, 1983 [1950]) here. It implies processes of self-making and being
made by state institutions and by living in society (Ong, 1996). Despite their status as
non-citizens in the host country, refugees are not necessarily apolitical beings. Instead of
forming their own nation or denying any allegiances (as in Malkki’s “pragmatics of iden-
tity”; 1995a: 153), refugees are directed towards the host state and develop a ‘pragmatics
of belonging’ in order to reduce uncertainty for their future lives. This pragmatics en-
tails first, integrating with their Tanzanian hosts, second, familiarising themselves with
their environment and developing a feeling of being at home, and third, claiming rights
normally reserved to de jure citizens. In order to do so, refugees often need to transgress
camp spaces for varying purposes and ‘hide’ while outside the settlements. In this pro-
cess they can become de facto citizens. Finally, they are not ultimately determined by the
suspension in time imposed but act as if their situation was permanent – an approach I
term the ‘pragmatics of waiting’. The pragmatic way of every-day living, belonging and
waiting may be important steps towards having de jure citizenship confirmed on paper.
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METHODOLOGY
“The positivist dream of an epistemological state of perfect innocence has the consequence of
masking the fact that the crucial dierence is not between a science which eects a construction
and one which does not, but between a science which does this without knowing it and one
which, being aware of this, attempts to discover and master as completely as possible the nature
of its inevitable acts of construction and the equally inevitable eects which they produce.”
— Bourdieu (1996)
In order to find out about the protracted situation of the Burundian refugees in Tan-
zania, the point of view of the government, of international organisations and the devel-
opment of a sense of belonging and citizenship on the part of the refugees, a qualitative
study in Tanzania using methods common to ethnographies was devised. The primary
field site was Ulyankulu refugee settlement in Tabora region. The study includes two
main research methods: participant observation and semi-structured interviews. While
participant observation shed light on the general atmosphere and collective experiences
in public places in Ulyankulu settlement, interviews illustrated more detailed individual
trajectories and opinions.
All in all, field research took place in three main phases from the end of January 2012
to mid-December 2012: first, living on Zanzibar for two months served the purpose of
following an intensive Swahili language course at a renowned university; second, staying
in Dar es Salaam for three and a half months allowed me to deal with obtaining research
permits and to gain contextual information from key informants; and third, conduct-
ing ethnographic research in and around Ulyankulu settlement in Tabora region for five
months (April, June, July, August, November), which constituted the core of the research.
In the first section of this chapter the research design is described. It spells out the back-
ground of ethnographic techniques that are used in this study, it defines what is meant by
the ‘field’, and it explains how my research questions were altered due to the changing
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policy context once I arrived in the field. The second section deals with aspects of data
collection: first, it discusses the choices made concerning participant observation in pub-
lic places in Ulyankulu settlement. Second, it describes the approach taken towards con-
ducting interviews, including access, sampling, selection criteria, and interview guides.
It further clarifies the choice and recruitment of research assistants, the use of secondary
data, and finally deliberates challenges, including translation, and recording.
The third section of this chapter deals with the dierent stages of data analysis, the
methods used to interpret the data and challenges. The fourth section gives a more de-
tailed account of research proceedings during the preparatory stages in London andZanz-
ibar, in Dar es Salaam including access to interview partners and the wider importance
of my stay there; and finally gives an account of basic demographics and spatiality of
Ulyankulu settlement. The last section deals with questions of ethics including a criti-
cal discussion of researcher reflexivity, danger in the field, and responsibilities towards
participants.
3.1 Research Design
The research design of this thesis aims at answering the research questions that are out-
lined inChapter I. In order to increase and complement the existing knowledge base about
the creation of, the dealing with, and the solutions proposed to protracted refugee situ-
ations, it was vital to follow a holistic approach, in which various actors involved were
interviewed and interactions in various public places were observed. This design used
qualitative methods, which are inherent in ethnographic studies, and served to develop
new theories about such situations in an inductive approach.
In qualitative research usingmethods common to ethnographic studies the researcher is
not an uninvolved observer but gains insights through first-hand experience with research
subjects or informants in action (Murchison, 2010: 4). Interactionswith these informants
can take forms of conversations, interviews, shared rituals and experiences. The research
takes place outside of a controlled environment and therefore needs to deal with the com-
plexity of the lives of the informants (ibid.). Ethnography as such was developed at the
end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century by anthropologists. Methods
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common to ethnography are now, however, used in a number of disciplines, including
sociology and human geography.
Ethnography has been used to oer implicit or explicit critiques of dominant systems
and understandings. Nevertheless, much of early ethnography supported existing sys-
tems and structures of power in a context of Western imperialism; and most of this re-
search was stereotypically androcentric, i.e. conducted by white males, who studied ‘the
other’. Such ethnographies, by being fascinated with cultural dierence, drew on an un-
derstanding of nationalism and cultural identity that presupposed essential characteris-
tics of groups of people (Murchison, 2010). Furthermore, these ethnographies usually did
not include a discussion of the methods used within the ethnography. Later in the 20th
century a sustained critique evolved of the early ethnographies. This included a question-
ing of claims to objectivity and discussions of ethical obligations towards participants.
Furthermore, since cultural and social phenomena are not static but are constantly sub-
ject to change (Murchison, 2010: 10), the need was pronounced to study the history and
change of these phenomena.
While this study follows the approach of gaining first-hand experience in a foreign
country, it aims to unravel the complexity of and between the cultural groups studied.
Thereby, it aims to prevent an essentialised picture of the informants. Although later
ethnographies questioned the exclusive focus on relatively isolated, small-scale, rural com-
munities, this study maintains a more classical ethnographic route in the sense that it is
taking a rural setting in Africa as its primary locality. This has the advantage of bringing
the local and specific of the field site into focus. Furthermore, it is based on a lengthy stay
in the field (albeit not as long as in classical ethnographies) – close to one year in Tanza-
nia and five months in the primary location of ethnographic research. The importance
of learning and working in local languages is therefore recognised.
In this study, ‘the field’ implies the primary field site, Ulyankulu settlement; but also in-
volves preparatory stages in Zanzibar, where a language course was followed, and in Dar
es Salaam, where interviews with government ocials and organisations was conducted.
In Dar es Salaam, the research strategy mainly included interviews, which served to con-
textualise and interpret findings gained through methods common to ethnographies in
Ulyankulu. Therefore, the ethnographic notes taken in Ulyankulu were not taken in iso-
lation or without prior experiences in Tanzania, the wider ‘field’. The research design is
thusmulti-sited, even thoughmethods varied in the dierent sites. On thewhole, research
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includes the methods of participant observation, interviews as well as finding secondary
material such as maps and charts, which are all key elements in qualitative research us-
ing ethnographic techniques. Interviews promise to elicit historical recollections and per-
sonal perspectives, whereas participant observation allows focussing on communal events
and oers an experiential dimension (Murchison, 2010: 40).
When I started the field research in Tanzania, the naturalisation and relocation policy
initiative had not yet been completed and qualitative research would serve to observe
a part of that process. As it turned out, no concrete decision was made until September
2012with respect to the 1972 caseload – the policywas under review by the parliament. In
September 2012, after more than half of my research time had passed, Tanzania’s Deputy
Minister of Home Aairs, Pereira Silima, suggested that the decision to grant citizenship
to Burundian refugees may be reversed (Milner, 2013). Although a definite decision had
not been made, the planned relocation did not take place as anticipated.
Initially I was interested in following the relocation process or, if already completed,
to interview those refugees who had relocated and had already obtained citizenship cer-
tificates about their experience with the process of becoming citizens and their future
aspirations. However, only 749 individuals had obtained these certificates and since the
policy was put on hold in June 2011 (Milner, 2013), I was cautioned by forced migration
researchers in Dar es Salaam that it would be too sensitive to interview the naturalised
refugees. They explained that interviewing these individuals and publicising details about
their lives would make them vulnerable to resentment by other refugees in the settlements
who did not have the privilege of being amongst the first round of receiving certificates.
Furthermore, resentments could be stirred by the fact that these former refugees were
part of “Group A” of refugees (see NASCIP document, explained in Chapter 4, Section
4.4.1), who already resided outside of the settlements in Dar es Salaam and other places
in Tanzania. This could be seen as unfair since refugees in the settlements were ocially
told that they could not be outside of the settlements for longer than two weeks without
a permit. After two weeks, they would have to seek renewal of the permit at the Min-
istry of Home Aairs in Dar es Salaam. Not all refugees had the means to pay the bus
fair to reach Dar es Salaam. In fact, “Group A” constituted a tolerated group of refugees
outside of the settlements, who had escaped life in the settlements and had found work
outside. Publicising their condition could also induce other refugees to move outside of
the settlement, which the government aimed to prevent. Drawing more attention to those
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refugees who got certificates could in the worst case scenario provoke the removal of their
certificates for reasons of fairness to the other refugees. It could potentially also provoke
the government to send some “Group A” refugees back to the settlements since ocially,
refugees had not been allowed to live outside until their ocial toleration announced in
the NASCIP document. Furthermore, publicising details of these refugees’ lives could
have potentially uncovered processes of favouritism in relation to who was allowed to live
outside the settlement and who obtained the first round of citizenship certificates. Judg-
ing these concerns as valid, I decided not to continue seeking to interview the certificate
holders but to locate my field research in Ulyankulu settlement.
Although the naturalisation and relocation policy was not carried out as planned, I
was present in Ulyankulu settlement/Dar es Salaam at a time of uncertainty for all actors
involved and this aspect was intriguing in itself. It inspired me to focus on the tempo-
ral dimension of my research and to identify experiences of ‘waiting’ as a major theme
emerging for refugees. In 2012, the priority of the government was to finally closeMtabila
camp, the last camp still open for the Burundian refugees who came in the 1990s. The
focus on that situation may have postponed other decisions concerning the 1972 refugee
caseload. Despite the protracted nature of many refugee scenarios including the one I
chose to study, my experiences in Tanzania in the year of 2012 show that the field of the
study of forced migration is highly volatile and changes at a fast pace: policies change,
priorities and funds shift quickly, not only related to refugees’ own arrival in the host
country and their subsequent behaviour but also according to internal political and eco-
nomic considerations of the host country. The policy of naturalisation and relocation,
however, had been on hold since 2011 with no interim announcement about what would
happen to the 1972 caseload of Burundian refugees.
3.2 Data Collection
3.2.1 Participant observation
Participant observation is a powerful ethnographic technique because it allows the re-
searcher to appreciate multiple perspectives and to engage dierent types and sources
of data hard to access otherwise (Murchison, 2010: 40). Participant observation is used
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to understand the world-views of people from the “inside” in their everyday experiences
(Cook, 2005: 167). However, since the researcher is both engaged in observation aswell as
in participation, s/he inhabits a paradoxical position. Both observation and participation
are necessary components of participant observation, in which the scholar is a research
tool him/herself. In the course of the stay in the field, the ethnographer finds himself or
herself between the etic, an outsider perspective, and the emic, an insider point of view,
in which s/he immerses him/herself into the everyday rhythms and routines of the studied
community (ibid.). According to Murchison (2010: 41), participant-observation is often
the way to begin doing research. Events can serve to introduce oneself in the research
setting, and by observing larger groups of people one can become aware of issues to fol-
low up on. Such initial settings may help with direct questions for later interviews and
conversations. Initially, the researcher will be more observing than participating but by
increasingly developing rapport with the informants, s/he will be a participant in the set-
ting. It is suggested that the researcher should start with regular and planned observation
in an event or a series of events, which can help to structure one’s research, and to build
relationships with informants (ibid: 42). In this study, for the qualitative data collection,
or ‘corpus construction’ (Bauer andGaskell, 2000), participant observationwas first used
in order to gain an impression of the situation that the refugees find themselves in. Public
events that could be regularly attended were the central market in Ulyankulu settlement
on Wednesdays and Saturdays, and church services on Sundays. Further places visited
involved schools and a court, where I attended school lessons and court hearings respec-
tively. Plates that capture impressions from these places of research can be found in the
annex (Annex 9).
The market
In the market, I was a participant in the scenario by buying food or clothing, and I was an
observer by taking notes on who was selling which kind of items or crops in which loca-
tion, what services and merchandise were oered in shops around the market place, and
who were the customers. It was, however, mostly not possible to overhear conversations
due to linguistic and acoustic reasons, so I started to use the market place to meet infor-
mants and to arrange interviews with them on another day at their homes. While some
were apprehensive about meeting a foreigner, others were interested in this interaction.
Many of the sellers came from far away villages; some did not have phone numbers, and
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exact addresses do not exist in the settlement. Therefore, most informants from market
encounters were shopkeepers or people living in Kaswa, the central village (see Figure
3.2).
Churches
From the beginning, I planned to participate in services on Sundays since most refugees
in Ulyankulu are Christian, and churches occupy a central role in the public life of the
settlement. Participation in services, however, proved not to be a straightforward task
since there were 13 denominations in 2007 (SA3, 2007: 23) and more have been founded
since then. Thus it was impossible to attend all of them. Therefore, I identified a few
churches of dierent denominations with varying membership both in terms of numbers
and people belonging to the parish, which I aimed to attend during my time in the field.
These include the Catholic Church in Kaswa, the Pentecostal Church in Mapigano, and
the Lutheran Church in Kaswa. The priests of the Catholic Church were all Tanzanians
but the church was attended by both refugees and Tanzanians (e.g. working for the gov-
ernment and international organisations). The church in Mapigano employed mainly
refugee pastors and it was predominantly visited by refugees. Both the Catholic Church
in Kaswa and the Pentecostal church inMapigano have a large congregation. By contrast,
the smaller Lutheran churchwas almost exclusively attended by Tanzanians, e.g. teachers
working for VETA (Vocational Education and Training Authority), a government insti-
tution. Early encounters with future informants at the settlement ocer’s building and
on the market lead to attendance of the Baptist Churches in Ikonongo and in Kaswa, and
the Calvary Church in Ikonongo (all mainly attended by and headed by refugees). Inter-
views were later also conducted with members of the Anglican Church and the Mosque
of Ulyankulu (members of these churches were both Tanzanians and refugees). Further
churches in the settlement are the Tanzania Assemblies of God, SOWER International
Church and many others. The Calvary Church in Ikonongo recently built another build-
ing in Taba1, the Pentecostal church is now split into two dierent denominations in sev-
eral villages in the settlement, and the Catholic Church has community groups in each
village in the settlement. Membership in the various churches ranges from about 40 peo-
ple to several thousand members.
1See maps of Ulyankulu below, Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
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Participant-observation in these churches initially included attending the service and
speaking to the pastor, church elders and members of the church after the service. Partic-
ipating in the service promised to be valuable in order to appreciate which topics priests
and pastors would address in front of the parish, to understand the variety in spiritual
life among these churches, and to experience in which language sermons would be held
and songs would be sung. Participation was highly valued by the pastors, who proved
to be gatekeepers to their parishes. They arranged interviews with various members of
their churches, introduced me to further informants from other churches, and invited
me to public and private events and celebrations. Some spiritual leaders, which I got
acquainted with during the research, had double roles in the community of being both
(former) government ocials and religious leaders. In the course of the research, several
religious leaders shared their wide-ranging knowledge about life in Ulyankulu.
Schools
Attending school lessons promised to oer interesting research material. This is because
allegedly changes that took place in secondary schooling could show the eects of the
planned closure of the settlement; but also because school lessons could oer insights
into the content of what students learn in the settlement, and interviews with students
would oer insights into their lives in the settlement and their sense of belonging. Again,
since there are three secondary schools and 15 primary schools in Ulyankulu settlement,
a choice had to be made as to which schools to attend. Ultimately, visits were arranged
to two secondary schools (the third one was closed at the time of research in 2012) in
Ulyankulu, to one secondary school outside of the settlement, and one primary school in
the settlement. In Ulyankulu Secondary School attendance of two lessons was granted,
a tour of the school, and interviews with the headmaster and two teachers. In Kanindo
Secondary School, conversations with three teachers took place, a tour of the school,
attendance of a school lesson, as well as interviews with six students. The secondary
school outside of the settlement was visited because allegedly people from Ulyankulu
also attended it. In that place, I conducted an interview with the headmaster and was
guided through the premises. In the primary school, an interview with one of the teach-
ers was conducted. Further participant observation in schools was not conducted since
it may have disrupted the everyday lives of the students, in addition to logistic constraints
encountered to reach the schools. Important insights into the conditions of the schools
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were gained by physically visiting these places. In the interviews, I could gain an impres-
sion of perspectives of students and teachers, not only about school life but about further
information on their sense of belonging.
The court
Finally, planned participant observation was conducted in court hearings. According to
the settlement ocer, arbitration in cases of conflict only takes place in the court outside
of the settlement in the village of Ichemba once a month2. In the course of the research,
two visits to court hearings in that village were arranged. Initial access to these was fa-
cilitated through the settlement ocer. In these hearings, information could be gathered
about the types of cases discussed, pointing towards contested issues in the community.
While participating in the hearings, I was in the background listening, observing and
recording the court proceedings. These visits to Ichemba also allowed for interviews with
the judge and with village leaders, as well as for conversations with people living in the
village.
All in all, planned participant observation in these four types of places allowed gaining
first impressions about public life in Ulyankulu. More specifically, it elucidated aspects of
trading agricultural and other products in the market, which is a main source of income
and part of economic life in the settlement, in the spiritual life of the inhabitants of the
settlement, in aspects of schooling of the second and third generation of refugees, and in
juridical proceedings. Political life was not as easy to access via participant-observation
since village meetings, for example, did not take place at the time of research. Therefore,
most information about political aspects stems from interviews.
Whenever possible, field notes were made in situ, for example in school lessons, church
services and the court where I was mostly observing instead of participating actively. Dur-
ing secondary school lessons I took note of the contents (English is the ocial teaching
language), and about student participation. In church services, I noted bible passages,
names of songs and other notable proceedings. One service was held in English, others
in Swahili. In the court, I noted the interactions between the defendants, the judge and
the lawyers (the session was held in Swahili). Other notable occurrences, for example
from the market, were recorded post hoc since it appeared to me suspicious to take notes
2There was no evidence of village-based arbitrations in Ulyankulu settlement, such as was common in
Burundi in precolonial times – “bashingantahe” (Daley, 2007:45; Turner, 2010:33).
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in the open space. I digitally recorded and transcribed parts of court hearings and church
services to have a detailed account of what happened and to overcome any linguistic
problems I encountered during the event. I do not believe that my presence significantly
altered the proceedings in the market or in the court. In one of the schools, the teacher
formally introduced me in front of the students and they could ask questions to me. Fur-
thermore, in one of the churches, the service was held in English due to my presence. In
those cases my presence altered the setting but being aware of these changes to the normal
proceedings helps to interpret the events and responses of students/church members.
Planned participant-observation was useful to find interview partners and to contex-
tualise information given in interviews, which proved to be the most in-depth source of
information. Participant observation in the public places mentioned above served to un-
derstand refugees’ day-to-day lives during this time of uncertainty of waiting for the clo-
sure of the settlement and the planned relocation and naturalisation.
Next to planned participant observation, I gained further impressions of life in Ulyan-
kulu by living on the campus of VETA vocational school, by walking and driving within
and outside of the settlement, and by using services in the settlement, such as restaurants,
the health centre and m-pesa banking3. In the process I took notes for example about the
construction of buildings, tobacco cultivation, gold mining, and access to water.
3.2.2 Interviews
While participant-observation allows observing the activities of others, and in some set-
tings to experience that behaviour in action, the researcher should engage in “conver-
sations with a purpose” (Valentine, 2005: 111) surrounding that behaviour in order to
understand the motivations underlying it (Murchison, 2010). This method allows a wide-
ranging discussion in which interviewees can explain the complexities and contradictions
of their everyday experiences (Valentine, 2005: 111). It has to be carefully planned who
to interview when, how, where and about what in order to obtain in-depth material that
could answer the research question (Murchison, 2010: 44). In this study more specifically,
interviews promised to gain insights into individual life histories, feelings of belonging,
3A mobile-banking service oered by Vodacom.
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memories of events in the past, as well as aspects of private life to which the researcher
could not easily gain access otherwise.
Sampling occurred via a snowball system because, as anticipated, access to partici-
pants or meaningful answers often relied on establishing contact with gatekeepers (cf.
Valentine, 2005: 117). Gatekeepers are “individuals [...] that have the power to grant
or withhold access to people or situations for the purposes of research” (Burgess 1984:
48). Even if this was the aim, it would have been dicult to obtain a randomised sample:
such samples can only be obtained in a controlled environment, in which the totality of
the population of potential interviewees is known. However, there is no detailed map
available of households within Ulyankulu settlement on the whole or within any given
village, which would facilitate the creation of a randomised sample. Furthermore, it was
not the primary aim of this study to attain a representative sample since the emphasis lay
on subjective experiences and meanings attached to citizenship and belonging. The goal
was to understand these notions of a variety of informants with internal rigour, instead
of striving for external validity or comparability.
Contacts were gained in two main steps: they were first made in public places of
participant-observation, and subsequently through the people thatweremet in such places
(see also Section 3.2.1 above). Among initial contacts were refugees of the first and second
generations, local Tanzanians and government ocials. Religious leaders (both refugees
and Tanzanians), who proved to be gatekeepers, introduced me to members of their
church, as well as to people in the same or other villages, who belonged to other churches.
These again introduced me to further informants. Teachers as well facilitated interviews
with their students in Kanindo Secondary School and at VETA school. Some interviews
that were arranged in places of participant-observation were one-o events and did not
lead to further snowballing. In other cases, several members of the same family could
be interviewed. A few respondents were already known by the research assistants (see
below) – these include the priests at the Catholic Church, and one informant, who was
knowledgeable and generally engaged for the refugee community (known by the second
assistant), as well as one family, who were acquaintances of the third assistant. Although
one could infer that this questions the credibility of the data obtained, these interviews
were among the most fruitful. Research assistants should be seen as part of the research
tool that the ethnographer embodies. Furthermore, some of these informants mentioned
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above were planned to be interviewed since the beginning even in the absence of an assis-
tant (see planned participation in churches).
Interviews conducted in the field were most of the time solicited (i.e. formal) but some
were unsolicited – in a more conversational setting. In general, the interviews were re-
flexive instead of pre-structured. However, in the beginning of the research, an interview
guide was established covering questions to refugees around six themes: 1) the past/life
history – relating to their arrival in the settlement (first generation), their educational
and work background, 2) life in Ulyankulu – concerning work, family, other activities,
satisfaction with the life in the settlement 3) belonging – where and why they belong
and whether they still feel like refugees, 4) citizenship and relocation – why they chose
naturalisation, what it means for the respondents and where would they relocate to, 5)
integration with Tanzanians – who they speak to in their daily lives, and 6) diasporic
identity – concerning connections to Burundi, to other refugee camps and settlements
and outside of the settlements. The more detailed, initial interview guide can be found
in Annex 6 (English version) and 7 (Swahili version). With evolving knowledge, other
questions were included, for example about the experience of waiting.
Interviews with central government ocials included questions about the reasons for
naturalising the refugees and for relocating them and the reasons for halting this process.
Interviews with government ocials in Ulyankulu aimed at obtaining information about
local statistics, events, and opinions about the past, present and future of the settlement.
Interviews with international organisations mainly included questions about the role of
the organisation in the protection of refugees now and in the past. Diering questions
were asked according to the specific position of the person – with relation to the UN-
HCR for example interviews were conducted with the Local Integration ocer in Dar es
Salaam, with an ocer responsible for the mass communication campaign concerning
naturalisation and relocation of the refugees, with the local head ocer in Ulyankulu,
and with a women’s protection ocer.
Interviews with Tanzanians were conducted with members of the central and local
governments in Ulyankulu and in the surrounding villages, in the old district Urambo and
in the new district Kaliua (see Section 3.4.3), and in the regional administration in Tabora,
with teachers in dierent schools (see above), and the police in Ulyankulu and in Tabora.
Further interviews were arranged with Tanzanian citizens of varying ages and places of
origin inUlyankulu settlement, in surrounding villages and inTabora town. Themajority
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of interviews with government ocials were conducted in English; whereas the majority
of interviews with refugees were carried out in Swahili. The language of the interview
was chosen by the respondent even though English was preferred if the respondent was
indierent. A few first generation respondents preferred to speak in French, one of the
ocial languages in Burundi.
Most interviews and conversations were conducted in the villages of Kaswa, the cen-
tral village, and Ikonongo, a neighbouring village (see more detailed spatiality of the
settlement in Section 3.4.3). However, some interviews were also held in the villages of
Kanindo, Taba, Mkindo, and Mapigano (see Section 3.4.3). Overall, the sampling pro-
cedure aimed to cover informants from various backgrounds in terms of age, occupation
or position, gender (about one third of the refugee respondents were female overall), as
well as ethnicity (next to the Hutu majority at least three informants had Tutsi or mixed
Hutu-Tutsi background, and some respondents were Nyamwezi or Sukuma).
The main selection criteria for refugee respondents included a dierentiation between
refugees of the first and second generation because it was anticipated that this distinction
would oer an interesting dierentiation for the analysis. As can be seen in Table 3.1
above, all in all, 117 respondents were interviewed in individual interviews (95) and group
settings (5 groups, 22 respondents in total). In addition, various conversations took place
in informal settings that sometimes led to formal interviews. I took note of some of these
conversations, which helped in understanding the context. Within Ulyankulu settlement,
formal interviews took place during the months of June, July, August and November. In
April, I mainly used the time to familiarise myself with the setting, to introduce myself
and to gain first contacts.
Furthermore, about 23 respondents were government ocials in Dar es Salaam, Tab-
ora, Urambo, Kaliua, Ichemba, Uyowa and in Ulyankulu. Seven worked in international
and national organisations dealing with refugee matters: UNHCR, the UNHCR imple-
menting partner Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS) and a former implement-
ing partner, Relief to Development Society (REDESO). All in all 34 respondents were first
generation refugees, 33 were refugees in the second generation, and 18 interviews took
placewith other Tanzanian citizens of various professions and backgrounds in Ulyankulu
and Tabora (see table below).
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Table 3.1: Total of Interviews Conducted
Respondents Individual
Formal
Interviews
Formal
Interviews
Total of Respondents
Refugees Total m. f.
First Generation 20 + 1* 3 (13 people) 34 26 8
Outside of Uly. (1st gen.) 1 1 1
Second Generation 24 2 (9 people) 33 20 13
Subtotal 68 47 21
Local Tanzanians
Ulyankulu 15 15
Tabora 1 (3 people) 3
Subtotal 18 16 2
Media (Dar es Salaam) 1 1 1
Tanzanian Government
Dar es Salaam 3
Tabora 3
Urambo District 3
Kaliua District 1
Ulyankulu 4+1*
Former Ocials 3
Ulyankulu
Ichemba 3
Uyowa 2
Subtotal 23 21 2
Organisations
UNHCR
Dar es Salaam 1* 1
Ulyankulu 3 3
TCRS
Dar es Salaam 1 1
Ulyankulu 1* 1
REDESO (Dar es Salaam) 1 1
Subtotal 7 5 2
Total 117
In this table: m.=male; f.=female.
*With these respondents, two or more interviews were conducted.
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3.2.3 Research assistants
For safety and linguistic reasons I decided to take a research assistant on my trips from
Dar es Salaam to Ulyankulu. The first research assistant was a Tanzanian, a former vol-
unteer of an NGO, from Dar es Salaam. He accompanied me on the first trip to Tabora
in April 2012 and to the settlement in order to introduce myself and to find out about
logistics and accommodation. Before travelling to Tabora, his role and details of pay-
ment were discussed. His role mainly included assisting in translating when some Swahili
words were missing in my vocabulary. The same applies to the second assistant, a Tan-
zanian university graduate from Dar es Salaam, who accompanied me for three months
from June to August 2012. Since aspects such as expenses for food, accommodation, the
number of interviews and the possibility of transcribing them in Ulyankulu, were unfore-
seeable fromDar es Salaam, we fixed and adapted certainmodalities concerning payment
once arrived in Ulyankulu. The last research assistant, who helped me in the final month
of research in November 2012, was a teacher, a local Tanzanian in Ulyankulu – his role
and payment were discussed and fixed in the beginning of the work. The fact that my
research assistants were generally knowledgeable and interested in the research topic was
invaluable for this study.
3.2.4 Secondary data
Maps and charts, a centrepiece of much ethnographic research (Murchison 2010:45),
serve to collect and organise information found in the field. This study has a clear spatial
dimension since the primary field site is located in a demarcated geographical area, and
it is a main aim of this research to find a new theorisation of the space of rural refugee set-
tlements. It was envisaged that maps would be important to understand developments of
the settlement over time, distances between villages and main locations of public places
inside and outside of the settlement, and entry points to the settlement. Maps may also
show the priorities and perspectives of the map-makers (cf. ibid.).
Population statistics about the settlement were collected from the National Bureau of
Statistics (census data), the UNHCR in Tanzania, the settlement ocer, and the district
council in Urambo, concerning land ownership, demographics (fertility, mortality and
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out-migration, i.e. repatriation), school enrolment and crime data. These sources include
maps that are used for the analysis of this study. Other secondary sources include newspa-
per articles highlighting recent developments in Tanzania concerning refugees and other
current aairs, and parliamentary debates concerning the naturalisation and relocation
of refugees.
3.2.5 Limitations and challenges
It was anticipated from the outset of the research that linguistic problems might occur.
Interviews with international and national organisations were held in English only. In-
terviews with government ocials were mainly in English but some were held in Swahili.
With refugees and local Tanzanians most interviews were held in Swahili but a few were
held in English or French. In Swahili interviews I asked questions which I had prepared
prior to the interview. My assistants helpedme to formulate spontaneous questions about
arising new topics, and translated some answers when I did not understand them fully.
This method generally worked very well but at times disrupted the flow of the interview.
While the first and second research assistants remainedmore in the background, the third
one, who lived in Ulyankulu himself, may have had the most influence on the research: as
a Tanzanian teacher, he showed that he was part of the community himself. Thereby, the
interview becamemore conversational. While his presence surely altered the interview, he
was respected and liked by the informants. It cannot be assessed ultimately towhat extent
he triggered the informants to give insights into their lives or by contrast, deterred them
from doing so. Some informants may have believed that the research assistants worked
for the government but factual evidence of such ideas was never given. I may have been
more approachable to possible informants without an assistant but due to linguistic and
logistic reasons, this was not often possible.
In the beginning of the research, when the respondent consented, interviewswere taped
by an audio voice recorder. This has the advantage of concentrating on the interviewwith-
out the pressure of taking notes (Valentine, 2005: 123). Therewere several situations, how-
ever, in which it was not possible to record. Such a situation occurred in the beginning of
my field research when I conducted a series of group interviews that were facilitated by a
gatekeeper in a church. In order to record, I would have had to ask each participant to give
consent to recording, which might have deterred them from speaking freely. Although the
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information given in the course of the interview was detailed and highly relevant, it was
hardly possible to take notes due to bad lighting. Furthermore, taking notes would have
disrupted the flow and intensity of the conversation. Some notes were taken by my assis-
tant but a large part was missing. Due to this experience, I decided to conduct individual
interviews whenever possible instead of arranging focus groups. Recording was also not
an option in situations where interview questions evolved out of an informal conversa-
tion, in situations with a noisy background, and in situations in which the respondents
explicitly did not want to be recorded. Furthermore, due to these problems, and the fact
that it was dicult to transcribe interviews in Ulyankulu with limited access to electricity
(for only three hours a day), from mid-July onwards I decided not to record interviews
but to directly write down fully substantiated, detailed notes in English.
During the first Swahili interviews that were recorded, there were minimal interrup-
tions due to translations. Whenever I understood the sense of what was said, we pro-
ceeded with the interview. Translations were reduced to moments in which I could not
follow the interviewee. Switching to hand-written notes was not a problem while work-
ing with the second and main research assistant. Since he also took notes, it reduced the
possibility of having misinterpreted information during the interview. During the last
month of field research translations did not occur just as unobtrusively as before and,
as mentioned above, interviews were more conversational and I sometimes had to ask
the assistant to translate any missing pieces. Furthermore, some typed electronic inter-
view transcripts were validated in hindsight by the respondents – but this was not always
possible in Ulyankulu due to technical limitations.
As mentioned above, in quantitative terms, the sample of people is not large enough
to be representative of the camp population counting more than 55,000 people. While
a greater number of respondents might have complemented the picture, this study has
high internal validity and data was considered saturated when themes reoccurred in the
respondents’ narratives. On a practical note, a challenge was to juggle various payments
for assistants and transport within and outside of the settlement. For each trip to a village
inside or outside of the settlement, a motorbike or car had to be rented since there was no
public transport in Ulyankulu (see plates depicting transport in Annex 9). Furthermore,
conditions of roads and vehicles hindered me from reaching some places of interviews.
However, my hosts, assistants, and acquaintances were very helpful in facilitating various
aspects of this research.
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3.3 Data Analysis
When arriving back in London, ‘field materials’, i.e. interview transcripts, observations
and notes, sketches, maps, diaries and letters (Crang, 2005: 219) were reconsidered as
a whole in order to allow for an inductive approach, in which one can write from the
research data instead of with the research data (Murchison, 2010: 173). Thereby, one
starts with the specific and arrives at the more general or abstract (ibid.). The writing
process overall included three main stages: a detailed research proposal including a litera-
ture review, research questions and hypotheses, a timeframe and suggested methodology,
which was finalised in December 2011, before going to the field. Then, during the field
research throughout the year 2012, data was gathered, and in September/October, while
being in Dar es Salaam, a first detailed writing plan for the full thesis was established.
After a further period of data collection, the writing plan was revised. At the start of
this third and final writing stage, the data was thus sorted into themes, which were noted
in a separate document, also called “open coding” (Crang, 2005: 222). In a second step
subthemes were identified and important concepts derived that could capture the experi-
ences in the field. Having identified these themes, the initial research questions that were
formulated before the field research were reconsidered and adapted in order to cover what
would be ultimately incorporated in the thesis. A detailed account of how, why and to
what eect the government and international organisations control refugees, was for ex-
ample not planned initially (see Chapter 5) but it proved to be a necessary and sensible
route to take when analysing the data. After having identified and sorted key themes, the
theoretical framework was expanded and adapted. In a final step, the empirical chapters
were written, by using the organising themes that were identified previously, and by going
back to the detailed field data. The overarching research question was carefully kept in
mind while writing these chapters in order to connect specific examples with the broader
picture, and to eventually give a coherent answer to the research question.
Most of the hand-written notes from the field were only digitised when back in Lon-
don. Interviews were inserted into the computer-based program NVivo, which is used to
organise qualitative data (Crang, 2005: 221). This process entailed a re-familiarisation
with the data, which helped to write the empirical (and theoretical) chapters in an e-
cient way (cf. ibid.). The process of digitising the data entailed sorting and coding it in a
systematic qualitative text analysis. In a first step, the data was coded into various cate-
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gories of respondents, such as government ocials, international organisations, refugees,
and local Tanzanians. In a second step, parts of interviews were coded into several key
themes within the software. Most codes were “emic” ones, i.e. those that are used by
the informants themselves, but some were “etic” ones, i.e. those that are assigned by the
analyst to describe events and attribute theories (ibid., 2005: 224). In reality, many codes
are a combination of the two (ibid.: 225). Nevertheless, the epistemological basis of any
qualitative research depends on emic and etic codes. Traditional qualitative research has
judged its accounts more reliable the closer they are to representing the world-view of the
informants (ibid.: 226). On the other hand, etic codes, which are directly related to the-
ory, can uncover unsaid structures (ibid.). This research presents a combination of both
coding strategies; but especially Chapter 6 uses emic codes in order to represent the point
of view of the respondents. In both types of coding, quotes are used to make analytical
points.
A further approach used for writing was to identify important research moments and
experiences that underlined the argument made in a particular chapter, and that could
tell a story (cf. Murchison, 2010: 176). Having participated in these events or moments
gives particularly strong evidence to some analytical points made – possibly even more
so than some accounts given by respondents, which may have been altered in the course
of transmission of the information to me. The importance of some of these research
moments – such as the inauguration of class rooms in Ulyankulu (see Chapter 5) – only
became clear to me during the writing process.
Some contradictions in the data can be a reflection of tensions between dierent per-
spectives of respondents, or of their idiosyncrasies (Murchison, 2010). Some of these con-
tradictions form an important part of the analytic points made, and they have revealed
the prevalence of certain powerful discourses (this is apparent especially in Chapter 5).
On the whole, data analysis aimed to show the most detailed and complete picture that
could be obtained from the data collected in the field, without ignoring or neglecting to
reveal tensions and contradictory perspectives.
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3.4 The Field: Research Proceedings
3.4.1 Field Work Preparations: London, UK, and Stone Town, Zanzibar
Before starting the field work in Tanzania, various preparations were made. Whilst still
in London, I received training in quantitative and qualitative research methodology, and I
participated in classes concerning contemporary debates in HumanGeography as well as
humanitarianismbefore passing the upgrade fromMPhil to PhD status inDecember 2012.
A three-month Swahili language course at the School of Oriental and African Studies
served as a foundation for further language training in Tanzania. Finally, I applied to
the Commission of Science and Technology (COSTECH) in Dar es Salaam for a research
permit and obtained information about health, safety, and visa regulations.
Eventually, before embarking on themain period of research, I stayed for twomonths in
February andMarch 2012 in Stone Town, Zanzibar, in order to participate in an intensive
language course at the TAKILUKI Institute for Foreign Languages on Zanzibar. By living
in a host family, I did not only practise my Swahili but also learned about key aspects of
Zanzibari culture and way of living.
3.4.2 Field site 1: Dar es Salaam
The first main field site was Dar es Salaam. Upon arrival, the research permit that I ap-
plied for at that Commission of Science and Technology (COSTECH) was issued. The
second permit, issued by the Refugee Services Department at the Ministry of Home
Aairs, which was needed to enter the settlements, could be secured shortly thereafter.
Mainly through Dr. Kweka at the University of Dar es Salaam, I gained a clearer concep-
tion aboutmy stay in Ulyankulu settlement, discussing key practical questions of working
with a research assistant, transport and accommodation in Ulyankulu. The stay in Dar
es Salaam proved to be a good foundation for the next step: research in Ulyankulu settle-
ment. My first field research in Tabora and Ulyankulu settlement therefore took place in
the month of April 2012 – see Section 3.4.3 below.
After an insightful first stay in Tabora region and in the settlement, I returned to Dar
es Salaam. During the month ofMay, I conducted contextual interviews (in English) with
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government spokespersons, international organisations and the media: Refugee Services
at the MHA, PrimeMinister’s Oce of Regional Administration and Local Government
(PMO-RALG), headquarters of the UNHCR, TCRS, REDESO as well as a journalist
working for The Guardian in Tanzania.
Gaining access to these interview partners was not a simple task. Some interviews
took place spontaneously, for example at TCRS, and some were arranged far in advance,
for example at the UNHCR and at the MHA. One politician finally agreed to conduct a
phone interview with me after I had contacted him repeatedly over the course of several
weeks. Besides the UNHCR, of which I had obtained a valid and helpful email address
prior to arrival in Tanzania by another researcher, my preferred method was to present
myself in person to the ministry or NGO in question. This is because most websites were
out-dated and did not present current email addresses or telephone numbers. Even to find
the physical place was not obvious – addresses in Tanzania in general are often vague. In
other cases an interview could be arranged for another day. Thisway, I was ultimately able
to secure interviews with all organisations I had planned to speak to. Some additional
interviews with parliamentarians were not possible to arrange, since the MPs were in
parliamentary session in Dodoma at the time I was prepared to meet them.
In Dar es Salaam, some secondary data could be obtained as well, such as census data
of 2002, data onTabora region andUrambo district held by theNational Bureau of Statis-
tics, a map of Tabora at the Mapping Division, and literature on refugees at the library
of Dar es Salaam University was obtained. After long waiting times and perseverance, a
residence permit of Class C was acquired as well. Although I had originally anticipated
to get aliated with the university and/or possibly the UNHCR, ultimately, my choice of
staying independent helped me to maintain maximum flexibility for the research. Never-
theless, the libraries of the university and the research institution REPOA (Research on
Poverty Alleviation), as well as COSTECH oered valuable services to me.
After a longer period of field research in Ulyankulu during the months of June, July
and August, Dar es Salaam served as a point of reflection on the material collected in the
settlement in September and October. This time was especially valuable since recorded
interviews could not be transcribed in Ulyankulu due to lack of electricity as well as time
constraints. Furthermore, I created an updated plan, detailing how to proceed during the
last stage of the research in Ulyankulu.
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In Dar es Salaam I was able to familiarise myself with various parts of the city, and kept
up to date with current aairs. During the months spent in Dar es Salaam, I stayed in
various places, includingMwenge, Mwananyamala, Mikocheni and Kigamboni. Staying
in these places allowed me to gain experience with Tanzanian urban living conditions
and domestic routines, food, economic life, family (gender) roles and my role of being
a foreigner, and with inter-faith and inter-ethnic interactions. Further, I gained insights
into some aspects of Tanzanian culture(s) by visiting music, and arts performances, and
historical exhibitions. Later, when some of my respondents in Ulyankulu referred to Dar
es Salaam, I could connect to their experiences.
While staying in Dar es Salaam, I used some time to travel to dierent places within
Tanzania. The impressions gained in other areas within Tanzania allowed me to appre-
ciate the dierences between those regions and Tabora. In the city of Mwanza, the heart
of Sukumaland, I was for example able to visit a museum about Sukuma culture, which
helped me understand the background of this ethnic group, which also lives in Tabora.
3.4.3 Field site 2: Ulyankulu settlement and surroundings
The second and main research site was Ulyankulu settlement. In fact, there are only few
studies located in Ulyankulu settlement in particular. The International Refugee Rights
Initiative in collaboration with other institutions published a working paper series4 on
refugees in all three so-called ‘Old Settlements’ (Mishamo, Katumba and Ulyankulu) but
there are not many other in-depth studies. A policy-oriented evaluation concerning the
protracted case of the Burundian refugees in Tanzania caseload was published jointly
by the UNHCR and a Danish team (Nordic Consulting Group, 2010) – it mentions key
points about the settlements, for example on economic productivity, but does not present
its more detailed history, governance, spatiality or in-depth experiences of belonging and
waiting of the people living there. Furthermore, a group of Norwegian students wrote
a field report about the naturalisation process (Kurtovic et al., 2011, unpublished). In
Malkki’s (1995a) research in Mishamo settlement, narratives about early camp-life in
Ulyankulu settlement emerged but these only refer to the time span of 1972 to 1979.
4(Hovil and Kweka, 2008; Hovil and Kweka, 2009; Hovil, 2009; and Hovil, 2013).
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Other scholars only make isolated remarks about Ulyankulu settlement (for example Da-
ley, 1991: 199#39; Turner, 2010: 35).
In order to understand the nature of fieldwork in this place, it is important to gain an
insight into some demographic and spatial details. Across the three settlements, and also
in Ulyankulu by itself, 78% of refugees are born in Tanzania, and only 22% were born
in Burundi (cf. Figure 3.1 below).
Ulyankulu can be described as a remote rural area – the next city (Tabora) is more than
one hour away, even if taking the fastest transport means available (i.e. private vehicles).
However, it is less isolated from its surroundings nowadays than Mishamo settlement,
where Malkki (1995a) located her study. Borders around the settlement are not clearly
demarcated – at most one can see a sign or a post indicating the start of the settlement in
some places. The settlement is surrounded by Tanzanian villages. Buses and mini-buses
to the city of Tabora and other smaller towns are available on the main square in the
settlement. These operate once per day; most of them around 6 a.m. at a cost of TZS
5,000 one way.5 It takes between one and a half to three hours (during rainy season) to
reach Tabora. From Tabora, buses return to Ulyankulu later in the morning and in the
afternoon.
Figure 3.1: Place of Birth by Settlement
Source: SA3 (2007:17)
5TZS 5,000 equalled GBP 1.97, at an exchange rate of 0.0004 on 30 November 2012.
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Since the settlement area is vast – about 1,200 km2 according to an estimate by the
UNHCR (2005, cited in Kweka, 2007), 1,000 km2 (Malkki, 1995a) or 490 km2, taking
another estimate (SA3, 2007), and consisting of eleven villages, it was clear that it would
take time to get to know the spatiality of the place. It was thus decided not to split time
between the three old settlements although I obtained permission by COSTECH and
the MHA to access all three settlements. Houses in the settlement are oftentimes far
apart. In order to reach a village, which is not adjacent to Kaswa, the central village in
the settlement, one has to use a vehicle in order to make best use of one’s time. However,
fromVETA vocational training school in Kaswa, where I lived, themarket, the compound
of UNHCR, TCRS and the village chairman of Kaswa, Ulyankulu Secondary School, the
Catholic Church, Centre Baptist Church, the police station and the mosque of Ulyankulu
were within walking distance.
The dierence in the two estimates of the settlement area mentioned above stem from
the fact that both the refugee settlement (Ulyankulu settlement) and the larger admin-
istrative unit around it (Ulyankulu division) bear the name ‘Ulyankulu’. The smaller
estimate might consider the settlement only, whereas the larger numbers may refer to the
division. According to maps drawn by TCRS, twelve villages belong to the settlement:
Mirambo, Kaswa, Ikonongo, Mbeta, Mkindo, Makonge, Kanindo, Kanindo B, Usigala,
Taba, Imara, and Keza. Population statistics of these villages and their embeddedness in
the administrative structure of Tabora region can be seen in Table 3.2 below.
Tabora Region (1 of 30 in the Republic of Tanzania)6
Kaliua District (1 of 7 in Tabora, with 21 wards) [previously Urambo District (1/6, 26 wards)]
Mwongozo Division [previously Ulyankulu Division (1 of 4 in Urambo)]
Ulyankulu Settlement (containing 3 wards of 11 total in Ulyankulu Division)
Kanindo
Ward
22,561 Milambo
Ward
25,933 Igombe
Mkulu Ward
17,308
Usigala 6,432 Ikonongo 6,897 Keza 5,243
Mapigano 3,447 Kaswa 10,748 Imara 4,974
Mbeta 5,388 Mkindo 5,088 Taba 7,091
Kanindo 7,294 Makonge 3,200
Table 3.2: Village Population Statistics, Ulyankulu Settlement
Source: based on Census 2012 data
6See Figure 1.2, a map of Tanzania with regional boundaries (2012), and Figure 5.13, showing the ad-
ministrative boundaries of districts in Tabora Region (2006).
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The first TCRS map below (Figure 3.2) is a simplification of the second map (Figure
3.3). In the map by the UNHCR (2009) (Figure 3.4), only eleven villages are listed; Mi-
rambo and Kanindo B are omitted. Kanindo B was a possible extension to the settlement,
which had not been built by 2009. Kaswa is indicated whereMirambowasmentioned pre-
viously, and Mapigano, a new village, is placed where Kaswa was listed. These changes
were nominal only.7 Maps cannot be easily obtained in the settlement. The one of 1979
used to hang in the oce of the Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party8 in the market
square in Kaswa; and the map by UNHCR (2009) can be found in the settlement ocer’s
building, which is remote from the centre. As ofAugust 2012, Ulyankulu division included
elevenwards: Uyowa, Silambo, Kanindo,Milambo, Igombemkulu, Ichemba,Mwongozo,
Kanoge, Sasu, Seleli, and Kashishi, which each consist of several villages. Out of these
wards, only three are part of the settlement: Kanindo, Milambo, and Igombemkulu (see
Annex 8, listing villages belonging to each ward outside of the settlement). In order to
understand the embeddedness of Ulyankulu settlement in its surroundings, and possible
interactions between refugees and the local Tanzanian population, it was planned to visit
some villages outside of the settlement in addition to those inside.
Ultimately, research was conducted in Ichemba village andMakingi village in Ichemba
ward, which is located on the way to Tabora on the south-western side of the settlement.
Furthermore, I visited Songambele village and Mwendakulima village in Uyowa ward in
the west of the settlement, and Nsungwa village, which is located on the way to Kahama
in the north of the settlement. Furthermore, it was planned to conduct interviews with
the district commission in Urambo and the regional administration in Tabora. During
the period of research, Kaliua became the new district, to which Ulyankulu belongs, and
interviews were conducted there as well.
7Conversation with UNHCR ocer, 6.1.2014
8This oce was used by the division ocer of Ulyankulu, who belonged to the CCM. Beyond this func-
tion, no political activities of the CCM took place in 2012. Allegedly, government ocers used to come to
Ulyankulu for dierent functions, but no specific refugee involvement in these is known.
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Figure 3.4: Map of Ulyankulu Settlement (3)
Source: UNHCR (2009)
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3.5 Ethics
3.5.1 Researcher reexivity and negotiating positionality
This section aims at uncovering some of the dynamics between the respondents andme in
the field to fulfil the premise of being a reflexive researcher. It is pertinent to assume that
the findings of my research were to some extent influenced by my identity traits includ-
ing gender, race, religion and nationality in a post-colonial setting. Kleinsasser (2000, in
Huggins and Glebbeek 2009: 9) defines researcher reflexivity as “(a) the process of critical
self-reflection on one’s biases, theoretical predispositions, preferences; (b) an acknowl-
edgement of the inquirer’s place in the setting, context, or social phenomenon he or she
seeks to understand and ameans for a critical examination of the entire research process.”
Relating to part b) above, Huggins and Glebbeek (ibid.) speak of “ethnographic position-
ality”, which they define as “a researcher’s location within existing hierarchies of power
and the ways in which the researcher’s identity and aliations are positioned among and
by others”. Considering my positionality, I faced advantages as well as disadvantages.
First, it is to mention that through my educational background in Europe and the fact
that I am a white researcher, I have dierent epistemological and ontological foundations
than an African, or in this case Tanzanian or Burundian, researcher. Surely, this influ-
enced my research design. The knowledge gained by an outsider can on the one hand be
more neutral than that of a cultural insider but it can also be less complete or insightful.
The hope of a cultural outsider is to have a dierent perspective than an insider, one who
does not take processes and behaviours for granted.
Gurney (1985) suggests that women may encounter various problems, such as exclu-
sion by an all-male fraternity, sexual hustling, and being treated with paternalism. She
also suggests that one way of finding out whether gender is an issue is to observe how
other women in the setting are treated by males. Speaking about refugees in Mishamo
settlement and Kigoma town, researchers Liisa Malkki and others noticed that it is dif-
ficult to interview refugee women in this male dominated environment (1995a: 50-51).
Women spoke in short sentences instead of more sustained narrative forms, they were
frightened of the female researcher and referred to their male family members to be in-
terviewed instead of them (ibid.). In Ulyankulu, women were generally more reserved
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than men; and the majority of respondents are male, especially in the first generation.
However, about one third of respondents overall are female – they pronounced their ex-
periences and points of view clearly.
As Gurney (1985) suggests, novice fieldworkers are advised to adopt a passive or non-
assertive role vis-a-vis setting members. At the same time however, the researcher is not
supposed to be viewed as incompetent; and a transition towards a more knowledgeable
and professional role should occur over time. The various groups of people I interviewed
– including government, UNHCR, most refugees and local Tanzanians readily answered
my questions and oered insights beyond what I was asking – which I take to be a sign of
a combination of being non-threatening and yet knowledgeable as well as understanding.
In Ulyankulu settlement, respondents had experience with other female researchers, with
African origin and from European countries, such as Dr. Opportuna Kweka, Dr. Liisa
Malkki and four female Norwegian students, who came to the settlement a year before
me. These experiences may have positively influenced their acceptance of my presence as
a female researcher.
Tanzanians and refugees were generally open towards me; but few of the refugees were
hesitant when they saw me for the first time. These refugees might have been apprehen-
sive about the fact that I lived with Tanzanians (as described below) and feared links to
the government. In one case, a woman who had previously agreed to being interviewed
was at first reserved when I visited her, and gave short answers. Later, however, she ap-
peared to be proud that I had come to see her in another village that day. The research
required juggling multiple research interactions: interviewing Tanzanians in positions of
power would require less time and debriefing than interviews with refugees. It required
more time and trust to make them feel at ease. Despite the fact that I lived with Tanza-
nians, respondents gained trust over time due to continuous interaction with them on a
day-to-day basis in public and private spaces. While not constituting a problem, factors
of gender and language may have altered some dynamics. A few refugee respondents
chose to speak more to my research assistants than to me – probably both because it was
easier to communicate with them in Swahili and because they were male. Overall, the
presence of my assistants was an advantage since they could fluently communicate with
all actors. The respondents accepted them as representing me as an interpreter (mfasiri)
and assistant (msaidizi).
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Various strategies to negotiate my positionality in the field were employed. Instead
of staying with government or UNHCR employees, I decided to stay on the VETA com-
pound with a Tanzanian female administrator (see also plates in Annex 9). VETA teach-
ers and students include Tanzanians from anywhere in the country, as well as refugees
from Ulyankulu. As a learning institution guarded by security, it is comparatively neutral
and safe. VETA is a respected vocational training school with branches in most Tanza-
nian cities. In general, I introduced myself as a student conducting research (mwanafunzi
anayefanya utafiti) because many people did not know the meaning of a PhD thesis (tas-
nifu) and as a student I would be non-threatening.
However, as in real life, I assumed several identities. Huggins and Glebbeek (2009: 5)
note that oftentimes the female researcher becomes excluded from the status of “research
scientist”. In a private setting, while in the beginning I was seen as a ‘guest’ (mgeni) by
my hosts, I was increasingly seen as a sister ‘dada’. I do not have the impression that my
domestic role as ‘dada’ underminedmy researcher status. Next to ‘mama’, a termused for
married women with children, ‘dada’ or ‘shemeji’ (sister in law), as some called me, are
favourable terms for women (msichana, mwanamke) presupposing a relationship of trust.
These terms show that I was ‘part of the family’. They refer to an ‘insider’ in contrast
to a ‘guest’ (mgeni) or ‘white person’ (mzungu). In terms of clothing, I neither belonged
to the young students in uniforms, nor to the oce workers in suits or to the farming
women wearing a combination of Western clothes and African kitenge. My clothes most
closely resembled those of urban university students, such as I saw in Dar es Salaam.
In terms of religion, I perceived it as beneficial to show that I was close in faith to both
refugees and Tanzanians in the settlement (as a Lutheran Christian), in whose day-to-
day lives religion plays a major role. During my research, the Catholic Church provided
essential help in terms of transport, food and information. This link was facilitated by
my second research assistant, who already knew the (Tanzanian) priests from previous
research visits. During the time of research, Burundian and Tanzanian clerics of various
denominations invited me to their churches and facilitated interviews. While there is a
Muslim minority in the camp and many of the surrounding Sukuma and Nyamwezi peo-
ple do not have an ocial religion; the overwhelming majority of settlement residents are
Christian. Due to the interaction with the Catholic Church in particular, some may have
wondered whether I came as part of a religious mission. The fact that I used the UNHCR
and TCRS facilities to access wireless internet from time to time made some believe that I
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belonged to the UNHCR as one of my respondents told me. Due to my multiple connec-
tions, however, I do not think that any of these positionalities were enforced permanently.
Respondents who saw me for the first time called me ‘mzungu’ (white person). Since
I was the only white person staying in the settlement for a long time during the year of
2012, ‘mzungu’would be a clear identity marker and refer to me only. The term ‘mzungu’
suggests wealth and in reality often turns into meaning ‘white sponsor’. Respondents
indeed asked for money for their children’s school fees, for bricks to build a house, to
repair equipment or for drinks. As Gurney (1985) notes, research oftentimes relies on a
reciprocal exchange relationship with respondents. Expected favours for respondents can
range from small ones like running errands or providing rides to illegal and immoral ones.
It is important, therefore, to define the limits of such exchanges. In the beginning of the
research I chose not to give anymoney to respondents in order to ensure equality between
participants and to ensure that their consent is truly voluntary. Since many interviews
were conducted at a person’s home, it was not expected to invite them for drinks or food.
Many interviews took place between harvesting and planting seasons, so people would
be at home on non-market days, willing to speak to me. Some of the respondents invited
me for food or soda. Towards the end of the research, I gave goods such as soaps (which
they had asked for) to one church, and participated in fundraising events ‘harambee’ of
two other churches – one of which occurred after a ceremony and another after a service.
In both cases every guest donated. I avoided individual donations as much as possible
however. In general I realised that people have a dierent understanding of money than
in Europe: one is expected to share it with relatives, close friends and people in need.
Despite the outsider connotations that the status of a ‘mzungu’ brings about, this status
also openedmany doors. The cultural preference for light skin renderedme in a privileged
position, which allowed me to speak to all actors involved (see also Goldstein, 2009: 228,
writing in a Brazilian context).
Finally, in the post-colonial setting of Tanzania, my race (as a white person), my nation-
ality (being German) and the place of my university (in London) could invoke colonial
resentments and bias. As said previously, being white I was often seen as a ‘sponsor’ but
I did not perceive any negative sentiments due to that. This could have been dierent if I
was from Belgium as that country was the colonial power in Burundi. A few respondents
compared the Burundians’ situation to the Jews who were dispersed in the world. This
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shows that the Burundian refugees feel themselves to be a distinct and oppressed people
in search for their own place to live in peace.
In general, not being formally aliated with any group or project within the settlement
was beneficial. People were able tomake up their ownminds of whether theywanted to be
interviewed or not. It was an advantage that the second and third research assistants had
some insider knowledge because of having conducted research in Ulyankulu previously
or living in the settlement permanently.
3.5.2 Dealing with risks in the eld
Given the fact that I was a (white) female researcher in a male dominated setting, avoid-
ing security risks was an important concern at the outset of the research. While living on
Zanzibar and in Dar es Salaam, for example, I experienced robbery, a two-hour non-
violent express kidnapping in a taxi by organised criminals. Therefore, the question
of what is an acceptable and what is an unacceptable risk while doing research in gen-
eral, and in Ulyankulu settlement, needed to be reconsidered. As noted in Huggins and
Glebbeek (2009: 3) we cannot know when we are in danger but rely on heuristic devices
to evaluate our risk. Familiar routines and assumptions about personal safety can be
comforting fictions. Researchers are therefore advised to craft a safe research space and
to seek cultural insider information about danger and security. Although Tanzania is
known for being peaceful and people as hospitable, Tanzanian and expatriate acquain-
tances armed that the way to Tabora was not safe – accidents are frequent and buses
had been hijacked several times. It was not advisable to arrive in the city alone in the
dark after the 14 hour ride from Dar es Salaam. However, this turned out to be the only
possible way: at the start of my fieldwork in Ulyankulu, the ostensibly ‘safe’ first class of
the train from Dar es Salaam to Tabora was not operating, so I was discouraged from
taking the train. The UNHCR and TCRS use a helicopter between Dar es Salaam and
Mwanza and then go to Ulyankulu by bus, which still takes about six hours. However,
they follow their own schedule on a needs basis, so this route was not an option to me.
The security risks referred to above were not attributed to the fact that I would be
in a refugee settlement. Despite the long history of violence in refugee settings and the
fact that Burundian refugees were said to possess and trade weapons at least in Kigoma
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region, I did not necessarily expect that there would be more security risks for me in the
settlement than elsewhere in the country. This is because there was no sign in the existing
literature that refugees in Ulyankulu would be more violent or criminal than any other
(Tanzanian) citizens. In the course of the research, however, the question of whether
these refugees were in fact “dangerous” was investigated especially in response to such
allegations made by certain research participants, as Chapter 5 shows. One concern at
the outset of my research in relation to the refugees in Ulyankulu was related to ethnicity.
Were the refugees all victims or had they been also perpetrators in the ethnic violence in
Burundi? Had some of them been involved in the ethnic strife in Burundi in the 1990s?
Literature onUlyankulu settlementmentions that refugees inUlyankulu are all Hutu (and
hence assumed to be victims of violence in Burundi in the 1970s) but in fact there are also
people of Tutsi origin (who may have been perpetrators in the conflict then). However,
it became clear that there were only a few ‘tolerated’ Tutsi families in the settlement.
Furthermore, more than 80% of the refugees are now in the second generation and do
not maintain strong ties to Burundi, as is discussed in Chapter 6. There is no evidence
that refugees fleeing in the 1990s came to Ulyankulu. In the camps that were opened in
the 1990s, the situation is dierent: Hutu and Tutsi, victims and perpetrators lived in the
same camp (Turner, 2010). Turner (ibid.: 18) mentions that he was seen by some as a spy
sent by the Tutsi. In fact, despite being white, a Rwandese Tutsi I once met outside of the
settlement told me that I looked like a Tutsi. Luckily, these allegations were not voiced
by the (Hutu) refugees.
3.5.3 Ethical responsibility towards respondents and assistants
While it is necessary to critically discuss my role in the settlement, it is even more im-
portant to look at the protection of informants. First, the research permit by the Gov-
ernment of Tanzania allowed me to generally interview anyone in the research areas in
Dar es Salaam, Tabora region and Ulyankulu settlement. After presenting myself to the
regional commissioner in Tabora, to the district council in Urambo, and to the settlement
ocer, I had to show my permits to some respondents and once to the immigration of-
ficers, who spontaneously checked on me. It was important to behave in a transparent
and non-suspicious manner since the government could have prevented the extension of
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my research permit. However, ethical clearance is not a one-o event but an on-going
process alongside the research.
Despite the fact that I was allowed to ocially interview people anywhere within the
settlement, most interviews were conducted in situ. That means they were conducted
at a person’s home or at a site of their choice where s/he spends time in his or her day
to day life. Sometimes interviews were conducted in private places that gatekeepers rec-
ommended – e.g. a room in a church. This ensured that they could feel at ease in their
surroundings, instead of travelling to a secret place to be interviewed. As Huggins and
Glebbeek mention (2009: 15), in a society ruled by fear and secrecy, secrecy itself could
call attention to a foreigner talking to a national; so it is helpful to “hide in the open”
and to let the respondent select a public place where the interaction would not be likely
to cause suspicion. At the outset of my research I did not know to what extent fear and
secrecy play a role in the settlement but being aware of Turner’s (2010) research about
rumours in Lukole refugee camp in Tanzania, it seemed advisable not to stir additional
rumours. Therefore, as long as the interviewee was comfortable with it, it was accepted
when the family or neighbours joined during the interview out of curiosity – they could
see that the topics discussedwere not dangerous and did not raise the interviewee to a priv-
ileged position. In interviews where neighbours and family were present, the informant
may have spoken less freely. On the other hand, some bystanders intervened and added
valuable information to the interview. Whenever possible, the context of the interview is
explained in Chapters 6 and 7 in order for the reader to understand the situatedness of the
quote at the time. Conducting interviews in situ prevented any suspicions being raised
by the government and by other refugees; and that they would strain a person’s time and
resources. This strategy was once jeopardised when government ocials suddenly joined
at a public place that was chosen for the interview. When they inquired what I was talking
about, I ended the interview and left the site in order to protect the respondent.
All respondents participated in the research freely and voluntarily. The purpose of the
study was clearly explained to them before the interview: in case of refugees who did not
speak English, I mentioned in Swahili that my research was for my university in London,
and it was about life in Ulyankulu, i.e. how people live there and what they do in their
everyday lives. I asked themwhether it was possible to ask them a few questions. Intervie-
wees thus gave their verbal consent at the beginning of the interview and were told that
names, specific dates and places would be anonymised. They were able to withdraw from
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an interview at any time. In a few interviews some apparently sensitive questions were
answered by “hamna”, which I have taken tomean “I don’t want to answer this question”.
Underage respondents were only interviewed when their parents were informed or when
their teachers facilitated the interview. Concerning participant observation, it was not
possible to attain consent by all participants. Disclosing my research aims may have been
intrusive in the refugees’ day-to-day lives and could have altered the findings. However,
throughout the time of field research I was transparent and honest about the nature and
purpose of the research and the community knew that I was a researcher. Anonymity and
confidentiality are upheld in order to ensure the safety and dignity of the participants.
As mentioned above, interviews with refugees who already obtained citizenship cer-
tificates were not conducted in Dar es Salaam in order to protect their safety. Instead
of pushing respondents to answer sensitive questions, in some cases it seemed advisable
to accept that they were reluctant to answer them – since insider knowledge of “danger-
ous pieces of information” could put both me and respondents in danger (Huggins and
Glebbeek, 2009: 19). This was even more so since I was clearly visible at all times; and
the settlement ocer was updated about my whereabouts: “I heard you went to Urambo
yesterday.” When asking first generation respondents about their past experiences for ex-
ample about the war in Burundi and the flight to Tanzania, it was clear that these could
increase the respondents’ pain. The detail of their answers was left to the interviewees’
discretion. Thosewho did decide to speak inmore detail about it were clearly emotionally
touched by the theme.
Despite the fact that the research projectwas explained to the respondents, some people
wanted to know about the purpose of this study or of research in general in greater detail.
One cleric, for example, asked whether I could do more for the refugees than his church,
the government and the international organisations. After explaining the reasons for
doing research in general and in my particular case, for example to make otherwise lost
voices heard to a wider public, he supported my cause. One respondent owned Malkki’s
(1995a) book Purity in Exile and was proud that he was going to be part of a new study.
He and others asked for a copy of my research once it would be finished, and I promised
to send one.
A recurring ethical dilemma concerned neutrality when involving various actors in the
research. It was dicult not to ‘choose sides’ – the one of the Tanzanians, Burundians
or of international organisations. I felt that it is my ethical responsibility towards cer-
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tain respondents to at least raise awareness and inquire about their problems with the
UNHCR without revealing names. Unfortunately, I am not sure whether the resulting
critical discussions have led to changes in their lives.
3.6 Conclusion
Despite the practical challenges encountered both in the urban setting of Dar es Salaam
and the rural setting in Ulyankulu, field research was largely conducted as envisaged prior
to arriving in Tanzania. Throughout the year of 2012, a broad range of actors were in-
terviewed, and settings and events experienced through participant observation. The
objective of the research design of becoming a participant observer in the settlement was
therefore accomplished. The period of field research in Tanzania oered interesting and
at times surprising or intriguing answers to the research questions. Overall the choice
of research design and methods allowed to gain a deep and multifaceted insight into the
dynamics surrounding this protracted refugee situation. By carefully considering the in-
formation given by various sources, the empirical data analysis in following chapters aims
to give a balanced representation of the situation. A critical reflection on the ethics sur-
rounding this project, including strategies of positionality and responsibilities, illustrates
the many decisions that a researcher has tomake on a day-to-day basis; and the dilemmas
and implications that these can bring about. Following various precautions, it was possi-
ble to uphold both the respondents’ and my own safety in the field. Due to and despite
the various challenges encountered, I developed personal ties to the actors involved, and
I increasingly became an insider to local knowledge.
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PHAS E S OF GOVERNANCE IN ULYANKULU
S ETT L EMENT AND EVOLUT ION OF TANZAN IA ' S
R E FUGE E POL I CY
This chapter details the evolution of the spatiality, economic situation and local gover-
nance of the area called Ulyankulu both internally and within the region with reference
to the broader evolution of Tanzania’s refugee policy, in four main phases (Phase 0 to
Phase 3) before and after the creation of the settlement in 1972.
Composed of three arguments, this chapter will firstly reveal how policies of control by
colonial powers and the Tanzanian government have shifted and evolved in several stages
from colonial to post-colonial times. Despite the fact that President Nyerere welcomed
the refugees in a spirit of pan-Africanism, there are continuities from colonial times con-
cerning control over the environment and the population, which can be traced through
all phases of governance in the settlement. However, in the very last phase (Phase 3), the
settlement was administratively invisibilised because it was supposed to be closed. While
this phase is characterised by non-maintenance and abandonment of social services in
the settlement, it needs to be seen in the broader context of control since the plan was to
relocate the entire refugee population to other regions, and to locally integrate them in
receiving regions in an organised and controlled way.
Secondly, this chapter also shows how the treatment of refugees has been similar to that
of citizens within the settlement, as they were induced to actively participate in govern-
ment structures since their arrival in the settlement, and especially during Phase 2. This
involvement bears signs of both agency and control. Refugees were, on the one hand,
induced by the government to engage in ‘self-help’, and on the other hand they actively
worked on the overall socio-economic development in the settlement and in improving
services by their own choices that were central in their everyday lives. They were thereby
both participating in citizenship self-making and were being made citizens by the state.
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In this process they created a sense of home, which, as argued in Chapter 6, is a main pre-
requisite for developing a sense of belonging. At the same time, however, the government
developed an increasingly restrictive view on refugee matters.
Thirdly, local Tanzanians have been reclaiming space in the settlement since Phase 2
due to their historical attachment to the land, which dates back to Chief Mirambo’s
times (Phase 0). Nowadays, Refugees and Tanzanians have been integrating because they
both inhabit the same space. The presence of Tanzanians in the settlement is another
important prerequisite for developing a sense of belonging, as argued in Chapter 6.
Chronologically speaking, in the 19th century (Phase 0), Ulyankulu was the centre of
ChiefMirambo’s kingdom. Later, during British colonial times (1919-1962), the area was
evacuated due to tsetse flies. Since the area was vacant, it was used again under President
Nyerere’s ujamaa policy to host tens of thousands of refugees from Burundi, who arrived
in Tanzania in 1972. In Phase 1, the Ministry of Home Aairs worked together with the
UNHCR and its implementing partner TCRS to build a basic infrastructure. Refugee
village leaders were installed and refugees started to cultivate cash and food crops. Since
refugees in Ulyankulu became self-reliant in 1985 (Phase 2), the settlement was embedded
in local government structures and it turned into a major trading centre in the region. Al-
though a separation between refugees andTanzanian citizens wasmaintained by policing
the settlement borders, an increasing number of Tanzanians managed to move to the set-
tlement. In Phase 3, the Burundian refugees were included in a naturalization initiative,
which was then put on hold and the settlement was administratively invisibilised.
4.1 Phase 0: Ulyankulu Before the Refugees Arrived
4.1.1 Tanzanians' historical claims to the land: Ulyankulu as centre of Mirambo's chiefdom
While the Government of Tanzania ocially does not allow local Tanzanian citizens to
live in the settlement, local Nyamwezi and Sukuma believe it is their right to live in the
area. They do not accept the borders to the settlement, and justify their claims to live in
the settlement by invoking their historical attachment to the land. In fact, Ulyankulu has
been inhabited by Nyamwezi and other ethnic groups for centuries preceding colonial
times. Furthermore, interaction with Burundians is not new for the Nyamwezi: Burun-
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dian slaves were taken by the powerful Nyamwezi ChiefMirambo in the 19th century and
have lived close to Ulyankulu settlement until today. This experience may have shaped lo-
cal Nyamwezi attitudes towards the presence of the Burundian refugees when they arrived
in the area.
Chief Mirambo who reigned over the territory in the last century from 1860 to 1884, is
the most renowned ruler in Nyamwezi history. The three chiefdoms of Uyowa, Ulyankulu
and Busagari formed the territorial base for Chief Mirambo’s activities (see Figure 4.1;
Abrahams, 1967). While not belonging to theNyamwezi aristocracy, hewas able to install
himself as the Chief of Urambo with the help of trade with ivory and slaves, as well as
Western firearms and money. While Chief Mirambo had a good relationship with Euro-
peans, his rule was characterised by antagonism towards Arab traders whowere powerful
in the region. Tabora was an important base on their trade route extending to Zanzibar.
At that time, many neighbouring chiefs joined Chief Mirambo as his allies (ibid.). Those
who refused to join him were raided by his forces. However, Chief Mirambo was never
the ruler of a centralised Nyamwezi ‘empire’ or kingdom, as some sources claim. Rather
he was the ruler of a loose confederacy of chiefdoms (ibid.). This confederacy expanded
to Lake Tanganyika in the South-West and to Buganda in the North.
During his rule, Chief Mirambo went to fight in Burundi and brought back slaves to
his kingdom (Kabeya, 1966; Kimambo and Temu, 1969). These slaves used to be called
the ‘Bagulwe’ – ‘those who were bought’, stemming from the verb baguru – ‘to buy’ in
Kisumbwa – or ‘Basese’ – ‘those who are working without payment’ (interview with G1).
These Bagulwe/Basese eventually blended into the tribe of the Sumbwa, to which Chief
Mirambo’s father belonged. They used to live in the area of Uyowa, adjacent to Ulyan-
kulu (to compare to a more recent map of the area, see Figure 4.2 below).1 The superior
attitude that Tanzanians presumably had towards the slaves may have impacted on the
local Tanzanians’ opinion of the refugees. On the other hand, there were rumours in Ul-
yankulu settlement that the Chief was of Burundian descent himself. Such a connection
may have had a positive influence on the relationship between Tanzanians and Burundi-
ans in Ulyankulu. However, this connection could not be confirmed by a descendant of
Chief Mirambo in the settlement. He explained, however, that Chief Mirambo’s origins
are contested since he had several wives from dierent tribes.
1Ulyankulu derives from “walima kata” in Kinyamwezi, which means “farmers with traditional cups”
(these cups are hollowed out and look like a pumpkin) (Interview with C1).
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Figure 4.1: Map of Chiefdoms, Tabora District
Source: Abrahams (1967:28)
Although ChiefMirambo’s chiefdomwas handed over to his descendants (firstly to his
younger brother ChiefMpandashalo, then toChiefMirambo’s first sonChief Katuya and
then to further descendants), the confederacy fell apart after his death (Abrahams, 1967).
When Tanzania attained independence in 1962, President Nyerere broke the tradition of
chieftaincy and installed village executive ocers instead. Chief Mirambo’s legacy, how-
ever, can still be traced in Tabora region. Several schools are named after him inside and
outside of Ulyankulu settlement. In Ulyankulu, tourists can visit the grave and memo-
rial shrine for Chief Mirambo (see Plate 4.1). Acknowledging that in Africa belonging
to a certain place is strongly tied to ancestral burial places (Geschiere, 2009), the grave
of this important leader bears significance for the Nyamwezi’s sense of belonging and
attachment to the land. It is probably due to these ties that some descendants of Chief
Mirambo have attained important administrative positions within the settlement.
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Plate 4.1: Shrine of Chief Mirambo in Ikonongo, Ulyankulu
Source: Author (April 2012)
*Text on the shrine: Ruler of East and Central Africa; Ruler Chief Mirambo, born: 1820,
passed away: 2 Dec. 1884 [Shujaa wa AfrikaMashariki na Kati; ShujaaMtemiMirambo;
Alizaliwa: 1820; Alifariki: 2 Des. 1884]
4.1.2 Population control since British colonial times: Ulyankulu evacuated due to tsetse ies
Population and environmental control has a long history in Tanzania in general, and
in Ulyankulu in particular. During British Colonial times, a major concern was tsetse
fly infestations, which has kept human settlement sparse and livestock populations ex-
tremely low (Surveys andMapping Division, 1976: 21). Tsetse flies spread mainly in four
regions, one of which was a corridor of cultivation stretching from Mwanza to Tabora.
The British tsetse expert C.F.M. Swynnerton launched an anti-tsetse campaign in 1921
(Ilie, 1979: 270). At the time, the British estimated that two-thirds of Tanganyika was
infested with tsetse flies (Ilie, 1979: 271). Rather than merely treating the symptoms
of the livestock disease trypanosomiasis and the sleeping sickness in humans, which re-
sults from a bite of a tsetse fly, the British initiated various control measures to eliminate
the flies in the early 1920s. A resettlement policy was adopted, which moved people into
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settlements large enough to “prevent bush regeneration, leaving the remaining land to
tsetse until natural population growth permitted recolonisation” (Ilie, 1979: 472). The
predominant approachwith which to attack the flies was ‘ecological intervention’, includ-
ing grass burning and the selective destruction of vegetation. Advances were made in five
main areas across the country, in Mbulu, Usukuma, Kondoa, Usambara and Uluguru,
through specially designed development schemes. These were supposed to protect the
peasants and to rehabilitate eroded land (Ilie, 1979: 472-474).
In Tabora, such schemes enforced shifts of people in and out of the region. An in-
terview in Songambele, located adjacent to the settlement in the Uyowa Ward, revealed
that “in 1934 there was an operation under Makwale [a German] to move the Waha to
this area [Uyowa] because there were tsetse flies alongMaragarasi River” (G1)2. Another
informant explained:
“In 1936, people were shifted fromMkindo to Ichemba to escape from tsetse
flies. Also, the land became unfertile, so they were shifted to fertile soil. [...]
The children ofChiefMilambo now live at Ichemba, a village located between
Ulyankulu and Tabora” (C1).
According to a further informant (C2), 1938-1958 was the “tsetse fly period” in Ulyan-
kulu, in which people (mainly Nyamwezi) were sent out of the area. When refugees ar-
rived in Ulyankulu in 1972, it was thus sparsely populated and interaction with the host
population was initially limited. In the map below (Figure 4.3) one can see that the cattle
distribution in Ulyankulu was extremely low until 1976, which also suggests a limited
presence of Nyamwezi and Sukuma, who are predominantly pastoralists.
Refugees had to build their livelihoods from scratch; interaction with Tanzanians only
occurred gradually over time. Furthermore, as will be seen below, the Tanzanian gov-
ernment continued to initiate population control schemes, which influenced the country
(under the ujamaa policy; see Section 4.2.1) and refugees (see Section 4.2.4) with lasting
eects.
In summary, Phase 0 was thus split in two main sub-phases: first, the Nyamwezi lived
in the area, ruled, most famously, by Chief Mirambo in the late 19th century. These
Nyamwezi still have an historical attachment to the land, not least because the tomb
2The coding method of interviews is explained in a note under “Interviews: Table of Respondents” fol-
lowing the bibliography. The letter ‘G’ means ‘government ocial’. Numbers follow the order of appearance
of the interview in the text.
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environmental protectio has been exercised sin e that time.
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4.2 Phase 1: Ulyankulu as New Home of Refugees under Nyerere
4.2.1 Refugees as a tool of domestic policy: Ujamaa and development
Since Tanzania’s independence in 1962, refugee policies were heavily influenced by do-
mestic politics. Milner (2009) explains that Tanzania has hosted two types of refugees:
those fleeing conflict in neighbouring (pre-) independent African states and those fleeing
wars of national liberation.
The earliest settlement sites for refugees in Tanzania were built in Kagera region in
order to host the 130,000 Rwandans who fled from pre-independence violence from 1959
onwards. In order to keep refugees in designated settlements and to secure financial sup-
port, a new refugee policy, the Refugees (Control) Act, 1965, spelled out various control
measures. It granted the government powers to deport refugees and powers to appoint
a “settlement commander to be in charge” of the settlement (Rutinwa, 1996: 292; Daley,
1991: 180; Milner, 2009; Paragraph 4(2) of the Act).
Various authors argue that the settlement of refugees represented an opportunity to at-
tract the financial resources necessary from international donors to encourage economic
development of under-populated regions of the country (Holborn, 1975; Tunga, 1987;
and van Hoyweghen, 2002). This logic could be traced in the enforced relocations of
refugees fromMuyenzi settlement to Bushubi (Kagera region), by which the government
aimed to grasp the opportunity to clear the bushes at the time still infested with tsetse
flies (Milner, 2009: 111). Furthermore, 10,0003 Rwandans were resettled by the UNHCR
from the Kivu province of the Congo (Zaire) to Mwesi settlement in late 1964 (Milner,
2009: 112). This resettlement was demanded by the Congolese government, which har-
boured negative feelings towards Rwandese, alleging that the refugees supported rebels
of the Mulele movement (Gasarasi, 1990: 92). The Tanzanian government agreed since it
saw an opportunity to enhance regional security and to foster development through the
refugees (Milner, 2009). The costs of this resettlement were shared by the Tripartite Part-
nershipModel, an agreement between the Government of Tanzania, UNHCR and TCRS.
Similar tripartite agreements were later concluded for all in all 13 settlements accommo-
dating refugees from Rwanda, Burundi, Mozambique and elsewhere for about 182,000
33,000 refugees according to Gasarasi, 1990:92
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refugees between 1963 and 1979, to which the UNHCR contributed over US$ 11 million
(ibid.).
Furthermore, from the late 1960s onwards the settlement of Burundian refugees and
of other arriving refugees was influenced by Tanzania’s national policy of socialism and
self-reliance (ujamaa na kujitegema), which was announced on 5 February 1967 in the
Arusha Declaration. The reception and settlement of various groups of refugees were in-
spired by these maxims. The national policy of socialism and self-reliance called for the
establishment of ujamaa farming collectives (see Figure 4.4) to encourage self-reliance,
an education system accessible to all and free provision of social services for all Tanza-
nian citizens. The ‘villagisation’ policy aimed to encourage cooperative farming of both
subsistence and cash crops in mutually dependent blocks of ten huts. After initially slow
implementation, Nyerere announced that the whole rural population were to live in vil-
lages by the end of 1976 – a process that involved forced relocation and eventual resettle-
ment of 75% of mainland Tanzanians. In line with this national policy, the settlement
of refugees at that time was channelled by the concepts of permanence and productivity
(Milner, 2009).
4.2.2 Refugees as a tool of foreign policy: wars of national liberation
While refugees from (pre-) independent states were used as a tool of domestic policy
(as seen above), Nyerere’s support for refugees fleeing wars of national liberation illus-
trates his willingness to also use them as a tool of foreign policy (Milner, 2009: 113).
Generally, Nyerere’s foreign policy was marked by an ‘open door’ policy in a spirit of
pan-Africanism.
Supporting the liberation movements in Southern Africa, Nyerere welcomed approxi-
mately 6,000 South Africans aliated with the African National Congress (ANC) or the
Pan-African Congress (PAC) as well as more than 50,000 Mozambicans who fled from
the war of national liberation fought between FRELIMO (Liberation Front of Mozam-
bique) and the Portuguese from 1964 to 1974 (Zolberg et al., 1989; Mendel, 1997: 39).
In contrast to Burundian and Rwandan settlements, those for Mozambicans remained
internally controlled by the liberationmovements. FRELIMO, based outside of the settle-
ments, waged a guerrilla war in northernMozambique for over a decadewith the support
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Figure 4.4: Ujamaa Village
Source: Scott (1998)
of Tanzania (Milner, 2009: 114). Later refugee flows include those fleeing internal power
struggles in the post-independence context, specifically Burundians and Rwandans (see
below), Ugandans fleeing from Idi Amin’s rule in 1971, Mozambicans arriving between
1985 and 1989; as well as individual political refugees from Kenya and Malawi (Mendel,
1997: 40). Ugandans and Mozambicans have returned to their countries of origin (ibid.:
43).
Due to diminishing terms of trade for cash crops and general economic decline, the eco-
nomic support of ujamaa eroded in the 1980s. Nyerere eventually agreed to a Structural
Adjustment Programme in 1982 while still sustaining the policy of ujamaa. However, this
balancing act could not be sustained, and Nyerere eventually stepped down as President.
He gave way to his successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi in 1985, who launched the Economic
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Recovery Programme (ERP). The thereby takenmeasures eventually led to the issuance of
US$800 million of credits by the IMF in 1986. However, the following austerity measures
that aimed at reducing public spending resulted in an erosion of provision of education,
health care and clean water, of which citizens and refugees suered (Milner, 2009: 115).
In this economic climate, hospitality towards refugees was not maintained like before.
Government ocials started referring to refugees as a problem and some refugees were
expelled from the country.
4.2.3 Dispersal and settlement of 1972 Burundians in Tanzania
The following sections concern the initial settlement and reasons of dispersal of Burun-
dian refugees from the 1970s, who were both the largest group of refugees in Tanzania at
the time of fieldwork and the ones who have lived in settlements for the longest period of
time. Upon arrival in Tanzania, these Burundian refugees were sent by the Tanzanian gov-
ernment with help of the UNHCR into one of three settlements; Mishamo, Katumba in
the region of Rukwa and Ulyankulu in Tabora region. Some were also settled in towns in
Kigoma region (Malkki, 1995a). In the settlements, families were granted five and some
up to ten hectares of land, as well as financial assistance by the UNHCR. Infrastructure
such as roads, schools, water points and administrative centres were established with the
help of humanitarian agencies4. The three settlements, as mentioned above, were created
by the Government of Tanzania along the lines of the ujamaa village system, which was
introduced in 1973, shortly after the refugees’ arrival. The arrival of the Burundians, who
are known as skilled agriculturalists, was seen as a blessing for the purpose of producing
cash crops, such as coee and tobacco. Moreover, the refugee situation was expected
to attract international funding. According to a headman of Katumba settlement, the
refugees and the host community are ‘like cousins’, and the acceptance of the refugees in
host areas was aided by a mutual understanding of each other’s mother tongue (Nording
Consulting Group, 2010: 20).
The main reason of the original dispersal of this group of Burundian refugees was po-
litical persecution by the Micombero regime in Burundi. The latter came to power when
4Africa has pioneered the implementation of such agricultural settlements, and they have now been
established in other parts of the world as well. According to Armstrong (1990: 196) every new settlement
has encouraged the agencies involved to learn and adapt their approach – the planning of Mishamo, for
instance, occurred after 15 years of experience of the TCRS.
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Lieutenant-GénéralMichelMicombero (a Tutsi-Hima from Bururi region) overthrew the
incumbent King Ntare V. Ndizeye in a coup supported by parts of the military and the
Bezi elite in 1966.5 While declaring Burundi a republic, he abandoned democratic struc-
tures under the pretence of bringing stability to the country. Micombero’s coup signified
the start of a process of militarisation and regionalisation with the Tutsi-Hima as a force
in politics. Micombero banned all political parties except the party UPRONA, Union for
National Progress, of which he became president and of which most members were Tutsi.
An alliancewas thus born between the party, themilitary andTutsi hegemony. In the years
until 1972 – the year of the refugees’ dispersal – genocidal violence was directed against
Tutsis in central provinces, the Baganwa elite and the Hutu majority (Daley, 2007: 66).
This led to the traumatic dispersal of several hundred thousand people. While the rich
(Tutsi) elite fled to Kenya and other countries abroad (e.g. Belgium), those that came to
TanzaniaweremainlyHutu farmers. Instead of the usually reiterated dichotomy between
Hutu andTutsi thismore detailed history suggests that ethnicitywas not a sucient cause
for violence but rather that regionalisation and militarisation were also significant, and
that identity was more fractionalised.
4.2.4 Initial conditions in Ulyankulu, road structure, plot allocation and resettlement to new sites
Ulyankuluwas a convenient choice for the government for the purpose of settling refugees
since no-one was allowed, nor wanted to live there, and this was an opportunity to clear
the bushes for the government (cf. Milner, 2009). However, the area had to be freed from
tsetse flies before settling the refugees there. One respondent explained, “There were a lot
of tsetse flies in Ulyankulu. When the refugees came, the UNkilled themwith helicopters”
(G1). Aerial spraying by the UN was thus supposed to render the area inhabitable again.
Despite various control measures taken against tsetse flies, such as by local tsetse con-
trol ocers reporting to a chief tsetse ocer in Dar es Salaam, 60% of the country was
still infested in 1976 including the area of Ulyankulu (see Figure 4.5; Surveys and Map-
pingDivision, 1976: 21). One can infer that the fight against tsetse was still ongoingwhile
refugees were living there. As the Voluntary Resettlement Programme in Ethiopia shows
5The Bezi and the Batare historically fought for the Crown since pre-colonial times. Tensions remained
until the time of the genocide (Daley 2007).
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(Hammond, 2008), moving people into tsetse fly infested regions has also happened in
other countries.
Between 1972 and 1975, 54,000 Hutu refugees were brought to Ulyankulu in several
large groups, including thousands who had lived in the Tanzania-Burundi border area for
several years (TCRS, 1984; cited in Malkki 1995a: 38). Many of them first stayed in Pan-
gale camp, located at 25 kilometres from the South of Tabora town, before being shifted
to Ulyankulu (interview with C2). Malkki (1995a) notes that transporting refugees to
camp sites was a significant step towards instilling order and regularising their lives. The
refugees themselves, however, perceived their surroundings as a dangerouswilderness and
referred to it as ‘the forest’. According to Christensen (1985) there were a great variety of
snakes and the last lion was seen in 1977 when a refugee woman was attacked.
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Early infrastructure: creating the grid-like road structure
Within Ulyankulu settlement, some control over the environment was exerted by building
a grid-like road structure that connected the villages with roads built by the UNHCR.
One respondent explained:
“They constructed roads starting with Roads 1-19. Road 19 ends at Ikonongo
village. They placed these roads in this format: Road 1 is split in two sides;
1A, which is on the right side, and Road 1B, which is on the left side. All
of these roads were increasing toward the western side, starting from north
heading south of Ulyankulu. Then they ended at Road 19 but the refugees
were increasing to flood into Tanzania. Then they constructed Roads 20 up
to 27, fromnorth to south. They thought thewarwould end and thingswould
settle but the refugees continued to come. Then they constructed Roads 28
up to 38. They were also increasingly added towards the western side. Then
the refugees continued coming. They constructed Roads 39 up to Road 50.
This is why you meet Roads 39 and 40 starting close to Road 19. The refugees
continued coming. Then they went to the other side of the River Igombe
and constructed Roads 51 up to 63, which were heading toward the west of
Ulyankulu” (C2).
The settlement thus expanded with the arrival of an increasing number of refugees.
The planning of the area was relatively limited: besides roads, some community centres,
schools and few other buildings, the place resembled wilderness. Refugees had to build
their own houses on uncleared land – refugee administrators had measured and assigned
plots (Malkki, 1995a) but notmade them inhabitable. Amap created byTCRS (see Figure
3.3), shows that by 1979 seven community centres had been built in the settlement along
with 10 primary schools, three dispensaries, five maize mills, one cooperative building,
and a stadium. The map furthermore shows information about the water infrastructure
in the settlement, revealing the priorities at least of the TCRS at the time (see legend of
the map, Figure 3.3). Nevertheless, the road structure served to create a basic ‘legibility’
of the place (Scott, 1998), created by the UNHCR.
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Criteria of plot allocation to refugees in Ulyankulu
According to the Tanzanian government, refugees need basic social services as well as a
piece of land to cultivate to reach self-suciency (Milner, 2009). In order to understand
the spatial organisationwithin the settlement, a government ocial explained the guiding
principles of land distribution to refugees:
“Every family got four hectares; 10 acres per family. When you get land here,
you have to note where you come from in Burundi – we want people from the
same area in their country of origin, so that they can assist each other and so
that it is easy to control the situation in terms of security. They [the people
in a particular village/street] would know – this person is a criminal” (G2;
emphasis added).
This security concern translates into a spatial distribution of people. According to this
respondent:
“In the South-Eastern part, most people here come from Lake Tanganyika
shores, Makamba province. Of course Burundi is a small country – they dif-
ferentiate themselves according to villages and not provinces. From around
this place [Road 1] they were resettled up to Road 6, these are the early-
comers.”
Thus, the organisation of distributing plots to people occurred according to dierent
areas in Burundi, due to dierent times of arrival from the conflict in Burundi:
“In Kaswa [the central village], people come from Nyanza Lake, from Ru-
monge and Lugara. 60% come from these areas. People from Kanindo are
known as Bukemba people [Rutana Province]. People in Ikonongo, Taba and
Mapigano came from Lake Tanganyika – for them it was easy to pass the
border. The war started in Mugala; they were the first to run. The UNHCR
took the people to the villages, except to Kanindo. Later Bukemba was also
aected by the war; so they were the last group to come to Tanzania” (F1).
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Secondary resettlement of refugees to other sites
The increased influx of Burundian refugees into Tanzania led to the construction of an-
other settlement, Katumba, built in 1973 in what is now Katavi region (formerly Rukwa).
A third settlement, Mishamo, was only built several years later, in 1978, in Katavi re-
gion (UNHCR, 2012b), due to deteriorating environmental conditions in Ulyankulu set-
tlement. According to Malkki (1995a: 39) half of Ulyankulu’s population, which had
risen to 60,000, was moved to Mishamo after a survey of land and water resources in
Ulyankulu in 1977. Colonial measures of population control for environmental reasons
were thus continued by the Tanzanian government, the UNHCR and the TCRS in rela-
tion to the governance of refugees. The TCRS created the early maps of the settlement
and of population movements (see Figure 4.6 below). One respondent explained:
“Then floods came. Then they created Mishamo settlement from Ulyankulu
settlement. It was for those who were attacked by the floods. The floods
covered some places; like Roads 9 up to 12 vanished, and especially Roads 6,
7, 8 and 9. 10A vanished because of the floods. Nowadays if you look clearly,
you will not find these roads. They are all in the pori [bushland]. Roads 12,
13A, 14, 15, 16 were sent to Mishamo. Road 11A was a bit higher so it is
still there. But 11B is in the grassland [pori]... People are cultivating there
now. Now there is no more heavy rainfall, so there are some Tanzanians, and
NNTs6 coming to live in those areas like Road 12. There are some people
living there now but before, people were moved to Mishamo” (C2).
Refugees from Ulyankulu were moved to Mishamo twice due to floods. The first time
was in 1978, the second time in 1997:
“The settlement was opened in March 1972. There were 24,000 people in the
beginning. The population grew rapidly. In 1997, when the El Niño floods
came, the government shifted 26,000 people to Mishamo settlement. From
1998 to 2008, the population grew to 55,000 people. The population growth
rate is 4%. After that, the repatriation of NNTs started” (G2).
In summary, during Phase 1 of governance in Ulyankulu, refugees were welcomed in
Tanzania under President Nyerere’s domestic policy of ujamaa and development in line
6A term used by the UNHCR and the Tanzanian government for the (former) refugees since they regis-
tered for naturalisation.
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with this foreign policy of supporting wars of national liberation. The dispersal of Bu-
rundian refugees in the 70s occurred during the ethnic conflict between the Tutsi-Hima
regime of Micombero and the military on the one hand, and the Hutu majority, Tutsi
from central provinces as well as the Baganwa elite on the other hand. When the refugees
arrived in Tanzania, they were sent to Ulyankulu after having stayed in a transit camp in
Pangale. Eventually somewere moved toMishamo and Katumba camps in Rukwa region
further South due to environmental reasons. The area of Ulyankulu had to be freed from
Tsetse flies, a road structure was built and four-hectar plots were allocated to refugees to
cultivate.
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Figure 4.6: Map of Refugee Movements in Tanzania
Source: Malkki (1995a), by Armstrong (1985) for the
Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service
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4.3 Phase 2: Local Government, Economic Development and Integration, 1985  2007
4.3.1 Reaching selfreliance and installing local governance
Refugee settlements in post-colonial Tanzania came to have two main functions. First,
international donors as well as the national government wanted refugees to become self-
reliant as soon as possible through the cultivation of subsistence crops for food needs.
Furthermore, they emphasised that refugees also have duties towards the host state, for
example to fulfill tax requirements, which could be met by planting cash crops7 (Daley,
1991: 189). Through their incessant labour on the provided land, refugees were eventually
able to become self-reliant and agriculturally independent by 1985, which marked the
start of a second phase of governance in Ulyankulu.
In 1985 the UNHCR left the management of refugee settlements to the Government
of Tanzania (UNHCR, 2012b). They were then placed under local government admin-
istration. Ulyankulu was subsequently administered as a division similar to other areas
in Tanzania with its own wards and representatives. Refugee leaders continued to rule
at the village level, whereas three Tanzanian Ward Representatives (diwani) (of the three
wards Kanindo, Igombemkulu and Milambo respectively) were representing the people
in the district council (halmashauri).
Nowadays, according to a study by the consultancy group SA3 (2007: 20), 41% of the
refugee population in the three settlements classify their main occupation as farming,
and 84% are involved in agricultural activities of some kind. They cultivate food crops,
including maize, millet, cassava, rice, beans and potatoes, as well as cash crops, includ-
ing maize, beans, groundnuts and tobacco (ibid.). Next to farming, they also engage in
animal husbandry, keeping chicken, goats, sheep and pigs. In a livelihoods analysis (ibid.:
19) it was found that 15% of the settlement population in Ulyankulu were pastoralists –
which hints towards the presence of Sukuma and Nyamwezi in the settlement.
7This emphasis was for example spelled out in a conference in Ethiopia on “Legal, Economic and Social
Aspects of African Refugee Problems” in 1967.
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4.3.2 Evolution of social services, economic development and environmental damage
Refugees’ participation in improving social services in Ulyankulu
The second phase of governance is mainly characterised by the treatment of refugees as
being similar to citizens within Ulyankulu settlement. From the time of their arrival in
the settlements, refugees enjoyed rights to basic social services, such as health care and
primary education in Swahili. Next to paying taxes, refugees actively engaged in improv-
ing the social services oered, for example by building schools, teaching and learning just
like Tanzanians in other parts of the country. This represented an important first step in
their de facto integration in Tanzania.
In Ulyankulu secondary education was hardly accessible until the 1990s. The first sec-
ondary schoolwas opened on the 14th of June 1999 (InterviewwithG2). This government
ocial explained that, before “the government had no programme for opening secondary
schools in Tanzania. First, we had to open primary schools. When the refugees wanted
to have education, they were allowed to go to government schools outside of the settle-
ment, e .g. to Tabora.” However, this option was only open to a few individuals who
were selected by the government (see interview with S1, quoted in Section 6.3.1 below).
Within the last ten years, 15 primary schools (SA, 2007: 18) and three secondary schools
were built in Ulyankulu. The building of secondary schools was encouraged by the Sec-
ondary Education Development Plan (SEDP) of 2004, which demanded one secondary
school per ward. According to a Tanzanian living in the settlement (C1), Kanindo, Ulyan-
kulu and Igombe Secondary Schools were built during this ‘community school campaign’.
Constituting a form of ‘self-help’ which has been promoted as a form of popular partic-
ipation in local development nation-wide by the Tanzanian government since the 1960s
(Jennings, 2003) refugees actively engaged in building the schools through their labour
with government funds. As a former government ocer explained, “The people in Ul-
yankulu participated in building the school in Kanindo” (C3). Furthermore, reflecting a
demand for professional training, the VETA branch in Ulyankulu, built in the 1970s, was
one of the first ones in Tanzania. The branch in Ulyankulu was originally an initiative of
the Catholic Church with funds from Caritas. Nowadays, VETA is a nation-wide profes-
sional training school. 25% percent of refugees in all three settlements are students (SA3,
2007: 19); and about a quarter are educated to Grade 7 and above (SA3, 2007: 18).
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Refugees have also been recruited as teachers. In total, there are 302 primary school
teachers and 65 secondary school teachers in the settlements (ibid.: 19). As the UNHCR
noted in 2010 (Interviewwith I1), theTanzanian government recruited 50 refugee teachers
in Ulyankulu, 30 in Mishamo and 64 in Katumba; and two medical personnel in Ulyan-
kulu, in addition to Tanzanian teachers and doctors.
Considering Tabora as a whole, the National Bureau of Statistics (2005: 222) notes,
“There is still a lot of room given that enrolment rates in the region are inadequate in pri-
mary schools and very low in secondary schools. Tabora is one of themost disadvantaged
regions in primary and secondary education in the country.” While the pupil-teacher ratio
for primary schools in Tanzania on the whole was 46:1 in 2012 (World Bank, 2013), it was
as high as 204:1 in Urambo district in 2002 (National Bureau of Statistics 2005: 188). As
district statistics suggest, refugees are not disadvantaged in comparison to other students
surrounding the settlement. Urambo District Statistics for the year of 2012 show that pri-
mary schools in the three wards of Ulyankulu settlement have a lower pupil-teacher ratio
than five of the eight other wards within Ulyankulu division. Ulyankulu settlement also
has a better primary school/secondary school ratio, at five primary schools per secondary
school, better even than the urban area of Tabora, which, as a district, has the best ra-
tio within the region with six primary schools per secondary school (National Bureau of
Statistics, 2005: 198).
Despite the rising educational standards, only 0.1 to 0.9 percent of the refugees in all
three settlements have professions other than farming, and classify themselves as tailors,
business service agents, religious professionals, carpenters, housekeepers, salespeople,
primary school teachers, builders, fishermen, and nurses/midwives. There are 13 doctors
in total, and there is only one lawyer, one judge and four pharmacists or pathologists
(SA3, 2007: 19). In fact, as interviews indicate, many qualified professionals may live
outside of the settlement as refugees have also increasingly enjoyed education outside of
it (in secondary schools, teachers’ colleges and university). While some returned to the
settlement, others are now working in other Tanzanian cities in a variety of professions
including teachers, doctors and religious leaders – and some key informants claimed that
even some politicians are refugees, even though this information could not be verified
ultimately.
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Refugees’ contribution to the local, national and global economy
Next to participating in social services, refugees were encouraged to plant food and cash
crops not only to be self-reliant, but also to be part of the local, national, and global
economy. The district government benefited by receiving refugees’ taxes whereas the lo-
cal market was supplied with food and the global market was enriched by refugees’ to-
bacco exports. Refugees paid their tax duties just like other citizens and they became
integrated in various scales of the economy as they interacted with Tanzanian traders
and international companies.
A UNHCR consultancy report of the 1990s explains that after self-reliance, refugees
should no longer be recipients of state or foreign aid and should instead be encouraged
to expand export-crop production for disposal through ocial channels. This was in ac-
cordance with the new agricultural policy of the economic recovery programme (ERP),
eventually enabled the issuance of Structural Adjustment Programme loans by the IMF
in 1986 (cf. Daley, 1991: 191). Therefore, since refugees arrived in the three settlements
in 1972, they were integrated into the national agricultural policy. Parastatals, crop pro-
grammes and co-operatives were introduced in the settlements. Tanzania’s sisal industry
and the Tea Authority recruited workers within the settlements in the 1980s (Daley, 1991:
190).
Eventually, Ulyankulu market became a major trading place in the region (compare
Plate 4.2 on a non-market day with Plate 4.3 on a market day). Nowadays, even citizens
from around Ulyankulu e.g. from Ichemba, a ward which used to be part of Ulyankulu
division, come to the market in Ulyankulu to buy the products they need. There is no
comparable market in any of the villages around Ulyankulu. According to a UNHCR
briefing note (2012, emphasis added):
“The food crops [...] grown by the NNTs in the settlements make up a consid-
erable proportion of the arable produce available at markets in Tabora and
Katavi Regions, and contribute significantly to food security in central Tan-
zania. [...] It is widely perceived that despite lack of ready access to capital
and restricted access to markets, the NNTs contribute substantially to the
districts in taxes. [...]”.
In fact, Ulyankulu settlement alone produced 34% of agricultural products in Urambo
District although the population only constituted 13%. In the other two settlements,
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production (42%) and population (34%) of Mpanda District were much more in tune
(Nordic Consulting Group, 2010: 19-20).
Plate 4.2: Ulyankulu Market Place on a Sunday
Source: Author (April 2012)
Plate 4.3: Ulyankulu Market Place on a Saturday
Source: Author (June 2012)
Both Ulyankulu and Katumba were located in areas designated by the World Bank for
the development of tobacco complexes and tobacco has been promoted as the main cash
crop (Daley, 1991). Refugees have indeed increasingly participated in growing tobacco
despite the disapproval of the Pentecostal Church (ibid: 191). Nowadays one can see
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tobacco curing houses in various places in Ulyankulu (see Plate 4.4), as well as tobacco
transports (Plate 4.5) and warehouses full of bags containing tobacco leaves (Plate 4.6).
According to the UNHCR (2012b):
“In Ulyankulu 899 tons of tobacco was produced in 2010/2011 according to
theChairman of IkonongoTobacco Primary Society inUlyankulu Settlement,
Mr. Ilambona Alexander. [...] Tobacco production in Mishamo Settlement
was measured by the Mishamo Tobacco Oce to have been 3,700 tons in
2008/2009which equalledTZS 1 billion tax revenue for theGoT [Government
of Tanzania], and 6,000 tons in 2009/2010 which equalled TZS 1,5 billion tax
revenue for the GoT.”
A government ocial in Ulyankulu explained:
“Up to now there are five cooperatives. Four are taking care of tobacco grow-
ers; and one is responsible for other businesses, such as cafeterias. [...] The
cooperatives are responsible of making sure that the refugees – by the way
they are refugees – are provided with essential inputs for tobacco growing.
[...] Most of the tobacco growers are peasants. They make sure they get back
money and improve their lives. Food crops and tobacco are two very dierent
things. The tobacco business runs under one individual only – PhilippMorris,
the world’s biggest buyer of tobacco. He used to come here to Ulyankulu. He
proclaimed that he will only buy from the cooperatives. He has a programme
for aorestation since tobacco uses a lot of fuel wood” (G2).
The refugees are producing tobacco for export to the global market via cooperatives.
They have become much more than subsistence farmers – Ulyankulu today is economi-
cally prospering as never before. Refugees are integrated not only into the local or Tan-
zanian economy; they are integrated into the global economy.
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Plate 4.4: Tobacco Curing House in Ulyankulu
Source: Author (November 2012)
Plate 4.5: Tobacco Transport in Kaswa, Ulyankulu
Source: Author (June 2012)
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Plate 4.6: Tobacco Warehouse in Ikonongo, Ulyankulu
Source: Author (July 2012)
Refugees’ settlement in forest reserves and environmental damage
While refugees behaved and were treated as citizens, engaging in their own development
by improving social services via ‘self-help’ and by becoming part of the economy, a main
concern by the government, echoing colonial times, was of an environmental nature. The
encouragement of agriculture and especially cash crops such as tobacco in the confines
of Ulyankulu settlement came at a cost. Considerable environmental damage was caused
over time. Tobacco curing thinned out the forests. The seasonal river, suering from
heavy soil erosion and human activity, has started to dry up. This process threatens the
livelihoods of people and animals alike and even has an eect on the water level in Lake
Tanganyika (see interview with G4, quoted in Section 4.4.3). Water is nowadays a scarce
resource in and around the settlement. During dry season, people in Ichemba need to go
to small creeks to fetch water (see Plate 4.8). Water, with muddy consistency especially in
the dry season, is transported in canisters from wells and pumps to people’s houses (see
Plate 4.7).
Encouraged in part by the government, for example through the Secondary Education
Development Plan of 2004, schools and some residential areas have been built within the
forest reserves that surround Ulyankulu (see Figures 4.7 and 4.8 below). These forest re-
serves are located next to Kigosi Game Reserve, which is the third largest Game Reserve
in Tanzania after Selous and Rungwa reserves, with an area of 7,000 km2 (Wildlife Divi-
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Plate 4.7: Transport of Water in the Settlement
Source: Author (November 2012)
Plate 4.8: Source of Water for Villagers in Ichemba during Dry Season
Source: Author (July 2012)
sion, 2012; see Figure 4.9). According to a government ocer who worked as a ranger in
the game reserve, poaching in the near game and forest reserves became common prac-
tice (G3). Indisputably, refugees have been responsible for hunting in the game reserves.
However, soil erosion and the building of schools in the settlement was encouraged by
national and international policies. Furthermore, if the encampment policy had not been
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enforced as rigorously, the situation of residing in the forest reserve and of poaching in
the game reserve would probably never have arisen in the first place8.
The onset of environmental damage also shows some conflicting policies by dierent
state ministries. The Ministry of Home Aairs was responsible for settling the refugees
in Ulyankulu and theMinistry of Education for building schools in the settlement. These
policies overruled some provisions concerning the Game and Forest Reserve, which is ad-
ministered by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. This Ministry, which is
in charge of the conservation of natural and cultural resources, has four main divisions:
forestry, wildlife, tourism and fisheries. TheMinistry, and especially the Forestry Depart-
ment, has not been powerful enough to prevent environmental damage generated by the
growing population of Ulyankulu – or to reverse the encampment policy earlier in order
to prevent the damage.
Therefore, instead of questioning their own policies and disputes, refugees are blamed
for the damage. This situation is reminiscent of colonial times. Under the Sukumaland
Development Plan, for example, the British colonial policy upset the local environmen-
tal balance in Mwanza Region by encouraging intensive cultivation of the land, which
ultimately led to a decrease in fertility. While on the one hand being overly concerned
about the environment, colonialists later blamed the Sukuma for this outcome since the
pastoralists had engaged in overstocking (International Bank of Reconstruction and De-
velopment, 1961: Annex, p.367). As Chapter 5 will show, environmental concerns were
also a reason for the proposed relocation of the refugees and the closure of the settlement.
4.3.3 Spatial distribution of Tanzanians in Ulyankulu
Over time, a considerable number of Tanzanians from adjacent villages and further re-
gions in the country have moved to Ulyankulu settlement. Many of them are Nyamwezi
from the surrounding areas, some are Sukumas originating fromMwanza region, whilst
others are Chagga from Kilimanjaro and further ethnicities from various regions. While
the Sukuma andNyamwezi pastoralists originally came in search of greener pastures, oth-
ers came as government workers (e.g. teachers), to run a business or simply to cultivate.
8It also needs to be acknowledged that until independence this forest reserve had not existed, as a map
in the Atlas of Tanzania of 1956 shows (Survey Division, 1956).
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Figure 2.8 Map of Ulyankulu Settlement and Surroundings (4) 
Source: UNHCR (2012) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9 Forest Reserves in Tabora, 1967 
Source: Government of the United Republic of Tanzania (1967) 
                                                Grey areas signify forest reserves. 
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Figure 4.7: Map of Ulyankulu Settlement and Surroundings (4)
Source: UNHCR (2012)
Observing that most people in the settlement spoke fluent Swahili, a government
ocial explained that many people were actually Tanzanians or mixed Burundian-
Tanzanians, indistinguishable from the Burundians. The same person estimated that
“one third of the people in the settlement today are Tanzanians” (G5). This is surprising
since Tanzanians other than government employees have not been ocially allowed to
live in the settlement and borders of the settlement have been policed. While the refugees’
places of origin influenced their distribution across Ulyankulu, the choice of place of
residence of Tanzanian citizens in the settlement has been guided by dierent processes.
In order to evade the government’s border control, many Tanzanians live in the centre,
while areas close to the border and far from the centre were inhabited almost entirely by
Burundians. As a second-generation refugee woman explained:
“InMsimba village [in Mbeta] – Road 7 – most people are Burundians. They
are not mixed with Tanzanians, even in primary school they speak Kirundi
and even the teachers are Hutu! Msimba is a village along the border of
Makingi. It is the area near the settlement ocer. There was a gate there.
Tanzanians were not allowed to be there, so most of them penetrated into the
interior. Also in the Northern part [in Igombemkulu] is the border. Most of
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Figure 4.8: Satellite Image Ulyankulu Settlement and Reserves
Source: SA3 (2007:35)
*The red circle demarcates Ulyankulu Settlement. Green lines are the borders (in reality
not visible) of the forest reserves that surround and cut through the settlement.
them, who used to live there, were Hutu, but nowadays, Sukumas are there to
graze their cattle. The area used to be under patrol of the operation police”
(S2, emphasis added).
126
4.3 phase 2: local government, economic development and integration
SPATIAL HISTORY, ECONOMY, AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE OF ULYANKULU 
SETTLEMENT 
44 
 
 
Figure 2.10 Satellite Image Ulyankulu Settlement and Reserves 
Source: SA3 (2007:35) 
*The red circle demarcates Ulyankulu Settlement. Green lines are the borders (in reality not 
visible) of the forest reserves that surround and cut through the settlement. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.11 Moyowosi Game Reserve, 1976 
Source: Surveys and Mapping Division (1976) 
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Figure 4.9: Moyowosi Game Reserve, 1976
Source: Surveys and Mapping Division (1976)
Ga e Reserve
In contrast to most Burundians who were given a piece of land to cultivate, Tanzanians
who moved to Ulyankulu recently have bought or rented land and houses from those
who repatriated to Burundi in 2009, from other refugees or even Tanzanians who left the
settlement. As the settlement ocer explained, it is ocially not allowed for Tanzanians
to buy land from the refugees:
“Actually we don’t give people plots right now. [...] The leaders of the villages
can allocate the land to someone; we only grace it. [...] If there is vacant land,
it can be allocated to members of the same village. Few people apply for the
land. We only allocate for use, not for ownership. If it is about public use [e.g.
schools], people get another piece of land [as compensation]. Community use
is a high priority; we value community use of the land highly. Some people
are cheatingTanzanians to sell land to them. UnfortunatelymanyTanzanians
don’t know about it – in the process of relocation they [the refugees] have to
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leave the place as plain as possible and take the building materials. This is
just a camp – in the camp you can only own land temporarily” (G2).
Land rights were thus dierent in the settlement than elsewhere in Tanzania. Refugees
in the settlement only had usufruct land rights in contrast to citizens elsewhere, who can
lease village land for 99 years and obtain a land title. While the World Bank and the Tan-
zanian government have tried to encourage people elsewhere in the country to formalise
their usufruct land titles (cf. De Soto, 2006), the settlement area was an exceptional place
where the opposite was promoted. Refugees indeed did not enjoy full property rights.
Within the space of the settlement, Tanzanian citizens ocially did not even have
usufruct land rights. While the refugees’ use of land was strongly shaped by government
control in the settlement, Tanzanians (besides government workers) were not allowed to
live there at all. There was a gap between the ocial number of Tanzanians in the settle-
ment, who all work for the government, and the reality on the ground. According to the
settlement ocer:
“In Ulyankulu, there are 600 recognised Tanzanians. All others are not recog-
nised, they are intruders. The area of the settlement is supposed to be for the
Burundian refugees only” (G2).
However, the government did not evict all “intruders”. In contrast to the top-down
planned plot distribution to refugees, the spatial distribution of Tanzanians in the settle-
ment occurred according to their own practical needs and to arising opportunities. By
living in the settlement against the government’s rules, they practically evaded theMHA’s
provisions and called its control into question. As will be argued in Chapter 5 below, this
was possible due to leniency on the part of some individual government ocers. The
presence of Tanzanians in the settlement, as will be argued in Chapter 6, has also been an
important prerequisite for the de facto integration of refugees in Tanzania, and for their
sense of belonging to the nation.
4.3.4 From `open door' policy to increasing restrictiveness
While the treatment of refugees was overall similar to that of citizens within the settle-
ment, at a national level refugee policies became more restrictive after President Mwinyi
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took oce in 1985. An important reason for this was a scarcity of resources and lack of
international support (Nordic Consultancy Group, 2010: 22). Nevertheless, in the 1990s,
Tanzania agreed to host the largest influx of refugees up until that time: in 1993, 250,000
Burundians and hundreds of thousands of Rwandans fled genocidal violence. In 1994
the refugee population climbed to 883,300, settling in camps in Kigoma and Karagwe
regions (UNHCR, 2000: 312). In March 1995, Tanzania changed its ‘open door’ policy
and closed its border with Burundi to prevent Rwandan refugees in Burundi from coming
to Tanzania (Mendel, 1997: 38). Then in December 1996 Rwandan refugees were told to
leave Tanzania by the end of that year. An armed intervention was launched against those
who did not accept this policy.
There were several reasons for these decisions. First, increasing restrictiveness was ef-
fectuated by a changing domestic Tanzanian political environment. Anti-refugee rhetoric
started to be spread in the run up to the country’s first multiparty elections in 1995, which
were implemented partially as a result of international pressure. In general, the political
environment became more focused on internal security instead of pan-Africanism (as
under President Nyerere) or economic restructuring (as during President Mwinyi’s rule)
(Nordic Consultancy Group, 2010: 22). In the name of internal security, refugees were
redefined from ‘welcomed guests’ to ‘unwanted others.’ This was a tactic by the CCM to
win support by a larger number of voters as the party promised to deal with the refugee
‘problem’, portrayed as a threat from the outside. As the outcome of these elections, Ben-
jamin Mkapa, the CCM candidate, was able to secure 62% of the vote.
In thewake of these elections, foreign policy also changed. UnlikeNyerere’s acceptance
of refugees from struggles for national liberation at the expense of friendly regional rela-
tions, the new regime aimed to keep good relations with all neighbours. This change in
foreign policy also transpired to the expulsion of the Rwandans, which served tomaintain
good relations with the Rwandan government (Milner, 2009).
Besides changing politics, another reason for the shift in refugee policy was the na-
ture of the refugee population. Members of the former Rwandan government joined the
refugee movement to Tanzania. Therefore, concerns were voiced that the refugees consti-
tuted a threat to security. Furthermore, the scale of the influx of refugees was worrisome
and international assistance not adequate for these extraordinary large numbers. Finally,
the number of arrivals exceeded the capacity of forests and agricultural lands in the host-
ing areas and therefore caused environmental damage (Milner, 2009 119).
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In the decade to come, Tanzania started to become ever more restrictive. The gov-
ernment passed a new Refugees Act in 1998, which issued that all Burundians should
move to camps, even those who had arrived in the 1970s. Tanzanian authorities began to
round-up Burundians living outside the camps. Furthermore, when crime rates rose in
the camps due to overcrowding and food shortages, refugees were prohibited from trav-
elling more than 4 km outside the camps; which curtailed all economic activity between
refugees and the local population. The hostile attitude towards the refugees was again
fostered during the second multi-party elections in 2000 where the opposing parties used
the refugee issue to promise to take local (host) populations’ grievances into account by
sending the refugees back home (L’Ecluse, 2010: 43).
The National Refugee Policy 2003 formally enshrined the previously announced lim-
itations on freedom of movement and on economic activity. This shows how dramati-
cally asylum policy has shifted: from encouraging self-reliance to confining refugees in
isolated and insecure refugee camps (Milner, 2009). Going even further, since 2005 the
government has pushed for Tanzania to become a refugee free zone altogether (Nordic
Consultancy Group, 2010: 23). During the period from 2002 to 2010, a total of 363,000
refugees were repatriated from the camps with UNHCR assistance.
In the beginning of November 2010, Tanzania held national elections. The incumbent
President Jakaya Kikwete, candidate of CCM, won the election but lost a substantial
number of votes compared to previous elections. With 61% of the votes, he could still
ensure a comfortable majority but the turnout was low. The opposition party,Chama cha
Demokrasia wa Maendeleo (Chadema) gained a significant number of votes in the 2010
elections, as well as the Civic United Front (CUF; EISA, 2011). Again, the CCM used
anti-refugee rhetoric and promised to send all refugees home as a tactic to gain more
votes (L’Ecluse, 2010).
In summary, during Phase 2 the government treated the refugees similarly to citizens
within the settlement. For example, they participated in building schools just like Tan-
zanian citizens elsewhere. Refugees also behaved like de facto citizens by becoming inte-
grated in the local, national and in the international economy. However, echoing colonial
concerns, the government realised that environmental damage was caused over time. In
the absence of a solution to the problem, it has blamed the refugees for it. As will be
shown in Chapter 5, environmental reasons, amongst others, were later cited as a reason
for relocating the refugees as part of the naturalisation initiative. During Phase 2, Tanza-
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nian citizens also moved back to the settlement area, seeing it as a preferred place to live,
for example for cultivation and the grazing of animals. Within the settlement space, both
Tanzanians and refugees have not enjoyed land rights as elsewhere in the country. The
political approach towards refugees during that time became increasingly exclusionary
as refugees were restricted in their freedom of movement from the settlement.
4.4 Phase 3: The Naturalisation Initiative, subsequent NonMaintenance and Adminis
trative Invisibilisation to `End the Refugee Chapter' since 2007
4.4.1 Citizenship for Burundian refugees
Against the backdrop of increasing restrictiveness, it seems surprising that the Minister
of Home Aairs Lawrence Masha publically announced the naturalisation of more than
162,000 Burundian refugees in April 2010, saying “Let me be the first person to welcome
you as Tanzanians and not refugees” (cited in Hassan, 2010). Analysing donor engage-
ment in Tanzania’s overall refugee assistance programme in the years prior to this deci-
sion suggests that the naturalisation was a means to re-engage donors in general, to draw
attention to this population in particular, and to obtain funds for various development
projects in the country.
Indeed, since 2000 the UNHCR consistently reported that its programme in Tanzania
was adversely aected by limited and unpredictable donor support. In 2001, the budget
was reduced by 20% resulting in a struggle to maintain a minimum level of health care
and food assistance. Furthermore, in 2002 and 2003 the World Food Programme (WFP)
reduced food distributions by up to 50% of the normal rations. The government repeat-
edly stated that it would only continue hosting refugees if the international community
provided the necessary support (Milner, 2009: 125-126).
Naturalising the Burundian refugees appears to have constituted a master stroke to
solvemany problems and to foster various initiatives. The budget oered by international
donors included financial means for the repatriation of refugees who wished to return to
Burundi, means for the naturalisation itself and also for the local integration of refugees.
In theOld Settlements, 222,036 refugees lived there in 2007 (Hovil andKweka, 2008). Due
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to the government policy, the UNHCR helped wide-scale repatriations of 53,000 of these
refugees to Burundi in 2008 and 2009.
Due to the proposal of relocating refugees to various regions in Tanzania (further dis-
cussed below), the local integration part of the budgetwould also benefit receiving regions
where development projects would be implemented in order to integrate the refugees (an
increased number of students would for example necessitate building new classrooms)9.
These plans would be carried out by the UNHCR together with the UNDP as part of the
newworld-wide UN reform initiative ‘Delivering as One.’ Tanzania was chosen as a pilot
country to carry out a UN Joint Programme to enhance cooperation between UN agen-
cies in the country and to act as One UN, starting in 2007. With respect to its Tanzania
programme, the UNHCR (2008: 15) mentioned:
“UNHCR is also supporting 171,000 naturalizing refugees to integrate into
their regions of destination. These refugees are from a farming background,
are predominantly young, and have already formed extensive links in the in-
formal economy. The One UN JP 1, ‘Wealth creation, employment & eco-
nomic empowerment’, is targeting poverty country-wide in rural areas and
in unplanned, un-serviced urban areas. The newly-naturalized fit this Joint
Programme very closely, and it is planned that this Joint Programme will be
extended to Regions hosting the newly-naturalized.”
The naturalisation of the Burundian refugees from the 1970s also served to render a
population visible again, which was previously invisibilised by UNHCR statistics. From
1985, when they became self-reliant, to 2007, these refugees were not mentioned in UN-
HCR’s Statistical Yearbooks as refugees, and are still only listed as ‘other persons of
concern’. The government, however, always counted them towards its total refugee popu-
lation, claiming that it amounted to over 800,000 in 2005 (Milner, 2009: 125). Especially
against the backdrop of restrictiveness, ocially naturalising the Burundian refugees
was seen as a generous move by the international community, and thus constituted a
favourable foreign policy move to enhance Tanzania’s reputation. At the same time, it
allowed the government to use this refugee population as a tool for development, remi-
niscent of Tanzania’s earlier post-independence policies.
9The original NASCIP document envisaged a budget of in total US$144, including US$36 million for
‘community based programmes’, a ‘direct community support component’ of US$15.5 and a ‘transition,
hosting and livelihood support’ of US$40.75 (Prime Minister’s Oce 2010-2014: 11, emphasis added).
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The process of naturalisation began in July 2007 with a census, followed by a regis-
tration process in which refugees were asked to choose between returning to Burundi or
receiving naturalisation and staying in Tanzania. Constituting a logistical challenge, the
government raised an application fee of $50 (previously $800), which was paid by UN-
HCR on behalf of the refugees. While the Tanzanian government played a major role
in the process, the UNHCR worked together with the implementing agencies TCRS and
the German Association for Technical Cooperation (GTZ; now German Association for
International Cooperation, GIZ), on the processing of applications in Ulyankulu (Hovil
and Kweka, 2008: 18).
There is a precedent of naturalisation in Tanzania: in 1980, naturalisation was oered
to several thousand Rwandan refugees from Muyenzi and Kimuli settlements. Although
the implementation was cumbersome and took over a decade to be finished, this seems
to have constituted the first mass naturalisation on the continent (Gasarasi, 1990). After
a period of resistance by the Rwandese any measure of permanency in Tanzania, they
came to value the Tanzanian residence permit and there was an outcry for naturalisation.
According to Gasarasi (1990), it was dicult to keep the Rwandese in settlements and
therefore, the government had little to lose by granting citizenship to them. The granting
of citizenship might have even been beneficial in terms of reducing disruptive political
activities. However, only few Rwandese ultimately obtained their certificates. After this
precedent about 30 years ago, the Tanzanian government again oered collective natural-
isation, this time on an even larger scale.
Why repatriation was not an alternative to local integration
Before discussing details of the naturalisation initiative, it is necessary to briefly explain
why the majority of refugees from 1972 have not returned to their country of origin. The
strongest push factor is still the security situation in Burundi (Green 2011). Nevertheless
between 2002 and 2007, an estimated 378,800 Burundian refugees repatriated to Burundi
from around the region; 38,900 of which returned from Tanzania in the year of 2007 only
(UNHCR 2007, cited in Hovil and Kweka, 2008: 18).
In fact, themajority of Burundian refugeeswho came in 1972wanted to go ‘home’; they
were tired of being labelled ‘refugees’, of not having access to freedom of movement and
political rights. Those who have returned were relieved to have shed their refugee status
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and the stigma of a label that had stayed with them throughout their time in exile (Hovil
and Kweka, 2009). Those who decided to repatriate via the ocial route of the UNHCR
were allowed to carry a maximum of 100 kg (originally 50 kg) to Burundi. Many had
their property stolen without compensation, especially on the Burundian side (returnee
from Rutana Province, Burundi, cited in Hovil, 2009: 20). Others became victims of
violence (Hovil, 2009). Upon arrival, those who were part of the ocial repatriation
scheme were assisted with housing, legal advice, provision of health care and a cash grant
of 50,000 Burundian francs ($45 USD). Only in April 2009 these benefits were extended
to the refugees from 1972.
Salient constraints awaited the returning refugees. Burundi had limited resources for
reintegration and often inadequate social services. Moreover, refugees faced problems
relating to the re-acquisition of land. Those whose land was given to corporate or gov-
ernment ventures could not reclaim their land and were moved to ‘peace villages’. These
villages had limited infrastructure and land is in some cases barren. Under Burundian law,
ownership of land that has been peacefully occupied for 30 years by a particular owner
cannot be challenged. Many returnees were able to reclaim a portion of their original
land but this was not perceived as fair by many returnees. Hovil (2010) thus proposes
that sharing land can only be a short-term solution and that sharing land and moving to
peace villages should not be equatedwith reconciliation, as the government has presented
it. The oer of citizenship came at a time at which – especially for those who arrived in
1972 – returning to their country of origin on a collective basis would have been hardly
a viable possibility. After having refused to grant refugees citizenship following a normal
procedure (as it would be given to other immigrants), mass naturalisation was an option
of last resort.
Who was able to register for citizenship; who was excluded?
While the citizenship scheme aimed to be inclusive, 2170 applications for citizenship by
refugee applicants and their dependents were rejected after a screening by district and re-
gional Security and Defence Committees that checked the applications in 2007 (UNHCR,
2012; see Table 4.1 below). Scholars raised concern that many applications were rejected
for arbitrary reasons (Hovil and Kweka, 2008: 3). Some of these included a ‘big fam-
ily size’ or that refugees were ‘not cooperative’ (Hovil, 2009: 7). Other reasons included
where families did not conform to specific structures, e.g. womenwhose husbandswere in
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Burundi or children who had not been ocially adopted. In the latter case, children were
in danger of being separated from their families, especially if the family had opted for nat-
uralisation. Women did not have the option to choose for themselves – only men could
decide about repatriation or naturalisation. Anyone with a criminal record – whether in
the end convicted or not – could not apply at all and people with disabilities were depen-
dent on their families’ decisions. Confusions with the Burundian Swahili accent could
have further caused some being denied citizenship (Hovil and Kweka, 2008).10
Below one can see a table of submitted, accepted and rejected applications for natural-
isation by settlement (Table 4.1). What is striking is that in Ulyankulu settlement there
were considerably fewer rejected cases than in the other settlements. Reasons for this are
not entirely clear – one possibility is that the Security and Defence Committees in Ul-
yankulu settlement were not as strict in rejecting applications as in the other settlements
(source: personal communication with ocial in Ulyankulu settlement).
Settlement Submitted applications Accepted applications Rejected applications
Appl. Dep. Total Appl. Dep. Total Appl. Dep. Total
Ulyankulu 20500 26520 47020 20498 26520 47018 2 0 2
Mishamo 23742 30027 53769 23208 29387 52595 526 629 1155
Katumba 28219 35441 63660 27752 34863 62615 452 561 1013
Total 72461 91988 164449 71458 90770 162228 980 1190 2170
Table 4.1: Naturalisation Statistics Position
Source: UNHCR (2012) *appl.=applications; dep.=dependants
In any case, the above mentioned reasons for rejection were irrelevant to the threshold
criteria set for naturalisation under Tanzanian law and thus constitute rights violations.
What was supposed to happen to these refugees was unclear.
What did applying for Tanzanian citizenship mean in practice?
In 2007, 79% of the population in the three settlements stated they wished to apply for
naturalisation (Hovil and Kweka, 2008: 9). The number of those wanting to return to
Burundi (approximately one fifth) roughly corresponded with the number of refugees
10To a Tanzanian, the Burundian Swahili accent for “getting a naturalisation certificate” (nakata uraia)
sounds almost identical to “I refuse (nakataa) naturalisation” (Hovil and Kweka, 2008: 21).
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born in Burundi. Around 80% of them belonged to the second generation (SA3, 2007;
see Ch.3). In fact, second generation refugees may have already been Tanzanian citizens.
Under Tanzanian law, anyone born in Tanzania after 1966 is a Tanzanian citizen (Hovil
and Kweka, 2008: Annex). Although de jure there is no mention of refugees, de facto,
this law does not apply to them. Seen in this light, the naturalisation of the refugees
already born in Tanzania does not seem very progressive but rather as a retrospective
redress of the exclusion of refugees from Tanzanian law. In practice, the refugees only
had two options: naturalisation or repatriation. The possibility of resettlement was not
considered and protection was not guaranteed in case the refugees did not apply. This
pressure might have increased the number of applications.
Ultimately around 160,000 Burundians registered for naturalisation certificates. New-
born babies were additionally registered in the subsequent years. The next step, which
was to go hand in hand with naturalisation, was the relocation of the new citizens to Tan-
zanian villages, a process that was supposed to be completed by 2014. According toHovil
(2009: 37) reasons for this relocationwere a shortage of land in the settlement regions and
the fear that naturalised refugees living relatively close to the borders presented a security
risk. The government also feared a ‘Burundian enclave’ in the settlement region. ‘Land
grabbing’ was another reason: parts of Kigoma region in the west of the country, where
about 22,000 Burundian refugees live in villages, as well asMishamo and Katumba settle-
ments, were to be sold to AgriSol Energy, an agribusiness company from Iowa (Siyame,
2011). Whereas some refugees were to go to places they had chosen, others, who had
not specified where they wanted to go or who chose locations that did not have sucient
available land, were to be allocated new homes by the government. A budget was created
to give every relocating refugee TZS 300,00011 per person in order to allow him/her to
travel to the destination and start building a house there. However, the question arises
whether such relocationwould have constituted a new form of displacement, which could
have been traumatic. In fact, some NNTs feared they could be stigmatised in their final
destinations after relocation (Hovil, 2009).
The strategy employed for the relocation was enshrined in the National Strategy for
Community Integration Programme (NASCIP), which planned for the relocation of the
NNTs, a total of 35,000 households/families, to over 50 districts in 16 regions. Some
criteria for the selection of regions included availability of land and population density.
11TZS 300,000 equalled GBP 120 at an exchange rate of 0.0004 on 30 November 2012).
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Group B
Number Region Households
1 Morogoro 853
2 Kigoma 656
3 Tabora 600
4 Rukwa 545
5 Shinyanga 176
6 Pwani 123
7 Kagera 105
8 Mbeya 87
9 Tanga 45
10 Singida 35
11 Iringa 21
12 Dodoma 6
Group C
Number Region Households
1 Dodoma 1450
2 Manyara 969
3 Tanga 965
4 Singida 704
5 Shinyanga 472
6 Pwani 106
Figure 4.10: Ulyankulu Settlement: Allocation of Households by Region, Group B and C
Source: UNHCR (2012)12
TheUNHCRwas chargedwith the task of administering amass information campaign in
all 16 regions organised from six zonal coordination centres, namely Dodoma, Mtwara,
Mwanza, Iringa and Dar es Salaam (cf. Prime Minister’s Oce, 2010-2014). While the
receiving regions were chosen by the government, the NNTs were allowed to travel out
of the settlements to ‘scout for’ suitable locations in selected destination regions in order
to make preparations. The means for the transaction of suitable land were to be met by
the government. Land could either be purchased by individual private owners or, where
not otherwise possible, the government was to facilitate the acquisition of public land,
in accordance with the Land Act and Village Lands Act of 1999 (ibid.). In the NASCIP
document, refugees were divided into three groups: Group A, which already lives outside
of the settlement and does not need to be relocated, Group B, which has chosen a place to
relocate to, andGroupC,which did not indicate a region to go to. ConcerningUlyankulu,
these groups comprised 750, 3,261 and 4,666 households respectively. The tables below
(Figure 4.11) show the divisions of Group B and C by regions to be relocated to. In total
7,927 households were identified to relocate from that settlement only (UNHCR, 2012a).
12In the original chart in Ulyankulu Briefing Note (UNHCR, 2012a), two more regions with 6 and 3
households respectively were included in the chart for Group B, but the names of these regions were not
included in the legend. The charts of Group B and C above show 13 regions in total. The remaining three
regions that were designated as hosting regions in NASCIP are Lindi, Mtwara and Ruvuma. The missing 9
households in Group B were supposed to be relocated to two of the aforementioned regions.
137
4.4 phase 3: naturalisation, non-maintenance and invisibilisation
What kind of citizenship was oered? Considering dual citizenship
One concern was that those who opted for Tanzanian citizenship may lose claims to their
Burundian nationality since they were asked by the Tanzanian government to renounce
their Burundian citizenship when registering for naturalisation (Hovil, 2009). In fact,
in Burundi, dual citizenship is allowed by Article 21 of the current law on nationality
(Hovil, 2009). As proclaimed by Foreign Aairs and International Co-operationMinister
BernardMembe in October 2010, Tanzania will as well allow dual citizenship in order to
benefit from its own diaspora from that time onwards (Nordic Africa News, 2010). This
law was a response to pressures from Tanzanian elites abroad (Chachage, 2009). The
dual citizenship law has not taken eect yet but it is planned to be enshrined in the newly
proposed constitution (Manby, 2014). Roughly half of all African countries have relaxed
their dual citizenship laws, often in order to allow their diasporas in the West to retain
links to their home country (Manby, 2009: 23).
The question arises whether dual citizenship would also apply to refugees, in case the
naturalisation was carried out. According to Burundian law, citizens who have revoked
their nationality in order to acquire foreign citizenship are allowed to later reclaim it. The
fact that dual citizenship was not allowed might have deterred especially some of the first
generation Burundians from applying for Tanzanian citizenship. Considering the dire
prospects upon return, this is unfortunate for those who may have opted for return in
order to stay Burundians (compare also to Mauritanians in Senegal, who did not opt for
Senegalese citizenship since they feared to lose claims toMauritanian citizenship, Manby,
2010). When the naturalisation policy was put on hold, the situation was highly volatile
for everyone: having ocially revoked their Burundian citizenship, the (former) refugees
were eectively stateless.
Intra-Tanzanian tensions and the reversal of the initiative
While the process of naturalisation was already under way, its implementation occurred
in a context of xenophobia and of hostility towards the scheme itself (Hovil and Kweka,
2008). Concernwas raised by regional commissioners (Hovil and Kweka, 2009: 8), by par-
liamentarians the Government of Tanzania (Nordic Consulting Group, 2010: 8) and even
by the central government itself. Regional commissioners feared that the arrival of the
relocated and naturalised Burundians would jeopardise security and would overall con-
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stitute a burden. Moreover, parliamentarians opposed the relocation of refugees because
they questioned an investment deal that was to sell some of the land that refugees culti-
vated in theOld Settlements to a foreign investor (see Chapter 5, Section 5.2.4). Following
these concerns, some government ocials claimed that the country had been pushed – as-
sumingly by the UNHCR – to naturalise the refugees without consideration of the local
community and the future of the country (PrimeMinister of Tanzania, cited in Hovil and
Kweka, 2009)13.
However, eventually, the MHA in charge of the naturalisation scheme, and the Prime
Minister’s Oce for Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG), re-
sponsible for administering the local integration of the new citizens, showed positive
engagement with the endeavour (Nordic Consulting Group, 2010: 78). Furthermore,
even though some Tanzanians see Burundians as combative (Hovil and Kweka, 2009: 8),
host communities showed a friendly attitude towards naturalisation (Nordic Consulting
Group, 2010: 78). However, despite the fact that the Tanzanian government had accepted
the scheme and UNHCR had oered comprehensive funding, regional governments were
reluctant to create budgets because this would indicate acceptance of the scheme. District
and regional security committees also resisted it (Hovil and Kweka, 2009; cf. evaluation
of TANCOSS, Tanzania Comprehensive Solutions Strategy, cited in Nordic Consulting
Group, 2010: 78).
Intra-Tanzanian tensions resulting in antagonistic scalar politics eectively prevented
a smooth implementation of the scheme: while all national actors were willing to grant
de jure citizenship, the parliament opposed the relocation, just like regional governments,
which were worried about the refugees’ presence in their regions after relocation despite
naturalisation. Furthermore, the incoherent outcome of the registration for citizenship
between the three settlements caused concern (see above). Due to these issues, the gov-
ernment eventually announced in 2011 that the policy would be on hold until further
decisions would be taken. Concerning the budget for the scheme, by 2008, the UNHCR
had oered US$12.1 million14 (Hovil and Kweka, 2009), which was later adjusted to 12.7
million, then to 22.2million (DfiD, 2012) and finally to 34.3million (UNHCR 2008-2009).
13Considering the discussion above, however, the government did initially have a considerable interest in
the scheme, so this quote seems to be a retroactive redress of its own policy.
14This figure was in fact quoted by Hovil and Kweka (2009:9) as 12.1 billion but this is likely to be a
mistake since other ocial sources quote figures in millions and not billions (UNHCR, 2008-2009; DfiD,
2012).
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This still only constituted a fraction of what the NASCIP document envisaged, namely
144 million in total in a period of 2010-2014 (PrimeMinister’s Oce, 2010-2014: 11). Ac-
cording to UNHCR’s supplementary appeal, the oered budget was allocated for “com-
prehensive solutions”, including naturalisation, local integration of those who wished to
remain in Tanzania, repatriation of those whowished to go to Burundi, and reintegration
in Burundi (ibid.: 9). Donors included the EC regional protection programme, the USA,
ECHO15, EC-European Development Fund (2nd part), Japan, Belgium, Germany, Ire-
land and finally the Department for International Development in the UK (DfID), which
vouched to cover a funding gap of 6,1 million for the relocation and local integration of
refugees in hosting regions (DfiD, 2012). When by April 2012, the local integration pro-
gramme remained on hold, DfiD decided to “close this project and relocate the balance
of the programme funds to other humanitarian needs in Tanzania” (ibid.: 4).
Given the withdrawal of funding, the reluctance to engage with the scheme by regional
governments and the ocial halt of the scheme announced by the central government, the
year 2012 was ones of heightened uncertainty for all actors involved.
4.4.2 NonMaintenance and abandonment of Ulyankulu Settlement
In 2007, the Government of Tanzania, under the Ministry of Home Aairs, took over
the task of ending the protracted refugee situation by naturalising the refugees in the Old
Settlements. At that time, the UNHCR reestablished its presence in Ulyankulu (UNHCR,
2012b) and the local government structure was dismantled. This marked the beginning
of a new phase in the governance of Ulyankulu settlement, which was characterised by an
administrative invisibilisation of the settlement and non-maintenance of social services
within the settlement. The invisibilisation of the settlement was encouraged by with-
drawing local government services, which previously used to be embedded in broader
governance structures of the district of Urambo and the region of Tabora. This in turn
led to a lack of representation of local Tanzanians and refugees at the district level.
15European Commission, Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department (ECHO)
140
4.4 phase 3: naturalisation, non-maintenance and invisibilisation
Cuts in social services and lack of representation
While the diwaniwere disempowered, village leaders (themselves refugees) have remained
in place, from then on reporting directly to the settlement ocer, who was assigned by
the Ministry of Home Aairs.
“In Ulyankulu division today, there are no village executive ocers [mtendaji
wa kijiji, employed by the DED16], no ward executive ocers [mtendaji wa
kata, employed by DED] and no ward councillor or representative [diwani,
elected by the people – Tanzanian citizens – in the villages], but village chair-
men are still employed [mwenyekiti, elected by people – here refugees – in the
villages]. Before 2006, they were all here in Ulyankulu” (G5).
According to a former diwani, the cancellation of the ward representative structure
occurred in order to give more power to the MHA:
“From 2000 until 2006 I was a ward representative [diwani]. Since 2006, there
are no ward representatives in the settlement any more. [...] Principally, we
worked with the local government. The diwaniwere well known and listened
to, they represented the people verywell. TheUNocerswere not considered
as leaders at that time. The ward representatives were cancelled so that the
MHA has more power over the area” (C3).
The cancellation of the ward representatives also meant that people’s opinions were
not represented at the district council any more. As a consequence, social services were
scaled down:
“During the diwani’s power, dierent development projects were established
in this area, but after they were restricted from being representatives in this
area, these development projects stagnated. That’s why dierent properties
that were distributed by the government to this area were taken back to the
district oce and the projects stopped. [...] Like schools, streets, even the
hospital are not maintained; the service is not good anymore. Even these
tobacco cooperative societies, which were doing tobacco farming, were given
subsidies... but nowadays, they don’t get subsidies [ruzuku] any more” (C3).
16District executive director
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Similarly, another former ward representative explained,
“Thereweremisunderstandings between the settlement ocer and us. We did
development projects as diwani. They did not consider the refugees or Tan-
zanians; we considered them as the same. [...] During my position I tried to
find an accurate communication between the hospital at Road 10 andUrambo
Hospital. So I founded a radio call, which is working until now. If solutions
were given [at the district council], we brought them back to the people. We
built dispensaries, teachers’ houses...During this time as diwani, I built one
teacher’s house and four classes; in Makonge three classrooms and toilets of
six chambers for each school. I was diwani for four villages: Kaswa,Makonge,
Mkindo and Ikonongo. Up to now there is no communication between the
district government and here. We also built a water tank at the health centre
to harvest rainwater” (C4).
As a consequence, Tanzanians living in Ulyankulu felt invisibilised and refugees no
longer participated in village meetings:
“Nowadays, there are many Tanzanians here in the settlement. I think we
reach 20,000 people. The government should consider this place and not sep-
arate [kutenganisha] it from the rest of the area. Also, we are making a big
contribution to the food and to the government [through taxes]. Almost every
week onWednesday and Saturday, we take agricultural products from the area
taken to other parts or sites where they have contributed [to the food avail-
ability]. Other Tanzanians come here to buy maize etc. There is a reason for
the government to assist us here. It is true – we have a very big contribution
to the government but it doesn’t see us!” (C4, emphasis added).
Furthermore, according to the village chairman of Kaswa, village meetings used for
development purposes have not taken place for a long time. Villagemeetings are normally
held once per month or once in two months. The participants are the hamlet leaders
(vitongoji), leaders of the lowest administrative units, about the size of a small village.
The Village Chairman of Kaswa explained, “Once in a while, there used to be a larger
village meeting with all villagers involved.” However, “There has not been such ameeting
for three years because the settlement might be closed. The purpose of those meetings
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was to accelerate certain development projects but nowadays there are no development
projects; so there are also no meetings.”
Control or abandonment?
Since 2006 (ocially, 2007) there have only been a few government ocials employed in
Ulyankulu. The main government presence, the settlement ocer and his assistants, is
located in a building far away from the centre of Ulyankulu, at Road 1 (see Plate 4.9). A
former ward representative explained that the centre has been abandoned:
“Government ocials from Urambo have not been here even though we as
Tanzanians live here as well. In the centre of the settlement here, there is
no government service at all from 2006 up to now. It is like a home without
mother and father” (C4).
When asked why there are so few government ocials in the settlement, the settlement
ocer said, “These people [i.e. the refugees in Ulyankulu] are lucky to get one or two;
the Tanzanians don’t have that” (G2).
On the one hand, the settlement commander thus presented theMHA’s presence in the
settlement as a service for the refugees instead of as a control measure. He commented
that “theTanzanians don’t have that”, which infers acknowledgement of the disadvantage
suered by the Tanzanians in Ulyankulu, who lack any representation in the settlement
since the cancellation of the ward representatives.
On the other hand, he acknowledges that the MHA alone is not able to provide ade-
quate services. Therefore the MHA called some ocers of the local government (under
the DED, then in Urambo) back to work in the settlement to help out:
“They have been called up by the MHA to provide social services [...]. There
is a ward educational ocer, who is supervising teachers at primary and sec-
ondary school, a coordinator of educational activities. There are also agri-
cultural and animal husbandry extension ocers, who give veterinary and
agricultural extension advice to the peasants. Furthermore, there are health
ocers, like medical ocers and doctors. Their two main functions are to
eliminate dirty areas and mosquito areas; to look after food sold under dirty
conditions. They have oces. For instance the meat that we are eating, it
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needs to be checked by the agricultural extension ocer; they can say it is
unfit for consumption” (G2).
Furthermore, he stated that control is the main function of theMHA in the settlement:
“The settlement is administered as a camp; it has a nature of militarism; in villages they
don’t need a permit. Some people in Kigoma have been arrested for going without per-
mit; in Mpanda also I received a call [...]”. The main reason for the Ministry of Home
Aairs to be present in the settlement is thus to control the movement of refugees. These
accounts show that the Ministry of Home Aairs is the institution holding most power
over the settlement. The UNHCR and its partner TCRS (see Plates 4.10 and 4.11) are
only mentioned in passing. In fact, while its oce is located in the heart of Ulyankulu, its
tasks after the 2009 repatriation and the registration of refugees for naturalisation have
been limited. A women’s empowerment programme has been oered by the UNHCR
along with technical support for vulnerable people by the TCRS. Furthermore, the UN-
HCR has helped to construct both a new building at Ulyankulu Secondary School and an
extention of the health centre. Next to these endeavours, ocials mentioned that they are
mainly waiting for the government’s decision on the relocation and naturalisation initia-
tives. As the government remained silent on the policy, the UNHCR andTCRS eventually
scaled down both their activities and sta until they planned to resign entirely. The bud-
get (as shown in Chapter 4) for the relocation and handing out of citizenship certificates
was withdrawn in 2013.
Plate 4.9: Settlement Ocer’s Building at Road 1
Source: Author (2012)
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Plate 4.10: Gate to the UNHCR Compound at Road 13, Kaswa
Source: Author (2012)
Plate 4.11: Gate to the TCRS Compound at Road 13, Kaswa
Source: Author (June 2012)
Within the settlement, the Ministry of Home Aairs thus dismantled the previous gov-
ernance structure. This happened to the detriment of the Tanzanians and Burundians
living in the settlement. The abolition of theWard Representatives had real consequences
both in terms of the delivery of social services to the people as well as in terms of repre-
sentation to the district council. The UNHCRwas not filling this gap to the same extent.
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On the one hand, the low government presence in the settlement equalled one of aban-
donment of important services within the settlement as well as an abandonment of Tan-
zanians living in Ulyankulu. On the other hand, the power of the MHA was increased
in comparison to other government actors. Control of the settlement as such, i.e. con-
trol of movements outside of the settlement, was still upheld. Furthermore, the MHA
controlled the material landscape of the settlement, as will be shown in Chapter 5. The
abandonment of services in the settlement, however, was still realised in the context of
control. This abandonment only occurred since the settlement was supposed to be closed.
Refugees, however, were supposed to be continuously controlled even after the closure
through an organised relocation and local integration process.
4.4.3 Ulyankulu as a district? Invisibilisation of the settlement
While the previous section showed changes in the internal governance structure marked
by abandonment and non-maintenance, this section analyses the administrative position
and eventual invisibilisation of Ulyankulu within the region of Tabora. Previous ocial
announcements proclaimed that Ulyankulu would become a district but these plans have
not been realised. In July 2012, Urambo was split into two districts: Urambo and Kaliua.
Ulyankulu is now part of Kaliua, which is about 60 km further away from Ulyankulu
than the old district capital Urambo. The actual distance of Ulyankulu to Kaliua by
car is more than 100 km. Figures 4.11 and 4.12 show the location of Ulyankulu within
the former and the new districts. Although Ulyankulu is ocially not part of the local
government structure, it is still divided into three wards and statistically recorded at the
district council just as any other division – as can be seen in a table on school enrolment
data of 2012.
Various reasons were given as to why Kaliua was chosen to be a new district over Ul-
yankulu. The government ocial in Urambo noted:
“They [the refugees] were not used to being part of a ward – they have their
own administration. The district was bigger. The government wanted people
to get more nearby services rather than going far. [...] Ulyankulu will maybe
get their own district in the future but we start with Kaliua and Urambo. The
problem is there is a reserve there [in Ulyankulu]” (G6).
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Similarly, a government ocial in Kaliua elaborated: “the purpose is to give public
services near to the people. Peoplemust get all services very near from the administration;
rather than having an administration far away like Urambo” (G4).SPATIAL HISTORY, ECONOMY, AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE OF ULYANKULU 
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However this ocial added:
“One reason [for not choosing Ulyankulu as a district] is that about 55% of
the Ulyankulu division is covered by refugees, but population-wise, 95% of
the dwellers over there are refugees; it would be another Burundi in Tanzania.
Another reason is that the whole area, which is used by refugees, is a reserve
area, a national reserve area. Another reason is that the whole area is a good
sponge of water reserve: during the rainy season, the area is collecting water
under the soil. This water runs from Madarasi until Lake Tanganyika. Wa-
ter has now been reduced because of cutting trees for cultivation; the area is
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eroded to the maximum because of human activity there; the water is pol-
luted.
All these reasons were given to President Kikwete. In the election campaign
of 2010, he announced openly that Ulyankulu will be a district. But after
doing a scientific survey, they found out that it could be possible that Lake
Tanganyikawould dry up. The president thought deeply, if this is the solution.
Now Ulyankulu cannot be a district.
[...] They [the refugees] are bringing problems to our country, when you are
bringing them to Tabora, Mwanza...it means chaos. These refugees are in
touch with those people in Burundi. They do so; they have a direct commu-
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nication like me and you. They just pretend to be very polite but they are not
[...].”
The ocial thus presented three reasons for not accepting Ulyankulu as a district. Two
reasons were of environmental nature: turning Ulyankulu ocially into a district would
rule out the option of closing the settlement. In the long run, population pressures on the
forest reserve would increase and soil erosion of Igombe River would worsen. As could
be seen above, the environmental discourse reaches back to colonial times and it is now
applied to refugees. A third reason reflects the government’s fear of refugees as a security
threat and possibly fear of the Hutu’s “violent subjectivities” (Das et al., 2000) which was
voiced increasingly since the 1990s (see Section 4.3.4 above and Chapter 5).
A dierent informant suggested that the Member of Parliament, who was responsi-
ble for Urambo district (Juma Kapuye), influenced the decision of moving the district
from Ulyankulu to Kaliua for personal and political reasons: the government buildings
in Kaliua used to be his hotel and he could count on more voters’ support if Kaliua was
the new district. Interestingly, Kaliua was only able to become a district through the in-
clusion of the three wards of Ulyankulu settlement in order to meet the ocial minimum
requirements for population numbers necessary to form a district (interview with I3).
Scrutinising the reasons given, one can say that, as during British colonial times, the
areawas administratively invisibilised andwas planned to be vacated via relocation of the
refugees due to environmental reasons. The situation of refugees in Ulyankulu threatened
to become similar to Sierra Leonean refugees in the defunct Boreah camp in Guinea: they
were invisibilised by the ocial closure of the camp, by recent UNHCR statistics and
by budgetary planning. They were neither legal residents nor refugees, they no longer
obtained social services and the Guinean state was unable or unwilling to provide secure
legal status (Gale, 2008: 538). Concerning Ulyankulu, refugees were then only noted as
‘other people of concern’ rather than refugees. The withdrawal of the budget for local
integration also made it dicult to imagine whether the naturalisation process would
ever be completed. The attention given to the repatriation in 2012 of Burundian refugees
from the 1990s, who had lived in Mtabila camp, may have fostered the stagnation on the
naturalisation policy and the invisibilisation of the 1972 caseload.
The situation in Ulyankulu also resembled the invisibilisation that occurred when
Ethiopians were resettled from one part of the country to another in a so-called Vol-
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untary Resettlement Programme as part of a national food security strategy. The area
where they were resettled was remote and characterised by limited infrastructure, a low
presence of NGOs and marked by tsetse fly infestation (Hammond, 2008: 518). While
the targeted destitute people were highly visible before, they were rendered invisible by
the programme, and the aim of food security was not achieved either (ibid.: 521, 530).
Refugees from the Old Settlements were also highly internationally visible when they reg-
istered for naturalisation. Turning Ulyankulu into a district would have increased their
local and national visibility. However, since 2012 Ulyankulu has been further removed
from the district capital than ever. As Hammond (2008: 534) notes, “invisibilisation be-
came a way of trying to deny responsibility for the failures; an easier and less expensive
option than trying to correct the fundamental problems with the programme.”
In summary, the government suggested to naturalise the Burundian refugees in 2007
coupled with an attempt to relocate them to other regions and to close the Old Settle-
ments. This initative was also aimed to serve the development of the hosting regions.
Ultimately 80% of the refugees opted to register for citizenship, whereas 20% wished to
go back to Burundi and repatriated in 2008/2009. Since the settlements were supposed to
be closed, the local governance structure that had been in place before was dismantled. A
period of non-maintenance and abandonment followed. Ulyankulu was administratively
invisibilised by choosing to embed it in a new district with a distant capital instead of
turning it into a district of its own.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter elaborated the development of Ulyankulu in terms of its spatial history, eco-
nomic activities, social services and its governance structure in four phases. It also dis-
cussed the evolution of Tanzania’s refugee policy over time.
Various measures of control could be detected in each phase. Going back to colonial
times, the government continued to exercise control over the environment and over the
population since the establishment of the settlement. As a control measure during British
colonialism, the area was vacated for environmental reasons (Phase 0). Since indepen-
dence, the Tanzanian government was generally open towards dierent types and scales
of refugee movements under Nyerere’s leadership. His foreign policy supported refugees
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from other liberation struggles in a spirit of pan-Africanism, while his domestic policy
saw refugees from independent states as beneficial tools of development. Having arrived
and welcomed in Tanzania, refugees in Ulyankulu were supervised by international and
national humanitarian organisations (UNHCR and TCRS) as well as the Tanzanian cen-
tral government (under the Ministry of Home Aairs) in order to prepare them for life
in the settlement. Spatial control was exerted by arranging plots in a legible grid, and
the distribution to people from similar places of origin followed a security motive. Even-
tually due to environmental reasons, a part of the refugee population was shifted from
Ulyankulu to another new settlement further south in the country (Mishamo).
Nevertheless, despite these control measures, refugees were treated as de facto citi-
zens within the settlement especially in Phase 2, which began when refugees became self-
sucient in 1985. This phase lasted until 2007. Humanitarian organisations withdrew
from the area and Ulyankulu was integrated into local governance structures. During
this phase, refugees were granted more freedom to show agency in the development of
the space especially in economic terms and in terms of ‘self-help’ to improve education for
example by building schools. This type of agency was overt and went hand in hand with
the governmental provisions. In general, refugees, like citizens, were part of a larger re-
settlement and villagisation programme introduced by President Nyerere. They obtained
a plot of land to cultivate cash and food crops in order to become self-sucient and pay
taxes. Refugees were also encouraged to produce tobacco for the international market.
Over time, they turned the centre village Kaswa into an economic centre within Tabora
region. Thereby they have contributed to food security in the region. Echoing colonial
concerns, however, the government realised that ecological damage was caused in the
settlement area, and made the refugees responsible for it. Overall, living with relative au-
tonomy for more than two decades in this Phase, has shaped refugees sense of belonging,
as will be further elaborated in Chapter 6. At the national level, from the 1980s onwards,
processes of economic restructuring and of democratisation caused changes in the do-
mestic political environment, which in turn led to an increasingly restrictive approach
towards refugees. Foreign policy also changed towards supporting neighbouring govern-
ments rather than refugees. The changed approach towards refugees was also a response
to heightened insecurity caused by the large-scale influx of refugees in the 1990s. Starting
by expelling Rwandan refugees in 1996 and closing the border to Burundi, refugees faced
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new limitations concerning their freedom of movement and economic opportunities re-
inforced by the Refugees Act, 1998 and the National Refugee Policy 2003.
Even though Tanzanians were not allowed to live there, they have increasingly moved
to Ulyankulu from Tabora region and beyond. For the Nyamwezi, it is argued, moving
back was related to their historical attachment to the land. Before the refugees arrived,
Ulyankulu was the centre of Chief Mirambo’s rule and his grave can still be found in the
settlement (see Phase 0). Those who lived in the settlement were resident in the central
villages since the borders used to be more policed. The fact that refugees behaved and
were treated like citizens, and increasingly interacted with Tanzanians had important
eects on their sense of belonging, as argued in Chapter 6.
In a third phase of governance (since 2007) a large number of refugees with Burun-
dian origins were registered in order to obtain citizenship. A process of relocation to
dierent regions around the country was planned, which proved to be problematic and
threatened the purpose of the naturalisation in the first place. It was also problematic
that refugees had to renounce their Burundian citizenship when registering for Tanza-
nian citizenship since they were then eectively stateless after the naturalisation was put
on hold. The government, it is argued, initially agreed to the naturalisation in order to re-
engage donors and to obtain funds to develop the receiving regions. This was reminiscent
of Tanzania’s previous approach to use refugees as tools of development. It also aimed
to increase its reputation with the donor community as a foreign policy tactic. However,
regional governments and parliamentarians opposed the relocation for various reasons,
including opposition to a foreign investment deal that would aect the settlement areas.
These antagonistic stances were the reason to halt the scheme in 2011. Since the start
of the naturalisation initiative, the Ministry of Home Aairs dismantled the administra-
tive structure within the settlement and thinned out the local government’s presence in
order to prepare for the closure of the settlement. Refugees and Tanzanians in the set-
tlement have not been represented to the district council any more. Within the broader
region, Ulyankulu was administratively invisibilised: while the division of Ulyankulu was
previously planned to enjoy increased importance by becoming its own district, it has
been part of a new district located far away since 2012. These developments speak for
abandonment of the area, but a discourse of control related to the planned naturalisa-
tion and relocation was perpetuated at the same time. A repeated reason for the plan of
closing the settlement was environmental degradation. Another reason, was a security
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discourse, which the refugees have been subjected to and which has been used to justify
control (elaborated further in Chapter 5). The next chapter discusses how measures of
control functioned to exclude refugees from citizenship throughout these phases but also
how they were in tension with other processes and shifting priorities.
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THE CAMP AS A S PACE OF CONTROL ? T ENS IONS
B ETWEEN EXCLUS ION AND BE LONG ING
This chapter explores how the refugees in settlements have been excluded from citizen-
ship in a ‘space of control’ by government policies, how this exclusion has been justified
by discourses of various government actors, but also how this exclusion has been in ten-
sion with other local process of citizen-making and conviviality, involving refugees, Tan-
zanian citizens and government ocials. In the previous chapter it could be seen that
Ulyankulu settlement has undergone three main phases of governance since the arrival of
the refugees. It is argued here that throughout the transformations of all of these phase
over the course of four decades refugees remained excluded from de jure citizenship en-
forced by the Tanzanian government and international organisations by various means
(legal, spatial, temporal and military) but that a process of de facto citizenship has en-
folded, which included both citizenship self-making and being-made, as explained above
(cf. Ong, 1996).
In the first section, it is shown that at a policy level, refugees have been treated as
legal exceptions in Tanzania: refugees lack a number of constitutional de jure citizenship
rights as well as human rights, such as freedom of movement, political participation and
the right to work. As depicted in the second part of this section, observations on the
ground, however, reveal a central tension between control and exclusion on the one hand,
and belonging and elements of de facto citizenship on the other hand. In Ulyankulu
one can perceive that the government and international organisations restrict refugees
from obtaining information; they segregate refugees and citizens in public events, and
perpetuate a sense of temporal control. However, observation of such a public event also
revealed that refugees had learned forms of demonstrating commitment to the Tanzanian
nation in school – they showed their belonging to the nation by dancingTanzanian dances.
The government has supported schooling the refugees, which can be a key element in the
process of forming political subjects and de facto citizens. This shows that for both the
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government and refugees, citizenship is a status and a process. A third part of this section
explains how the government has enforced an artificial separation between refugees and
Tanzanians by controlling the border with military force. However, this could also be
seen as an attempt to protect the refugees from an invasion in their everyday lives.
The second section analyses discourses employed by government actors in relation to
the formerly proposed relocation policy. Fundamentally, that policy was the most con-
troversial issue in relation to the refugees in Ulyankulu at the time of fieldwork. The
relocation policy was already on hold in 2012 but it was still not clear whether it would
be implemented later. These discourses may also show why refugees had been excluded
from de jure citizenship until the naturalisation initiativewas announced in 2007, andwhy
it had not been implemented until the time of fieldwork in 2012. As this section shows,
all government actors voiced security concerns in relation to refugees and some also ex-
pressed concerns with mixing and purity of the Tanzanian nation. Security was here a
generalised national concern – it did not directly relate to local criminality of refugees
since numbers of crimes in Ulyankulu were not higher than elsewhere. By proposing the
relocation initiative, the central government shifted from a concern with purity towards
finding a solution that would permanently eliminate the category of ‘refugees’. However,
regional governments did not follow this shift and therefore, the relocation initiative was
put on hold.
In the third section of this chapter, the eects of the legal restrictions on refugees’ lives
in Ulyankulu are discussed. While refugees routinely evaded government control, they
also faced punishment. However, it becomes clear that at the same time refugees have
achieved a degree of conviviality with some government ocials, which allowed them
some leeway to act in the settlement according to their choice. This chapter shows types
and reasons of control and how they have been in tension between acts of exclusion and
belonging. This analysis will provide the context for Chapter 6, which will focus on a
nascent sense of belonging and citizenship claims-making by the refugees.
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5.1 Exclusion from Citizenship in a `Space of Control' in Tension with Processes of
Belonging
5.1.1 Exclusion from citizenship in legal and spatial terms
In this part the contents of top-down Tanzanian refugee policies, which were in place in
2012, are discussed in order to demonstrate the legal dimension of government control
over the Burndian refugees. It is shown which rights refugees in Ulyankulu lacked in com-
parison to Tanzanian citizens. Refugees were thereby excluded from de jure citizenship
but they were also hindered to integrate in the host community in a de facto (actual) man-
ner. In addition, this part explores how local Tanzanians were also aected by control
measures within the settlement.
The government separated refugees from citizens in political, legal, material and spa-
tial terms through the Refugees Act, 1998, which repeals the Refugee Control Act, 1965,
and in the National Refugee Policy 2003. Politically and legally, refugees lacked citizen-
ship rights. In Tanzania, these rights are spelled out by the Constitution of the United
Republic of Tanzania, 1977 (see Annex 2). Provisions pertaining to the attainment of cit-
izenship and the naturalisation of non-citizens are spelled out in the Citizenship Act of
1995. According to the Act any person can obtain citizenship by birth:
5.-(1) [...] Every person born in the United Republic on or after Union Day
shall be deemed to have become and to have continued to be a citizen of the
United Republic with eect from the date of his birth, and with eect from
the commencement of this Act shall become and continue to be a citizen [...].
Furthermore, non-citizens can register for citizenship through naturalisation:
9.-(1) Any person who is not a citizen of the United Republic may, being a
person of full age and capacity, on making an application in that behalf to
the Minister, [...] be naturalised as a citizen of the United Republic, and be
granted a certificate of naturalisation.
Refugees, however, were not considered eligible for this provision. Recently, a newCon-
stitution of the Federation of Tanganyika and Zanzibar has been drafted but it has not
yet taken eect. The draft by the Constitutional Review Commission will make radical
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changes to the framework of citizenship law enshrined in the Act of 1995 (Manby, 2014):
the automatic right to citizenship of those born on Tanzanian soil will be withdrawn,
which, as Manby (2014) notes, can exacerbate statelessness in the region and constitutes
a violation of the African Charter on the Rights andWelfare of the Child adopted by the
African Union in 1990. It is also in tension with the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 1966, ratified by Tanzania in 1976, which spells out in article 24(3) that
“every child has the right to acquire a nationality”. Tanzania follows the UK and other
Commonwealth countries in Africa, which have already changed the system by withdraw-
ing automatic jus soli provisions. However, those countries (such as South Africa and
Namibia) allow children who are born to legal residents to become citizens. Manby
(2014) suggests that government ocials may not realise that the change in citizenship
law is a drastic one. Most commentators on the new constitution focused on the positive
changes in terms of human rights and gender equality but have not mentioned the change
in citizenship law (ibid.).
Rights that were curtailed for refugees in Tanzania are freedom of movement, the right
to assemble and join associations, and the right to participate in public aairs, i.e. vot-
ing and putting oneself forward as a candidate in the political process. Refugees were
also not allowed to work outside of the settlement. These rights are spelled out in the
Constitution in Articles 17, 20, 21 and 22 (see below, emphasis added; see also Annex 2).
While the rights to assemble and to work include “every person”, the rights to freedom
of movement and to take part in the governance of the country are reserved to “every
citizen”. The articles in the Constitution echo the corresponding articles in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 with the dierence being that the Declaration in-
cludes “everyone” on all four matters (rights to freedom of moment, assemble, take part
in governance and work).
Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977:
17(1): Every citizen of the United Republic has the right to freedom of move-
ment in the United Republic, and the right to live in any part of the United
Republic, to leave and enter the country, and the right not to be forced to leave
or be expelled from the United Republic.
20(1): Every person has a freedom, to freely and peaceably assemble, associate
and cooperate with other persons, and for that purpose, express views publicly
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and to form and join with associations or organisation formed for purposes of
preserving or furthering his beliefs or interests or any other interests.
21(1): [...] with the conditions for electing and being elected or for appointing
and being appointed to take part in matters related to governance of the county,
every citizen of the United Republic is entitled to take part in matters pertaining
to the governance of the country, either directly or through representatives freely
elected by the people [...]
22(1): Every person has the right to work.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948:
13(1): Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within
the borders of each state.
20(1): Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
21(1): Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives.
23(1): Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just
and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
These restrictions do not only relate to refugees in Tanzania but have also been applied
in dierent settings. The reasons for these restrictions are related to security concerns and
the assumption that refugees stay only temporarily. Kaiser (2006) notes for example that
refugees in settlements in Uganda have not enjoyed freedom of movement. Furthermore,
even though the UNHCR promotes the adherence to human rights, it acknowledges:
“[...] All refugees, as indeed all persons, have certain basic human rights.
[...] Refugees have the right to freedom of movement. However, it is recog-
nised that, particularly in cases of mass influx, security considerations and
the rights of the local population may dictate restrictions” (UNHCR, n.d.:
5).
With reference to Tanzania’s refugee policies, material control was exercised since the
refugees’ arrival. According to the Refugees Act, 1998, next to surrendering weapons to
the ocers in charge, refugees could be dispossessed of animals and vehicles:
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13(1) Detention and Slaughter of Animals: The competent authority may di-
rect that any animal imported into his area from outside Tanzania by any
person whom he has reason to believe to be an asylum seeker or a refugee
shall be kept in such place as he shall direct or shall be slaughtered or other-
wise disposed of.
14. Possession of vehicle of asylum seeker or refugee: The competent author-
ity may take [...] possession of any vehicle in which any person whom he
has reasonable cause to believe to be an asylum seeker or a refugee arrived in
his area and authorise its use in the area for the purpose of moving asylum
seekers or refugees or any store or equipment for their use.
Furthermore, refugees were not allowed to own houses made of durable materials such
as burnt bricks in the settlement. Only houses made of un-burnt clay were allowed. This
is in tension with Article 24 of the Constitution (see Annex 2), which spells out the right
to own property.
Freedom of movement is restricted through Articles 16 and 17 of the Refugees Act,
1998, which prescribes that refugees live in designated areas (see also Annex 3):
17(1) The competent authority in consultation with the Minister or the Di-
rector may by order, require any asylum seeker or refugee or group or cate-
gory of refugees to whom this section applies who is within his area to reside
within a designated area whether or not such area is within the jurisdiction
of competent authority.
Furthermore, refugees need to obtain a permit in order to move out of the area and can
normally only stay outside of the settlement for 14 days:
17(5a) No asylum seeker or refugee shall be allowed to leave a designated area
as directed under this section unless he has sought and obtained a permit from
Director or Settlement Ocer as the case may be, and, subject to such terms
and conditions as the Director or a Settlement Ocer may prescribe in the
permit.
17(5b) No asylum seeker or refugee may be allowed to be out of a designated
area formore than fourteen days unless the Director has allowed in the permit
159
5.1 exclusion from citizenship in tension with belonging
a longer period upon which an asylum seeker or a refugee may stay outside
the designated area.
If refugees move out of the settlement without such a permit, they may be imprisoned
for up to six months or be liable for a fine of TZS 50,000.1 Aswill be seen below, such pro-
hibitions were actually enforced and policed. When refugees moved outside of the camp
without documentation, they were subject to harassment by the authorities for suspicion
of unlawful presence in the country and they were in risk of being deported. This is due
in part to the fact that border ocials as well as village executive ocers (VEOs) and
other ocials have not received any special guidance on the handling of refugees and asy-
lum seekers (Rutinwa, 2005). For a refugee in Ulyankulu without legal documentation,
showing a permit from the settlement ocer to prove that one is allowed to move outside
of the settlement for two weeks, has thus been all the more important.
Under Tanzania’s National Refugee Policy 2003, refugees have only been allowed to en-
gage in small income generating activities in the camps and settlements (paragraph 17).
Otherwise, they could request a work permit from the Director of Refugee Services at the
Ministry of Home Aairs and they had to obtain an additional permit from the Depart-
ment of Immigration (Rutinwa, 2005). The Act of 1998 has not prohibited ownership of
immovable property but it was nevertheless discouraged, such as by an announcement by
the government of February 9th, 2009 (Annex 4). The state thus exerted a form of control
over the material/built landscape within the settlement.
Local Tanzanians were also aected by the prescriptions related to refugees. The an-
nouncement of February 2009 with the title “To stop building houses in the settlement”
(Annex 4) clearly stated that Tanzanians should also be discouraged from building per-
manent houses, i.e. made out of burnt bricks, in the settlement, and from buying houses
or land there. Thus, government control also applied to Tanzanians. In fact, they were
ocially not permitted to live in the settlement all; refugees and citizens were legally and
spatially separated.
1TZS 50,000 equalled approximately GBP 20 (precisely GBP 19.71 at an exchange rate of 0.0004 on 30
November 2012).
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5.1.2 Schooling and information as tools for both exclusion and belonging
An important part for states to engage in citizen-making is by schooling and various
forms of information dissemination. However, withholding certain pieces of information
may also be a way to exclude refugees from the process of becoming citizens. As will be
seen below, these two processes have been in tension in Ulyankulu. In the settlement,
information about rights and responsibilities is ocially disseminated to refugees (and
to Tanzanians) in various ways.
According to Rutinwa (2005), there have been three main methods of information dis-
semination in the eleven Tanzanian camps that were still open in 2005, including Ulyan-
kulu, Mishamo and Katumba settlements. The first method was public meetings called
by the UNHCR or the government. They have been held by district commissioners, re-
gional commissioners or even ministers. However, these meetings have tended to focus
on responsibilities of refugees and have often involved threats to comply, rather than ex-
plaining rights to the refugees. A second method was ‘protection training’ workshops, in
which dierent rights were discussed. They have addressed both refugees and assistance
providers. A third method was through billboards and posters, which have been placed
at strategic places, in English, Swahili and Kirundi, as well as Congolese and Rwandese
languages according to the first language of refugees in the respective camps. A fact sheet
about rights and responsibilities was developed as well in 2005 (ibid.). However, since
not all refugees are literate, these methods may have had limited scope.
Concerning the first method, in Ulyankulu, announcements were spread within the
settlement through general village meetings held by the village chairmen. Sometimes
they were joined by other government ocials such as the settlement ocer. During the
time of fieldwork, a public meeting with the regional commissioner of Tabora was held
to inaugurate the new buildings of Ulyankulu Secondary School on 2nd August 2012 (see
Annex 10). This was the only public event of information dissemination during the time
of research – a village chairman confirmed that other publicmeetings had been suspended
since the settlement was supposed to be closed. The school inauguration turned out to
be symbolic for the relations between refugees on the one hand and government ocials,
international organisations and donors on the other hand in this protracted situation.
This event demonstrated existing power relations and segregation between the central and
regional governments aswell as humanitarian organisations, who controlled the occasion,
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and the refugees, seen as non-citizens, who were invited to attend and take part in it. At
the same time, as discussed below, it showed refugees’ belonging to the Tanzanian nation.
The regional commissioner and a delegation of donors, including the Japanese govern-
ment and UNHCR ocials from Dar es Salaam, were present and sat in the shade at the
front of the scene. Children and other spectators were partially covered by a temporary
plastic roof, but many had to sit or stand through the whole ceremony in the glaring sun
(see Plate 5.1). The organisers had decided to drive a new land rover and a motorbike,
which was given to the Regional Commission in Tabora by the UNHCR as a present, all
the way from Tabora to Ulyankulu and back in order to show the gifts to the refugee pub-
lic. Refugee children performed Tanzanian dances and songs at the start of the ceremony.
I was given a seat in the shaded section with local UNHCR and TCRS employees – in
contrast to my assistant and a local Tanzanian with whom I had arrived. The message
given by the regional commissioner to the refugees was that they should not lose hope
while waiting in face of the uncertain situation concerning citizenship.
The atmosphere and staging of the event reinforced the distance between refugees, gov-
ernment and international actors. The spatial segregation between first and second class
seating, the showcasing of expensive presents (vehicles), and speeches are elements of pub-
lic performance that demonstrated the power of the regional commissioner and interna-
tional donors, who will ultimately decide the refugees’ fate. As Askew (2002) maintains,
power can be embedded in performance: refugees performed their gratitude for the new
school buildings and their submission to the benevolent donors by entertaining themwith
their dances.
However, while these dances suggested submission to the government and donors, they
also represented a public display of the refugees’ belonging to the Tanzanian nation.
These dances have been taught to refugees and to students anywhere inTanzanian schools
as variations of local Tanzanian ngoma dances for educational purposes (Jerman, 1997;
Askew, 2002). They have generally aimed to “reinforce national discipline” (Jerman, 1997:
288), or to “perform the nation” (Askew, 2002). The fact that refugee children performed
these Tanzanian dances emphasises that they have, by now, become accustomed to Tanza-
nian nation-building traditions instead of Burundian ones. The refugees’ local tradition,
with which government ocials expect to be entertained when they visit places, has be-
come a variant of the Tanzanian ngoma. This suggests that refugees now belonged to the
Tanzanian nation, especially in light of the fact that Burundian dances were indeed still
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practiced and promoted by the government and international organisations in the early
years after the refugees’ arrival in Ulyankulu (see Chapter 6, Section 6.2.3).
Plate 5.1: Ulyankulu Secondary School Inauguration: Performance in the Shade
Source: Author (July 2012)
At this event, one could see that control has not only been exerted over the refugees in
legal and spatial terms, but that it has also been temporal. The government adjourned im-
portant decisions, such as the formerly proposed naturalisation and relocation, with the
eect of perpetuating the refugees’ hopes for betterment on the one hand and anxieties
on the other hand, without ever satisfying its promises (cf. Bourdieu, 2000; see Section
2.3.2). The event described above constitutes an example of how the government actively
prolonged this situation.
At the time of my research, I did not witness any instance of the second method of
information dissemination mentioned above, namely that of protection training2. This
may be because such training is most important in emergency situations rather than in
protracted cases (cf. UNHCR, n.d.). Concerning the third method, announcements were
spread using a noticeboard at the main square on the wall of the CCM oce. In order
2Protection training encompasses instructions on how to ensure the international protection of refugees.
International protection is a temporary substitute for the protection usually provided by states to their na-
tionals abroad. The aim of international protection in emergencies is to ensure admission and at least tem-
porary asylum, i.e. to help Refugee Status Determination, to prevent forcible return (“refoulement”) and
to ensure refugees are treated according to basic human rights standards. The principles of protection are
based on the 1951 Statute of the Oce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and the 1967 Protocol, as well as the OAU Convention of
1969 (UNHCR, n.d.).
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to combat the problem of illiteracy, information in Ulyankulu was also spread through
religious leaders, such as priests and pastors of the various churches in the settlement.
Important announcements, such as that of 9th of February 2009, were made at the end
of religious services. Persons of authority within the community – such as former village
chairmen and religious leaders – possessed some government hand-outs and otherwritten
material, such as books. However, written information throughout the settlement was
scarce.
While first generation refugees may have learned about the meaning of citizenship in
Burundi, second generation refugees learned about citizenship as well as definitions and
rights of refugees in school in Ulyankulu (see Annex 5, civics book for Forms 3 and 4).
Many people in the settlement possessed radios and had obtained mobile phones. How-
ever, due to the lack of electricity, people did not have access to television or the inter-
net. Access to the internet for the general (refugee) public was only available in Tabora
town. There was also still no possibility of obtaining newspapers of any kind in the set-
tlement. Judging from participant observation in Ulyankulu, while one cannot say that
information was actively withheld from the refugees, public written and oral informa-
tion dissemination was limited – and often served purposes of control by the government
and international organisations. As Rutinwa (2005) points out, the information dissem-
ination that existed emphasised duties instead of rights and thus did not aim to include
refugees fully in Tanzania’s citizenry.
5.1.3 Enforcing a separation between refugees and citizens by military acts of repression
As could be seen above, refugees are excluded from citizenship through national legal
provisions but on a local level in the settlement, there is a tension between processes of
exclusion from citizenship and citizenship-making on the side of the state. In addition to
these processes, the government has also engaged in “everyday acts of repression” (Scott,
1985), which aim to separate citizens from refugees. Several times in the settlement’s his-
tory the Tanzanian government engaged in rounding up refugees who had, for example,
gone outside of the settlement without a permit and conducted business activities in Tab-
ora town. Their legitimate businesses were closed down and the refugees forced back
to the settlements; and many to prison (Daily News, July 12, 1985; May 25, 1986; July
9, 1986; cited in Daley, 1991). As shown in Section 5.3.1 below, this practice has contin-
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ued until now. However, two specific instances in the history of the settlement show that
refugees who live in Ulyankulu are sometimes protected and favoured in comparison to
intruding citizens or ricochet refugees.
Military repression of Sukuma intruders in 2010
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Tanzanians have increasingly moved to the settle-
ment area, claiming their rights to the territory that used to be theirs. While most of these
Tanzanians came peacefully on an individual basis in agreement with village leaders in
the settlement, in 2010 Ulyankulu experienced a larger, unannounced influx of Sukuma
pastoralists. They came in search of greener pastures with their herds from semi-arid
areas in Shinyanga and Mwanza regions. The area of Ulyankulu promised to be more
fertile. These Sukuma arrived in the North-Eastern part of the settlement, in Igombe-
mkulu. Not accepting the presence of this Sukuma group in the settlement, the Tanza-
nian (operational) police took away the cattle from the Sukuma. The Sukuma, however,
did not accept this intervention and started to burn huts belonging to refugees and other
Sukuma who were living in the area of Igombemkulu. Eventually, the police took some
of the Sukuma to the police station in Ulyankulu, which the Sukuma tried to attack in
return. After this attempt failed, the conflict stopped for a while but then erupted again.
This time, the police reacted with a stronger force, supported from Urambo and Tabora.
They arrested the leaders and sent them to prison in Urambo. Thereafter the group were
said to have moved on (interview with I3).
While this intervention served to uphold the separation between refugees and Tanzani-
ans, it may also signify bias by the state against the pastoralist Sukuma population, who
thereby experienced disenfranchisement from their land like other mobile populations in
Africa (Hogg, 1997; Turton, 1996, cited in Hammond, 2008). Instead of protecting the
Sukuma citizens, the government protected the lives of the more settled refugees, who, it
could be argued, were in this instance treated more like citizens than the pastoralist.
Rounding up and sending back ricochet migrants from Burundi
Many of those refugees who repatriated in 2009 eventually returned to the settlement
even though they had been told that they could not be refugees or citizens in Tanzania
once they moved back to Burundi. These ‘ricochet migrants’ had faced diculties in
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obtaining land in Burundi or could not cope with the education system in Burundi –
which is conducted in Kirundi and French instead of Swahili and English as in Tanzania.
Realising that Ulyankulu had become their home, they decided to come back to Tanzania.
While some of them went to the immigration oce in Tabora in order to legally obtain a
residence permit before going back to Ulyankulu (interview with G7), many returned to
the settlement without documents.
The government, in an attempt to control the situation, rounded up many of these
(former) refugees and forcibly repatriated them to Burundi. In this instance, the gov-
ernment’s control mechanisms aimed to separate those who had accepted the option of
naturalisation and those who had chosen to repatriate. While those who hadwished to be
naturalised were still protected, others who chose to repatriate were now excluded from
any protection. This shows that belonging, in the eyes of the state, involves a conscious
decision and a willingness to be citizens. The importance assigned to such a decision
was also mentioned by an interview with the Prime Minister’s Oce, as quoted below
(Section 5.2.1, interview with G8).
In summary, the aim of these military acts of repression has been to separate refugees
from citizens in order to enforce a ‘space of control’ in the settlement area. This space, as
explained above, was created in the first place by national legal provisions. The govern-
ment aimed to create a legal and spatial separation between refugees and Tanzanians, a
fact that could also be seen in the secondary school inauguration on a small scale. How-
ever, that event also showed that refugees had learned in school to perform a sense of
belonging to the nation through dances. While the state had thus instilled a sense of cit-
izenship in the refugees, it also restricted information about citizens’ rights at the same
time. The school inauguration also showed that the government exercised temporal con-
trol by adjourning decisions.
It may seem odd that at certain times, such as the repression of the group of Sukuma
in 2010, the government was protecting the refugees instead of its own citizens.
On the one hand, this highlights a concern with separation of refugees and citizens and
a fear of impurity and losing control. On the other hand, it shows that the government
was capable of controlling other populations on its territory as well, even if they were
citizens. Ricochet migrants were treated worse than refugees because they once made the
decision of repatriation, which in the eyes of the government shows a lack of belonging
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to the Tanzanian nation. Citizenship was hence seen as more than a de jure status or
document by the government.
5.2 Security, Purity and Visibility: Concerns with Naturalisation and Relocation
5.2.1 Concerns with security and purity at different levels of government
Government ocials at various levels believed that refugees endangered national security
in Tanzania. Initially this belief may have been a key rationale for excluding refugees from
de jure citizenship and for separating them from Tanzanian citizens. After the naturali-
sation initiative was proposed in 2007, the narrative of refugees as security threats was
also used both as a reason at a national level to suggest relocating them to other regions
after obtaining citizenship but also, at a regional level, to oppose the idea of relocation.
In 2012, this security concern was so prominent that government ocials invoked it with
reference to various issues. Although the relocation policy had already been put on hold,
it was not clear at that time whether it might still go ahead. It was also the most contro-
versial and disputed policy at the time and therefore each actor still held strong opinions
about it. As can be seen below, in 2012 all actors had some reservations concerning the
relocation. However, as Section 5.2.3 will show, the delay of the implementation of that
policy was seen as positive in terms of security on the side of regional actors, but as am-
biguous on the side of central government actors, who feared the creation of a ‘Burundian
enclave’.
When refugees registered for citizenship in 2008, they were asked which region they
would like to move to once the settlement would be closed and they would be citizens. As
Figure 4.10 showed, their answerswere recorded as numbers of householdswhowanted to
move to a certain place. The largest number of households (853 out of 3261) in Ulyankulu
said that they would like to move to Morogoro. When asked about this outcome in a
phone interview, a spokesperson of the Regional Administration and Local Government
of the Prime Minister’s Oce (PMO-RALG) assumed that the reasons for this choice
were the following:
“The NNTs – most of them don’t know the places. They are in the settle-
ments; it is just an assumption they are making. Morogoro is along the cen-
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tral railway line. This line goes until Kigoma, which is on the way to Burundi.
This way they can easily access Burundi by rail. Also there is abandoned land.
The NNTs are good peasants” (G8).
The spokesperson imagined that the first reason why refugees preferred moving toMo-
rogoro was related to the refugees’ links to Burundi. Such links were seen as a threat
to national security because refugees might be influenced by politics in their country of
origin, and could thus become disloyal to the Tanzanian nation. Children were, for exam-
ple, taught in schools that such links are dangerous (see excerpt of civics book in Annex
5). Furthermore, it was believed that they might smuggle illegal arms and other goods
into the country. However, Morogoro is much further away from Burundi than is Tabora.
Geographically also, it would be much more reasonable to believe that refugees wish to
move to Morogoro due to its proximity to Dar es Salaam. Another reason (which was
indeed voiced by some refugees), which the spokesperson did not mention, is that land is
known to be especially fertile in the region of Morogoro.
While the outcome of the relocation, due to refugees’ choice of destination, was seen
as a potential threat to national security, the government’s decision of initiating the relo-
cation was also based on security concerns. When asked about reasons for the planned
relocation, the spokesperson added:
“Yes, there are other reasons [for the relocation], like security concerns. It is
easy for them to go back to Burundi and to be influenced by other relatives. As
Burundians they like to go to Burundi. Now they are Tanzanians, there is no
need to go back to Burundi. They decided themselves; they said theywouldn’t
like to go back to Burundi. Even those who decided to go back, they like to
come back here. They lived very comfortably in our country; when they go
back, it is dierent” (G8).
The relocation policy then was a government response to stop people going to Burundi,
for security reasons. The decision for naturalisation itself was thus valued by the govern-
ment as it was believed that it reduced the potential security threat emanating from the
refugees. However, refugees’ choices were still questioned, as could be seen above – con-
sidering that the choice of Morogoro, a main receiving region, was on the railway line
to Burundi. In these quotations from the same interview, refugees’ own behaviour and
choices as well as the government’s decisions and its attitude towards the refugees were
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immediately related to security. The security narrative was much stronger than any other
narrative, for example one centred on economic growth.
Ocials at other levels of government confirmed this predominant security narrative.
In an interview at the regional administration of Tabora, a government ocial substitut-
ing the Regional Administrative Secretary (RAS) on that day, voiced the following con-
cerns:
“The camps in the region have detrimental eects. As a direct impact, they
cause environmental destruction of the forest reserve. Indirectly, they do not
stay in the once identified areas; they aremixingwith citizens. Even in Tabora
you meet these guys pretending to come from Kigoma. There is a big threat
about their behaviour. Tabora has become quite unsafe. When the refugees
came from Rwanda and Burundi, they came with weapons. We don’t have a
civil war here. [...] We are fed up with them. They should go home now.
Apart from illegal killing [poaching] and harvesting, these people are involved
in hijacking. Tabora has become very unsafe at night! We have been so kind
to them for so long. But they have shown brutality. [...] They should start a
normal life. By having these people, Tabora is no longer safe. [...] You give
them naturalisation if the country of origin is peaceful. It is dicult to give
citizenship to someone who on the last day was holding a weapon in his hand.
You are inviting problems!” (G9).
The concerns of the regional administration were thus more localised than the national
security concerns voiced by the Prime Minister’s Oce. The administrator worried that
Tabora had become unsafe due to the presence of refugees. In contrast to the national
security threat perceived by the PrimeMinister’s Oce – fearing connections to Burundi –
the regional administrator spoke about amore concrete local threat posed by the presence
of weapons, which have been used to hijack buses among other crimes.
However, besides security concerns, the regional administrator first mentioned that
it was problematic that refugees were mixing with Tanzanians citizens, especially out-
side of the settlement. This shows a concern with ‘impurity’: the Tanzanian nation was
supposed to remain pure and distinguishable from other ethnicities and nations. An in-
tegration process which was started by the refugees, rather than by the state, was seen as
dangerous. The Regional Commissioner Dr. Rajab Rutengwe of Katavi, where the other
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two old settlements Mishamo and Katumba are located, cited similar concerns: “It’s not
proper and safe for our nation, according to their status, they won’t be good to stay there,
I don’t want to see a new Burundi in my region” (Said, 2012).
At the regional level, opposition to the relocation and the naturalisation were based
on the belief that refugees would render the nation improper or impure and unsafe. The
prime minister’s oce, by contrast, mentioned security as a reason for the relocation and
the implied naturalisation process, arguing that the refugees’ own decision to naturalise
would reduce the danger. However, as could be seen above, some doubts remained in his
narrative.
In the course of the interview, the regional administrator inTabora equated the refugees
with “snakes in your house with fangs and poison”. Interestingly, however, he related
the situation in Tabora to a broader security concern. According to him, the problem
persistedwith bothHutu andTutsi, fromBurundi andRwanda, as well as with theMuha,
living in the area of Kigoma in Tanzania. For him, they all had the same dangerous
qualities. Rather than a local security problem, the problem persisted with ethnicities
from outside of Tanzania.
This reflects a fear of violent subjectivities (Das et al., 2000) of ethnicities and nations
from outside of Tanzania, here relating to refugees, which can be found at various levels
of government. In an interview with a district level governor, who had recently moved to
Kaliua when it became a new district, similar concerns were expressed:
“[...] if you are going to naturalise them, you will see the consequences. Con-
cerning the planned relocation, in Ruvuma region – I saw it -, it bounces back!
In Ruvuma region, they said no! We can be beaten from inside our country,
in a case of war! But it is too late... There are so many machine guns here
now, in Tabora! They come from Burundi.
These Burundians, they say [they are good people but they are not]. Themain
source of war was the Hutus, not the Tutsi! The Hutu are warlike! They
sometimes go from Ulyankulu to Burundi to fight...Tanzanians and Burundi-
ans don’t have a good relationship. These rebels there [in Burundi] now, they
could be from Ulyankulu! Tanzania and Burundi are not close in terms of
security. Around the border, there are a lot of soldiers” (G4).
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The quote above was directed generally towards the ‘refugees’ but specifically towards
the Hutu as an ethnic group as well as towards the whole nation of Burundi. These
Hutu refugees were seen as threats even though in the conflict of 1972, the Hutu were,
in fact, primarily the victims of the Tutsi. Memories of Hutu violence against the Tutsi
especially in the 1990s, both in Rwanda and Burundi, may have tainted the perception of
the Hutu ethnicity. Although some local concerns were mentioned, in both interviews by
the regional and the district administration it could be seen that the security threat was
generalised from refugees to the Hutu, to Burundi and even to the Tutsi and to Rwanda,
i.e. to ethnicities and nations outside of Tanzania that were considered violent.
The fact that the respondent above linked the reservations concerning the relocation
by Ruvuma region to security concerns instead of other reasons such as a lack of vacant
land shows that the security narrative trumped other narratives.
At the level of the settlement, security concerns were mentioned as well. In relation to
the spatial organisation of the settlement, the settlement ocermentioned in an interview
at his oce (see also Chapter 4):
“Every family got four hectares [of land]; 10 acres per family. When you get
land here, you have to note where you come from in Burundi –wewant people
from the same area in their country of origin, so that they can assist each other
and so that it is easy to control the situation in terms of security. They [the
people in a particular village/street] would know – this person is a criminal”
(G2).
Again, the government’s decisions, here regarding the distribution of land inside of the
settlement, were based on an overall security concern. As can be seen from the above,
security concerns were mentioned in a number of contexts and at all levels of government
– national, regional, district and at the level of the settlement. At the regional and district
levels, refugeeswere seen as dangerous not only because they constituted a threat to safety
but also to the purity of theTanzanian nation. The decision to become citizenswas valued
by a national spokesperson but doubts about their national loyalty remained.
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5.2.2 Whose security? National versus human security, criminality and control
National versus human security
In order to put the security narratives voiced above into context, it is necessary to evaluate
the security situation in the settlement. Security in general can be seen as a protection
from harm or a state of being free from danger or threat (cf. Oxford Dictionaries online).
Yet government ocials routinely referred to a notion of security that is centred on the
survival of the nation state (Paris, 2001; Figure 6.1 below). Refugees are a military threat
because they can be a proxy for international hostilities (cell 1, ‘national security’) or
because they threaten the intra-state security as violent non-state actors (cell 3, ‘intrastate
security’). Furthermore, they can be an environmental threat to the state (cell 2, ‘redefined
security’). In contrast to this concept of security, the notion of human security has come
into vogue, as first promoted by the United Nations Development Report, 1994. This
implies various forms of security for the individual: economic security, food and health
security, environmental, personal, community and political security (cell 4). The security
threat emphasised above related more to national security than to refugees’ and local
Tanzanians’ human security.
Criminality, policing and security inside and outside of the settlement
Indisputably, violence and criminal acts committed by refugees could endanger Tanza-
nia’s intra-state security as well as the Tanzanian citizens’ and refugees’ human security.
Crime data, which was recorded in a book at the settlement ocers’ building, demon-
strated that the most common oences included house-breaking, threatening violence,
indecent assault, unlawful entrance to Tanzania, kidnapping, unlawfully acquired prop-
erty and robbery with violence (in contrast to civil oenses, which are not recorded here).
During the period of January to August 2009, for example, fewer than 20 cases were
recorded each month. The ethnicity of criminals was recorded: some of the oenses
were committed by Sukuma and people of various other Tanzanian ethnicities. A few of
them occurred outside of the settlement. Most of them were cases of burglary and theft,
some including violence and housebreaking. Rape occurred in a few cases of underage
teenagers (who were 16 or 17 years old) and one murder, committed by a Sukuma. The
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Figure 5.1: Types of Security
Source: Paris (2001)
number of recorded crimes committed by refugees was thus limited and could not be
considered a particular threat to security.
Ulyankulu hosted the only police stations in the vicinity of the settlement. There were
two kinds of police in the settlement: the regular police under the Tanzanian government
in the centre built a long time ago, and the operational police in Mbeta village, called
for by the UNHCR as part of the ‘Tanzania Security Package’ in 2008. The operational
police dealt with crimes of refugees specifically whereas the other was responsible for
anyone living in the area.
The ‘Security Package’ was a response to heightened incidents of murder, armed rob-
bery, hijacking of vehicles, rapes and unlawful possession of arms from war-torn coun-
tries across the border from Tanzania between 1994 and 2000 in and near the camps in
Northwestern Tanzania, including Ngara, Kasulu, Kibondo and Kigoma areas. After
the massive influx of refugees in the 1990s, camps in these areas, located near to Burundi,
DRC and Rwanda, became unsafe. While maintaining that law and order was the respon-
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sibility of the government, in the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda, the government
of Tanzania and the UNHCR agreed that the latter would arrange a ‘Security Package’,
which would train policemen and women to work in refugee camps for six-month assign-
ments. Their tasks were to patrol the camps, investigate crime reports and escort vehicles
to protect them from banditry. As a consequence, crimes inside and around the camps
declined overall but gangs continued to terrorise the local population and engaged in car-
jackings. The Tanzania regular police needed to intervene in certain instances as well as
the army (Rutinwa, 2005: 29-30).
With respect to Ulyankulu, the commandant of the regular police explained the rela-
tionship between crimes committed inside and outside of the settlement in an interview
held in an oce of the police station in Ulyankulu:
“A lot of cases have been reported outside of the settlement; these people
here are living peacefully and are coping well with the Tanzanians. Within
the settlement the integration is very good; if there is anything, the case is
outside of the settlement. This morning for instance, I went there, outside,
because somebody was threatened to be killed. It was a Sukuma threatening
to burn another Sukuma. [...] We are working with and are concerned with
the security of the whole community [jamii] here within and outside of the
settlement and even outside of the division [Ulyankulu division]” (G10).
In line with the collected crime data, he thus confirmed that refugees in Ulyankulu
could not be seen as security threats in terms of personal security, and that the main
problem persisted outside of the settlement. In an interview held outside the operational
police building with another police ocer present, the operational police commandant
added to the information above:
“Of course the Tanzanians seem to be a higher percentage. Because the set-
tlement itself is surrounded by the Tanzanians; there are many. We also work
outside of the settlement. They sometimes call us; we are patrolling inside
and outside the settlement. [...] Most serious oences, like murder, happen
outside the settlement” (G11).
As could be seen in the answers given by the ocer at the Regional Commission in
Tabora, a major security issue arising from the refugees was the presence of weapons.
However, the operational police commandant said:
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“Nowadays, there are no weapons found here from Burundi. Some crimes are
committed by Burundians and Tanzanians jointly. But this is a peaceful area”
(G11).
While the number of crimes and the presence of weapons in the settlement were thus
not considered a threat, there was a high likelihood that the number of crimes were higher
than ocially registered. According to the police commandant of the regular police, the
police faced a number of challenges to work adequately:
“[...] The government doesn’t consider us. Nowadays, this station doesn’t
have its own motorbike or car. We need to rent motorbikes and we ask at the
UN operation police to get a car; but sometimes the car is not there; it is even
used for escorting purposes [of UN ocials]. Sometimes cases are reported
but we don’t have a car; while at the UN there are a lot of cars... we may fail
to reach a place because there is no transport.
We are working in a hard environment; there is no lock-up for children and
women; only for men; sometimes women are locked up in the corridor. It
is not good because policemen are regularly passing from the counter to the
oce; sometimes there is a bad smell. So it is dicult to stay here at the oce.
There is no electricity here but we are waiting to get it. We have sent some
requests to get electricity from the UN but there is no response. It is dark here
at night, so we have to use torches with batteries. Then they break; you get
tired. At Road 28 they have a generator. But it does not work the whole day
like at the UN.We only want electricity for this oce, not for the policemen’s
houses. [...] We have an air conditioning here [which is most of the time not
working due to lack of electricity] because most of the machines only work
in cool climate [i.e. computer, finger print machine]” (G10).
The police thus faced three problems: a lack of transport to reach places of crime, a lack
of electricity to record cases at night and to use several devices to help identify criminals
and a lack of a place to lock up female criminals. While the operational police was in
a somewhat better state – it had a car and electricity at least sometimes – the hardships
faced by the police overall may have reduced the number of recorded cases. Nevertheless,
the settlement did not seem to be an insecure place in terms of personal security – at
least compared to its surroundings. One could also infer that security as such was not
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important enough to support a well-resourced police station or at least a prison cell for
women.
Even in the broader region of Tabora, it could not be confirmed by the police that
refugees had been involved in criminal activities on an increased scale. When visiting the
district police in Tabora town and starting to ask about refugee criminality in Tabora,
the district criminal ocer replied: “I don’t have a single record of a refugee committing
a crime in my district – if you want aggregate data, you have to speak to the regional
criminal ocer” (G12). In a subsequent interview at the regional police station in Tabora,
the police commander agreed since nationality was not recorded in general:
“No [we don’t have crime records stating the nationality of criminals].
Refugees are treated like other civilians. In brief, crime records or proper
recordswill be from immigration; records aboutwhatmistake they havemade
etc. To get the records here is dicult. They don’t consider the nationality; it
is so hard to recognise persons involved in a crime but usually the ones who
are involved are Tanzanians. Refugees are small in numbers.
Illegal immigrants are mostly involved in crime events. When we reach the
court, they treat the case like any other foreigner. In the end [after staying
in prison] he will be returned to his origin country with immigration ocers.
A lot of them come from Burundi but they pretend to come from Kigoma.
Some people are criminals from their original country; at the first instance
he will be seen as disloyal. They came here recently or a long time ago. This
has been a problem for so long and it keeps on perpetuating” (G13, emphasis
added).
Thus, refugees were few in the total number of crimes committed in the region of Tab-
ora as a whole. However, illegal immigrants, some from Burundi, seemed to cause trou-
ble. Who these immigrants were in particular is dicult to judge – in the absence of
documentation, it is possible that they included refugees from Ulyankulu.
Impurity and fear of losing control
As the regional police mentioned, it was dicult to identify the origin of criminals. In
contrast to data collected in Ulyankulu, the regional police did not specify a dierence
between people of varying nationalities. While this was not a cause of concern for the
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regional police, it was seen as a problem in Ulyankulu. The operational police ocer
quoted above, for example, perceived refugees as a security threat because Burundians
and Tanzanians collaborated in crimes and it was dicult to identify them:
“TheBurundians andTanzanians aremixed here, so that is a challenge. Some-
times, somebody is identifying themselves as Sukuma or Chagga, it is dicult
to identify them. When you arrest them, they hide their nature. When their
relatives come, they say ‘no, they are Hutu’!” (G11).
This points to the conclusion that rather than refugees being a security threat in actual
terms, the police feared losing control over the situation in the settlement due to the high
degree of integration between refugees and non-refugees. They feared ‘impurity’ of the
Tanzanian nation because it would form an obstacle to identification and categorisation.
It is not surprising that this fear wasmentioned by the operational police, which, contrast
to the regular police, employs ocers on a rotating basis for periods of one year only and
has thus amore limited overview of the settlement in comparison to the regular police and
even the settlement commander. The apparent success of refugees in hiding their origins
in front of ocials begs the question that surely, this could have endangered the validity of
crime data recorded, although, as the respondent mentions, ethnicity was often verified
by relatives. The operational police commander feared a general security threat due to
on-going links to Burundi:
“They are Burundians; sometimes they don’t know the laws of Tanzania.
Even though they have been here for 40 years, they get all their goods from
Burundi. You can talk to them, if they feel Tanzanian” (G11).
Surely the alleged lack of knowledge and connections within Tanzania that this ocial
refers to stem from the fact that they were not allowed to freely move and work in Tanza-
nia, and, as could be seen above, information was also relatively restricted. The implied
security threat concerned an abstract threat to national security posed by the refugees’
presence, identity and links to Burundi rather than the threat posed to personal security
through individual criminal acts.
All in all, while there were crimes committed by refugees inside the settlement and
possibly outside as well, many crimes, and the more serious ones in particular, were
committed by Tanzanians outside of the settlement. The operational police and espe-
cially the regular police in Ulyankulu worked under adverse conditions and had to cover
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a vast area – stretching beyond the borders of the settlement over several wards and be-
yond. The actual enforcement and monitoring of the security situation by the police was
not an issue of priority for the government. A main problem that was identified by the
government was that it had lost control over its ability to identify refugees in contrast
to Tanzanian citizens and illegal migrants, and that refugees may have retained general
links to Burundi. A concern about national security was certainly fed by memories of
historic incidents, in which refugees contributed to violence and instability in the region,
such as the Tutsi refugees who invaded Rwanda from Uganda in the 1990s. Furthermore,
the fact that weapons from Burundi were found in Kigoma and possibly also in Tabora
in the past (interviews show contradictory answers about this) must have been a factor
for fearing insecurity stemming from refugees’ activities. In the settlement itself, there
were rumours that refugee rebels/soldiers went back to Burundi to fight there. None of
the first generation respondents could confirm this, however. An elderly respondent even
got very emotional when asked about it: “Ce sont des mentis!”3 (F2, also quoted in 6.2.1
and 6.2.3). It has been claimed many times by the Burundian government, and refuted
by the Tanzanian government that refugees from Ulyankulu and other settlements went
to Burundi to fight (cf. Rutinwa, 2005). In the 1990s, refugees were indeed radicalised
in most camps (Malkki, 1995a; Turner, 2010) but this radicalisation has not endured, at
least with respect to Ulyankulu. Surely, the main reason for this was that the conflict in
Burundi had calmed down since the 1990s. Another reason, however, was that more than
80% of refugees in Ulyankulu belonged to the second generation, who had less memories
and ties to Burundi.
5.2.3 Security and controlled integration
In the security narratives above, one could see that the mixing between Tanzanians and
refugees was seen as a security threat and a threat to the purity of the Tanzanian na-
tion. However, it is not true that integration per se was seen as a problem. An ocer at
the department Regional Administration and Local Government of the Prime Minister’s
Oce (PMO-RALG) in Dar es Salaam (also quoted above in Section 5.2.1), which was
specifically charged with the task of relocation, mentioned:
3Translation from French (original): “These are lies!”
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“The main reason [for the relocation] is what I said. They have been natu-
ralised but they are still seen as refugees. If we leave them there [in the set-
tlements], they are living together. In other areas, they can learn from other
Tanzanians; it will make them Tanzanians. [...]. When they are Tanzanians
[through naturalisation], now let us [the regions] receive them” (G8).
In an interview in Ulyankulu, the settlement ocer further explained:
“The question of relocation is important. Here, they will always be recog-
nised as refugees. They should live with Tanzanians; they should not have a
special area to stay in” (G2).
In the eyes of the government, therefore, the refugees would integratemore after having
been naturalised and relocated. They would be able to live like normal citizens and finally
shed their refugee status. Furthermore, relocationwould be necessary in order to alleviate
the security threat. In an interview at theMHA in Dar es Salaam, the Director of Refugee
Services mentioned:
“The Government decided to relocate these people in order not to create Bu-
rundian enclaves in the settlements” (G14).
Thus, the two functions of relocation are to promote a controlled (in contrast to a spon-
taneous) process of integration and to diuse the security threat that a mass of refugees
with high population growth rates may pose. Government ocials did not only fear a
loss of control related to the high level of integration between refugees and Tanzanians
inside the settlement but also outside of it. As the PMO-RALG ocer maintained:
“Yes, there is an issue of intermarriage. Now they are relocated. The local
integration of those in category A [of the NASCIP document, who reside out-
side of the settlement] – they are married to Tanzanians. This is category A”
(G8).
If it is important to learn from and integrate with other Tanzanians, the question arises
why they could not do so in the settlement regions or in the places they have alreadymoved
to. The spokesperson said:
“[...] The law says Tanzanians are free to move anywhere else. It is just for the
control mechanism we have to relocate them. Then they can move around as
human beings. You cannot stop them from moving. They are relocated first;
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later they cannot be stopped from moving elsewhere where they want to go”
(G8).
Therefore, the planned integration of refugees into other regions, a process that would
have implied relocation and subsequent education and service provision in the hosting
regions, was seen by the government as a positive development because the process was
initiated and controlled by the government. Furthermore, the planned integration would
alleviate the problem of refugees living together in the settlement as a ‘Burundian enclave’,
which was seen as dangerous. The concern of a ‘Burundian enclave’ was voiced even
though the government itself had enforced a separation between refugees and citizens in
their day to day lives in designated spaces.
On the other hand, spontaneous integration by the refugees through intermarriage was
seen as a problem because it endangered the policy of enforcing a separation of refugees
and citizens, it created problems with identification and it questioned the legitimacy of
government provisions. It further threatened the purity of the Tanzanian nation, as ar-
gued above.
The shift from encouraging an exclusionary space for Burundian refugees towards en-
couraging local integration signifies a changed emphasis from a concern with mixing and
impurity towards a focus on getting rid of the category of ‘refugees’ through ‘invisibili-
sation’ by spreading them in Tanzania. Relocation would invisibilise the refugees in the
eyes of the international community but not in the eyes of regional governments and local
Tanzanians, to whom the newly naturalised citizens would be highly visible. While ac-
cepting the potential impurity and insecurity caused by refugees in receiving regions, the
national government aimed to render refugees at once invisible to the international com-
munity and increasingly recognised and visible in the eyes of the regional governments
and local Tanzanians. This shift, however, did not occur at the regional level. Regional
governments continued to oppose the relocation, fearing a threat to their own regional se-
curity and therefore by proxy also to national security. The administrator at the Regional
Commission of Tabora, quoted in Section 5.2.1 above, said:
“Never, we cannot accept that as long as there are weapons. There should
be a disarmament programme. We are endangering the whole of Tanzania”
(G9).
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These dierent emphases at the national and the regional level caused the relocation
policy to be put on hold.
5.2.4 Land grab as another reason for relocation
In addition to the security and purity concerns there were further reasons for propos-
ing the relocation: economic aspects also played a role in this decision. First, relocation
would have resulted in increased development aid by international organisations benefit-
ing the receiving regions (see Chapter 4). The UNHCR oered to contribute to building
capacities of local governments to receive the refugees. According to the UNHCR head
ocer in Ulyankulu, who was at the time the only international sta employed there:
“The population will increase in those [receiving] regions; so more social ser-
viceswill be needed. TheUNworks as one now inTanzania. The intervention
of international organisations will come; but now we are waiting” (I2).
Furthermore, it was assumed that refugees would invest the money they had been sav-
ing in the receiving regions after relocation. The settlement ocer explained:
“With this economy, any improvement will show in their way of living. But
here in the settlement, they don’t improve the life because of the restrictions
of the government. They are not allowed to build permanent houses. Those
who are adhering to the law, they cannot build houses. This is where being
naturalised becomes important. The government wants to relocate them to
spend this money. This is a camp; a temporary living environment. If people
are building permanent and expensive homes here, no-one will be ready to
compensate for the loss later” (G2).
Through naturalisation, refugees would have formal land rights and could enhance
development by building houses. It should be mentioned that the lack of permanent
investments in the settlement was indeed another concern for security. According to the
government ocial of the regional administration in Tabora:
“The refugees are donating funds to give to their countries [Burundi and
Rwanda]. Ulyankulu has a high potential in tobacco production. Where does
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that money go? It is used to support the fighting groups. Wewant that money
to develop Ulyankulu. The big question is: where does that money go?” (G9).
Indeed, refugees were neither allowed to invest inside of the settlement nor in another
part of Tanzania. Families who were well o in the settlement therefore invested their
money in the education of their children (see also Chapter 6). Whether or not they were
remitting money to Burundi for conflict or other purposes could not be confirmed.
Reasons given for the relocation, as could be seen above, were the benefits for the re-
ceiving regions, and the thereby diused threat of refugees living in an enclave. One
could thus think that planning the closure of the settlements would have been a conse-
quence of proposing the relocation. However, the following argument suggests that the
causality ran the other way around: the relocation was planned because of the closure of
settlements. The UNHCR ocer in charge of questions concerning the refugees’ local
integration in Dar es Salaam said:
“About the relocation: In 2007 they were supposed to be integrated where
they were [according to TANCOSS]; I am not sure why in 2008 the decision
was made to relocate them. Some reasons mentioned were security issues –
even though there is no significant dierence regarding the security situation
between the settlement and other areas. The settlements are known to be
rather peaceful. The government wanted to really integrate them. Further,
they expressed the wish to use the Old Settlement areas for “other national
purposes” (I1).
With respect to Ulyankulu settlement, the formulation of “other national resources”
could hint at the fact that it was supposed to be (re-)converted into a forest reserve –
although this was not ocially announced. As explained in Chapter 5, the southern
and northern parts of Ulyankulu settlement were located in forest reserves, administered
by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. Surveys and investigations into the
matter of environmental damage, which were conducted in the settlement in recent years,
served as a reason to close Ulyankulu settlement in order to protect the forest reserve.
In Katumba and Mishamo settlements, by contrast, the formulation “other national
purposes” is a signifier for an investment deal with the U.S. firm AgriSol, which requested
the use of the settlement areas to grow genetically modified crops. According to the Oak-
land Institute (2011), a study into the feasibility of investing in Katumba and Mishamo
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settlements was conducted by AgriSol USA in July 2008 – about the same time as the gov-
ernment’s announcement to close the camps was made. The former Minister of Home
Aairs LawrenceMasha, who announced the decision to naturalise the refugees, became
the ‘legal advisor’ to the firm. In an interview at the Guardian in Dar es Salaam, a jour-
nalist who had followed this issue for several years, explained:
After talking to dierent people, including the refugees themselves and even the district
council leaders, the government side, the head of that settlement, it was like there was a
push behind. [...] It was because of the AgriSol Company Ltd. that these people were
supposed to be relocated to other areas to leave that space for Agrisol Company Ltd. to
invest. [...] So, telling them that [...] they are trying to reallocate the refugees [...] it was
just a cover so that AgriSol Company Ltd. could come to invest” (M1, emphasis added).
The AgriSol deal was one of 22 existing and proposed agricultural investment-related
land deals in Tanzania as of December 2010 (Oakland Institute, 2011). Investors from
countries such as USA, UK, Sweden, the Netherlands and South Korea are interested in
food or biofuel production, such as that made from the jatropha tree. Foreign investment
in Tanzania has grown from 0.1 per cent of Tanzania’s GDP in 1990 to 32.9% in 2005.
Four million hectares of land was requested by these investors in recent years although
only a part of it has been granted to them by the government. Some of the agricultural
investment deals, often referred to as ‘land grabs’, have been criticised when the investor
could not keep its promise in terms of job creation and compensation to the local popu-
lation (for example the UK-based investor Sun Biofuels; Carrington, 2011).
In the case of the AgriSol deal, the journalist further maintained that district govern-
ment leaders were bribed to attend preparatory meetings with the US firm, in which the
firm convinced them to agree to the deal. The local population questioned the length of
the lease, which was set to 99 years,4 they were afraid that the genetically modified crops
would threaten the growth of local plants as well as discontented since they were not in-
volved in the decision making process. The parliament also challenged the investment
decision since they did not agree with the terms of the contract. An opposition politician
voiced concern about the investment deal in a meeting on the 2011/2012 expenditure of
the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives:
4According to the new “Guidelines for Sustainable Liquid Biofuls Development in Tanzania”, published
in 2010 (Oakland Institute 2011), land for agrofuels can now only be leased over a five year probation period
and eventually extend the lease to 25 years.
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“Mr. Chairman, as in North Mara the police are guarding the mine and
kill Tanzanians, the same government brings Agrisol to Mpanda and police
to protect investors because it is the culture of this government that favours
the investors and ignores its people” (Said Amour Arfi, Mpanda Town Con-
stituency, CHADEMA, 26 July 2011, Dodoma).
Although not ocially confirmed, the AgriSol deal might have influenced the decision
to relocate the refugees fromMishamo andKatumba. The security concerns voiced about
the Burundian enclave (see above) thus need to be considered next to other economic and
environmental interests.
If the relocation exercise was put on hold in June 2011 (Milner, 2013; or in August
2011 according to the UNHCR, 2014k) due to the reservations about the investment deal
and concerns by the hosting regions, it was problematic that the naturalisation of the
refugees was tied to the relocation: according to the government, citizenship certificates
could only be obtained once a refugee would have moved to his/her final destination.
In summary, this section showed first, that security narratives trumped the policy dis-
course surrounding the formerly proposed relocation. These concerns were related to
national security rather than personal safety. This claim is supported by the fact that crim-
inality in the settlement is in fact lower than outside, and the limited equipment of the
police suggests that security was not a current priority in Ulyankulu. Security concerns
were related to a fear of impurity of the nation and of losing control over the refugees.
However, in order to eliminate the category of ‘refugees’ on Tanzanian territory, refugees
were to be integrated in a controlled manner (i.e. in regions and districts with host fami-
lies chosen by the government). This suggestion faced opposition by the receiving regions
and was therefore put on hold. The relocation also had economic reasons, such as a pro-
posed land deal. The fact that citizenship was tied to relocation was problematic both
for refugees and receiving regions.
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5.3 Effects and Functions of Control and Conviviality in Ulyankulu
5.3.1 Everyday implications of control
Since the refugees’ arrival, the MHA excluded refugees from de jure citizenship and im-
posed spatial control by eecting a separation betweenTanzanian citizens and Burundian
refugees or ‘new Tanzanians’ in the settlement for reasons of security and purity, as ar-
gued above. Sukuma and other Tanzanians have ocially not been allowed to live in the
settlement (see Annex 4) even though they frequently came to the market in the settle-
ment and started living in Ulyankulu. Residents in the surrounding areas of Ulyankulu,
in the broader region of Tabora and beyond have benefitted from this exchange. While
only 600 Tanzanians were registered with the government, about 10,000 Tanzanians lived
in the settlement actually, as mentioned in Chapter 4.
Legally, refugees from Ulyankulu were not allowed to leave the settlement without a
permit. This has had implications for the everyday lives of both Burundian refugees and
Tanzanian citizens. A first generation refugee, a farmer who had come to Ulyankulu
when he was three years old, outlined the disadvantages of living in the settlement in an
interview in Kaswa:
“Yes, there are a lot of disadvantages. When I am travelling to town for busi-
ness I have to pass the settlement ocer. The policemen can take my money
and other property if I don’t have a permit. [...] This happened to me fre-
quently. For example, we go with fear if we don’t have that permit. I was sent
to jail at that time. I went to Tabora for treatment of my eyes; then I was
caught by the migration police [...]. I went to jail for 4 days. In order to get
out, I had to sell my phone” (F3).
An open conversation held primarily with two other first generation refugees, taking
place on ‘Kariakoo market’ in Ikonongo with interference of various people that visited
the market and strongly agreed to what was said by the other two men, revealed:
“Until now we are not allowed to be outside of the settlement. If we are
caught, we face problems and are forced to come back. There was one man in
Mnange who opened an oce there; he was sent back to Ulyankulu by force.
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But if you are found in Mwanza [or another city]...you will be sent to prison
and you have to bribe them. If you don’t have money, you cannot get out of
prison” (F4).
Refugees who were illegally leaving the settlement without a permit thus risked being
sent to prison. In the case of the man going to seek treatment for his eyes, obtaining a
permit might have been a too slow and cumbersome bureaucratic process for someone
facing a health emergency. The man who went to open an oce in Mnange (a village
outside of the settlement) may not have tried to seek a permit at the settlement ocer’s
oce probably because he knew that working outside was not allowed.
Both accounts are examples of refugees who risked being sent back to the settlement
and possibly to prison in order to obtain economic and health necessities. They thereby
endangered their human security, i.e. their economic situation and health status. In both
cases, the achievement of economic capacities or health treatments had the eect of break-
ing the law with unfavourable consequences on these refugees’ wellbeing. There is a con-
stant interplay between control and agency: the refugees have disregarded the law with
their own agency and some of them have subsequently faced the bitter consequences of
control.
The separation achieved between refugees and citizens also had repercussions for local
Tanzanians. Ocial laws endangered refugees’ economic security as well as some Tanza-
nians’ physical security – one Tanzanian was sent to prison because he employed refugees
outside of Ulyankulu. His 22-year old son, who ran a small restaurant on the market in
Kaswa, explained:
“After completing secondary, I did a short course of four months at Masoma
Utalii [college for tourism studies]. I could not succeed in finishing because
my father was taken to prison because he employed Hutus on his farm in
Sikonge. He had to go to jail for six months. I stopped college when I failed
to pay the fees. I stopped it after one month” (C5).
While control was in the first place directed towards refugees, local Tanzanians sim-
ilarly suered from it. The artificial separation of refugees and citizens was routinely
questioned in refugees and Tanzanians’ everyday lives but it was still enforced by the gov-
ernment in many instances.
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5.3.2 Everyday functions of control and conviviality
One could think that the separation between citizens and refugees functioned in order
to preserve control over the refugee population. However, the first two examples in the
section above (5.3.1) showed that the enforcement of the separation between refugees and
citizens also functioned as a routinised everyday benefit of some individual local govern-
ment ocers, who allegedly accepted bribes from refugees as well as local Tanzanians in
exchange for economic and personal security.
The original rationales of control were thereby indeed at least partially invalidated.
This transformation had, on the one hand, the eect of further perpetuating the situa-
tion of control and top-down power relations between the government and refugees. On
the other hand, it gave refugees scope to act in their own interest, such as by moving out-
side of the settlement or by circumventing the prohibition to build permanent buildings
(see Section 5.1.1). This will be further explored in the next chapter. In fact, one could de-
scribe the relationship as one of “conviviality” (cf. Edmondson, 2007; Nyamnjoh, 2007,
see Section 2.3.1), i.e. a spirit of collaboration and togetherness between the state and
individuals or particular groups (as explained in Chapter 2), from which both parties
benefit. In this context, conviviality should be more narrowly defined between individual
government ocials and the refugees.
The situation also bears similarities with Lipsky’s (1980) “street-level bureaucracy”,
which is based on the idea that public implementation of policies depends on the street-
level bureaucrats, who are ultimately responsible for implementing them. These bureau-
crats often have considerable discretion over the day-to-day implementation of such poli-
cies. While dealing with huge caseloads and with inadequate resources, government
ocials need to negotiate with clients, and to make decisions on a case-by-case basis.
Thereby, they vary the extent to which they enforce the rules and laws that they are sup-
posed to follow. Under pressure to meet targets, the dierence between the theoretical
aim of the policy and the practical outcome can be substantial.
It is argued here that first of all, government ocials in Ulyankulu probably lacked the
means to enforce the law, for example to stop refugees and local Tanzanians frombuilding
permanent structures. The alleged ‘bribes’ they took therefore rather functioned as ‘fines’,
which served as a punishment for the wrong-doers, a substitute for law-enforcement. Ac-
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cepting such ‘fines’ should therefore not only be seen as self-interested corruption. Fur-
thermore, fines did not only serve as a financial benefit for the ocers in question. Coop-
erating with the refugees and local Tanzanians became a mutual benefit. Constructing
houses, for example, would be a benefit for the entire society, including the government
ocials. If control measures against the refugees’ agency (here in the form of resistance)
could be avoided, this would benefit everyone.
Some government ocials indeed developed a degree of conviviality with the refugees
and other Tanzanians in the settlement. This is because some of these ‘street-level bureau-
crats’ personally integrated into the local economy and proceedings of Ulyankulu. They
did not only perform their functions as government ocials in Ulyankulu, but also took
part in everyday life for example by cultivating, and by sending their children to school
in the settlement. Some government ocials, such as a former police commander of Ul-
yankulu, decided to stay in the settlement for their retirement since it had long become
their home:
“Yes, I stay here kwa muda – forever. I am already retired. [If] the settlement
closes, I will be able to stay here. [...] My children go to school here, so it
would not be good to move. It would cause disruption” (C11).
This is why the settlement ocer, who had already been in Ulyankulu for five years
(since 2008), believed that, in order to enforce government control measures over a long
period of time, there needed to be a rotation of ocers in the settlement:
“If you stay too long in one settlement, you lose perspective and become too
embedded in local processes. It is better if another settlement ocer takes
over after a while who has a fresh perspective” (G2).
Over time, the degree of conviviality that has been attained with some government of-
ficials may have helped refugees to feel at relative ease. Furthermore, as became apparent
in the field, there was a hierarchy amongst government ocials. Some who did not have
the power to make important decisions were simply not listened to. As will be further dis-
cussed in the following chapter, the camp was not a place of temporary refuge any more
– those that lived there did not wish to return to Burundi. They lived in the time-space
of Tanzania. Although the government made them wait for their citizenship certificates
– a temporal way of exerting control – most refugees did not live in apprehension of this
control.
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5.4 Conclusion
As could be seen in the first section, refugee policies, often originating in international
agreements but enshrined in national law, attempt to control refugees in various ways.
Refugees in Tanzania ocially lack important citizenship and human rights. The space
of Ulyankulu settlement allowed for an enforcement of this lack of rights, for example
through sporadic military acts of repression. The spatial separation of refugees and
Tanzanians functioned as a border between refugees and citizens. Power relations were
perpetuated and reproduced by restricting information dissemination and were demon-
strated in performances as could be observed in the school inauguration event on 2nd
August 2012. Such events also served to create a sense of temporal suspension, and to
make refugees wait. However, at the same time, the school inauguration showed that
refugees de facto already belonged to the Tanzanian nation as they performed Tanzanian
dances to show their local tradition, which they learned in school. The state thus engaged
in acts of exclusion and inclusion at the same time.
Discussed in relation to the formerly planned relocation, government ocials voiced
various security concerns as well as concerns with the purity of the nation. Such concerns,
it is argued, were also the basis of restrictions on citizenship rights such as freedom of
movement and voting. However, the perception of what security meant varied between
dierent levels of government. These conceptions of security focused on national secu-
rity instead of personal safety. Security was a main concern despite the fact that criminal-
ity was not very high within the settlement. Government ocials within the settlement
feared impurity that was facilitated by a loss of control over refugees and the settlement
area. The extent of integration achieved informally through refugees’ agency triggered
new security concerns by the government. However, it was rather the spontaneous char-
acter of integration under the current policies of encampment that was seen as a threat.
As proposed in 2007, the central government attempted to achieve integration in a con-
trolled way by relocating the refugees to other regions. This was designed to serve as a
way to ‘invisibilise’ the category of refugees while at the same time making them more
visible to other Tanzanians as newly naturalised citizens. Other reasons for the formerly
proposed relocation included an investment deal and environmental concerns. However,
regional governments did not agree with this proposal and the policy was put on hold.
189
5.4 conclusion
The control exerted in Ulyankulu settlement by the Tanzanian government together
with humanitarian actors was routinely evaded by refugees and Tanzanians alike.
Refugees often circumvented the control exerted in order to work or to be treated in
hospital. Thereby, they risked their own security since without a permit they could be
sent back to the settlement and could even be imprisoned. However, refugees managed
to circumvent some rules by paying favours to some government ocials. Due to limited
resources such favours may have been a substitute for law enforcement, functioning as
fines. Some ocials became so embedded in the settlement proceedings that they had
more than just a financial interest in exercising discretion. They developed a degree of
conviviality with the refugees, which benefited the entire society. While it may not have
completely altered the power relations between refugees and the government, it granted
the refugees some room for manoeuvre.
All in all, in the absence of clear borders, control was exerted in the settlement in var-
ious ways in order to maintain a separation between refugees and citizens. The main
reasons for such control were a national security motive and a concern with impurity. Al-
though controlwas still upheld in 2012, it was partially attenuated by discretion shown on
the part of individual government ocials. A will be shown in the next chapter, refugees
have in fact developed a sense of belonging to the nation despite the various control mea-
sures.
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PRAGMAT IC S OF B E LONG ING , DE F AC TO
C I T I Z ENSH I P AND WA I T ING IN A S PACE OF
AGENCY
While the previous chapter dealt with the various ways in which control has been exerted
in the settlement by the Tanzanian government in collaboration with humanitarian agen-
cies, and with the tensions arising between mechanisms of exclusion and belonging, this
chapter aims at scrutinising how refugees have dealt with these constraints through their
agency. It is argued that refugees have developed a ‘pragmatics of belonging’, which con-
sists of three dimensions: a relational one based on mutual recognition between refugees
and citizens, a dimension of feeling at home, and a dimension of claiming de facto citizen-
ship rights. Furthermore, they have engaged in a ‘pragmatics of waiting’, characterised
by a future-oriented way of dealing with the time spent in uncertainty.
The first section addresses the ways in which refugees have interacted with Tanzanians
under the constraints discussed in Chapter 5, within and outside of the settlement. It is
argued that the first dimension of a developing ‘pragmatics of belonging’ on the side of
the refugees has been relational, created by mutual recognition of refugees and citizens.
A second dimension of this ‘pragmatics of belonging’ has been the feeling of being
at ‘home’ in the settlement and in the Tanzanian nation. It will be discussed to what
extent refugees wanted to be, and indeed already felt like, Tanzanian citizens. Some suf-
fered under the on-going exertion of control and felt confused by their state of liminality.
As will be discussed, first and second generation refugees’ feelings about this diered in
a number of ways. In contrast to previous studies on this refugee population, most of
the refugees clearly positioned themselves as citizens and emphasised their good relation-
ship with their Tanzanian neighbours. They therefore did not try to refuse a Tanzanian
identity as refugees did in Kigoma, which Malkki (1995a: 153) termed a “pragmatics of
identity”.
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The third section considers how refugees have claimed de facto citizenship, seen as
a third dimension of belonging, which is interrelated with the other two dimensions.
Refugees have claimed de facto citizenship by transgressing the government’s provisions.
They have become increasingly mobile, especially among the second generation. In feel-
ing that they belong to the nation, they have moved outside of the settlement and have
found various ways to hide their refugee status from Tanzanian ocials in order to com-
pensate for their lack of rights. Most refugees have dealt with their past and their sur-
roundings in Tanzania in pragmatic ways – instead of accepting the ‘certainty’ of being
a non-citizen, they have instrumentally acted as informal citizens to claim rights. They
thereby achieved a sense of belonging to the Tanzanian nation, without longing for their
supposed Burundian homes.
Finally, as explained in the fourth section, refugees have also dealt with the temporal
control exerted in pragmatic ways. Refugees used the time spent waiting for the govern-
ment to make a decision on their relocation creatively in order to continue their daily
activities, to prepare for the future, and to resist aspects of the proposed policies.
As already discussed in Chapter 5, the settlement should not simply be seen as a ‘space
of control.’ Even though the structure of a controlled space has been eectuated by excep-
tional legal provisions and acts of repression, refugees have formed a pragmatic sense of
belonging and waiting in their everyday lives in what could be called a “space of agency”.
This pragmatics also involves local Tanzanians and some government ocials, as dis-
cussed in Section 5.3.2 and below.
6.1 Pragmatics of Belonging: Mutual Recognition of Refugees and Citizens
There are various types of interaction between Burundians and Tanzanians in their every-
day lives. In this section, their cooperation inside of the settlement, exchanges between
the settlement and outside villages and towns, and aspects of intermarriage are consid-
ered.
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6.1.1 Everyday interactions despite control: Cooperation inside the settlement
Despite some contentious points (further discussed below), the relationship between
refugees and local Tanzanian citizens has been generally characterised as cooperative.
The village leader of Kaswa, who had held his position for 17 years since 1995 at the time
of the interview (a first generation refugee who came to Ulyankulu when he was 14 years
old) emphasised the aspect of cooperation between the refugees and the local Tanzani-
ans, who were mostly Nyamwezi and Sukuma. He believed that the Tanzanians had an
interest in the refugees’ naturalisation. He explained:
“Those [Tanzanians] who live here, they were happy because some of them
have married our daughters. We work together in farming; for example they
[the Burundians] don’t know agriculture of the bushland; they were taught
by the Sukuma” (F5).
Tanzanians also emphasised that there is a mutually beneficial relationship between
them and the refugees. Despite the spatial separation between refugees and Tanzanians,
the government allowed a fewTanzanian students to study in the secondary schools at Ul-
yankulu and many Tanzanians study at VETA, the vocational training school. Speaking
about the closure of Ulyankulu settlement, a 25-year old VETA student (C6), aNyamwezi
from Urambo who studied in the settlement, said:
“Yes [I heard that the settlement will close soon], but it is a rumour. [...] I feel
bad [if the settlement closes]. One reason is that we feel peace and love with
most of them. Withmost of them, we play football here on the ground, maybe
others help us with water, shoes, money...Also clothes and other things, we
can find there on the market. It will be bad for many students.”
Cooperation between Burundians and Tanzanians has increased over time as more and
more Tanzanians have moved to the settlement in order to find work, and some to get
married (see Section 6.1.3). An increasing number of Tanzanians have built houses in the
settlement as well. Notably the relationship between refugees and local Tanzanians has
not always been peaceful – Sukumas have foughtwith refugees over land onwhich to graze
their cattle. According to a first generation refugee in his forties, who experienced such
a conflict over his land, “we chase them away but we speak bad words to each other. The
police do not listen to us refugees; they favour the Tanzanians” (F1). While the policemay
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not have settled such disputes, the village leader above mentioned that concerning land
conflicts he was responsible for mediating and reconciling those refugees and Sukuma in
his village before sending them to the court. When such a conflict happened on a large
scale in 2011, the police did take action in order to repress the Sukumas’ residence in
the settlement (see Chapter 5, Section 5.1.3). On the whole, most refugees emphasised
that they lived well together with the Tanzanians in the settlement. There was a lively
exchange between the two groups and they recognised each other as legitimate residents.
Viewing themselves as ‘Tanzanians’ (see Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 below) and interacting
with Tanzanian citizens on a daily basis, the distance between refugees and citizens was
reduced considerably, if not collapsed. Compared to the situation described in relation
to Mishamo settlement in the 1980s (Malkki, 1995a), this is indeed a significant change.
6.1.2 Exchange between Ulyankulu and other places
A lively interaction between Tanzanians and Burundians was not restricted to the set-
tlement. At the administrative level, there used to be an exchange between the oce of
Ulyankulu division and the surrounding wards, which reported to the division secretary.
On an administrative level, Ulyankulu therefore had an important position – and local
government ocials from villages around the settlement could often be found in the set-
tlement. Tanzanian citizens from outside of Ulyankulu also came to the settlement to go
to the market to buy food and utensils, and to be treated in the health centre in the set-
tlement. Refugees, on the other hand, moved to the villages outside of the settlement in
order towork. This interaction reached as far as Tabora town and beyond. Some refugees
went there to sell their products, and Tanzanians came to the settlement to buy crops to
resell them in the market in Tabora. In a small meeting place in Tabora market, where
men used to discuss and drink coee, dierent opinions were voiced in a conversation
that I initiated. Two Tanzanian men who had regular exchanges with the Burundians,
had contrasting opinions:
“The Burundians are not as welcoming to foreign people as Tanzanians. [...]
Sometimes they are very rude” (C5).
But an older man noted:
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“They are very loyal – if you lend them money, to collect maize on another
day, they will not use it in another way, they will use if for that task only;
otherwise they will return the money to you” (C7).
However, not all residents in Tabora knew of the refugees’ presence, and many did
not know details regarding their background. When speaking about my research, some
Tanzanians, whom I met on transit in Tabora, one of which ran a hostel and the other
led a long-term NGO project there, said when asked, “Are there still many refugees?”
(C8), and, “Yes, I know the Hutu and Tutsi live there” (C9), although the overwhelming
majority of refugees were Hutu. In the surrounding wards of Ulyankulu almost everyone
was familiar with the place but in the next biggest town, Tabora, only some people had
been to Ulyankulu, and those with business relations to the place had varying opinions
about the refugees. However, their presence as such was not questioned. At a distance,
it thus seemed that Ulyankulu had become invisible – it blended in with and belonged to
its surroundings.
6.1.3 Intermarriage between refugees and Tanzanian citizens
Tanzanians and Burundians have intermarried inside the settlement and outside of it, in
surrounding villages and in further away towns and cities. One respondent, a Tanza-
nian Muslim originally from Kagera in an interview elicited by the Imam of Ulyankulu
mosque, explainedwhy he came to the settlement about eight years ago and howhe found
his wife, a refugee, in the settlement.
“Life was dicult there [in Kagera]; that’s why I came here in ‘search of life’
[kutafuta maisha]. I came here with my identity card. Here I could work on
a farm; I could earn at least TZS 400,000 per year. I was employed here but
there was a misunderstanding because the tobacco farmer failed to give me
food. The tobacco farmers have to give you food throughout the year. So I
decided to live here at the centre as a bicycle technician.
[I got married] this year in October [2012]; now we have been living here for
about a month. [I met my wife] here at Road 13; near to the centre. [...] She
was working at a restaurant in the centre but now she is farming. I was given
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a piece of land by my wife’s parents, 1/2 an acre, and one acre we are renting”
(C10).
This respondent thus came to Ulyankulu in search of work and started his married life
there. Not only was he (presumably) employed by a refugee, he also obtained a piece
of land from refugees through his refugee wife, who had converted to Islam for him.
Another couple in a village outside of the settlement met each other when the man, a
Nyamwezi, went to Ulyankulu to the market. Soon after they got married and opened a
shop outside of the settlement.
Other mixed couples first lived in Ulyankulu and then moved to another place. How-
ever, they still come back to the settlement from time to time and kept contact with the
family. An 18-year old waiter, a second-generation refugee, explained at a restaurant in
Ulyankulu:
“My brother doesn’t have any work – he went to Kahama in 2008. He is
farming. In 2009, my other brother moved to Mwanza with his wife, who
came from Mwanza. They wanted to live in the city. My brother is a tailor.
They come back [to visit] here sometimes” (S3).
The extent of intermarriage within the settlement can be estimated in a remark given
by a local government ocial, who originally came from the south of Tanzania. He ex-
plained that it would be dicult to distinguish the refugees from theNyamwezi and other
Tanzanians for interview purposes because they were “all intermarried”. Despite ocial
statistics, which state a low percentage of intermarriage (6.19% of families were recorded
as one with a mixed marriage or as including a Tanzanian parent; SA3, 2007: 58) empir-
ical findings thus suggest that intermarriage was a common phenomenon.
Marriage patterns thus changed over time. Malkki (1995a: 175) noted that refugees in
Mishamo settlement did not approve of marriages between refugees and citizens at the
time of her research in the 1980s probably because they saw their stay in Tanzania as tem-
porary. Once exile had become protracted, however, intermarriage, at least in Ulyankulu,
became a normal and desired phenomenon since it increased their sense of belonging to
Tanzania. A 35-year old (refugee) woman with four children, who had married a Tanza-
nian man, explained a change over time:
“At the time the Burundian women [first] went there [to live with the Sukuma
inside and outside of the settlement], they failed to do their work – of shifting
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around and caring for the cows. Sometimes they used bad words like, ‘You
are too lazy, you cannot do our work’. [Citizenship means] to feel freedom;
to respect each other, especially by the Sukumas who despised us so much.
But now they started to marry us; we are integrated” (S12).
As could be seen above, the issue of intermarriage was viewed positively by first and sec-
ond generation refugees, while government ocials feared that they would not be able
to distinguish refugees from citizens. One can note that while refugees had been con-
cerned about impurity of their nation at the time of Malkki’s research, the concern with
purity was rather on the side of the government at the time of field research in Ulyankulu.
Refugees had already embraced the idea of becoming part of the Tanzanian nation. One
person mentioned that she married a Tanzanian because he was wealthy but others said
that they were marrying for love, personal choice, or because they lived outside of the
settlement – similar to the town refugees in Malkki’s study (1995a). The woman cited
above explained, “[I married a Tanzanian] because I liked to [nilipenda]. My heart has
fallen to him” (S12).
In summary, refugees and Tanzanians integrated with each other to their mutual bene-
fit. Instead of remaining linked to Burundi, refugees interacted with Tanzanians espous-
ing a pragmatic future-oriented way of thinking in order to gain a sense of belonging.
Refugees benefited from cooperation with Tanzanians for example by learning farming
techniques adequate for the climate and landscape of Ulyankulu, (see quote by F16 be-
low, Section 6.2.3) and Tanzanians benefited from refugees by obtaining products sold in
the market. The exchange between refugees and citizens extended well beyond the settle-
ment; some refugees went as far as Tabora town to sell their products; and Tanzanians
went to the settlement to buy. Tanzanians have also started marrying refugees, both in
the settlement (since Tanzanians moved there) as well as in towns and cities outside of the
settlement. This spontaneous integration was feared by some government ocials but it
was the lived reality of the people living in Ulyankulu as well as outside of the settlement.
The spatial and legal separation that was attempted by refugee policy was not legitimate
in the eyes of the refugees. Although it was sometimes eective (e.g. when refugees and
Tanzanians were sent to prison for not complying with the law), they often bypassed it
in their daily routines. Despite the control they faced, a ‘space of agency’ became man-
ifest, which extended beyond the settlement as it became integrated into the Tanzanian
economy and society.
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6.2 Pragmatics of Belonging: The Settlement as Home
6.2.1 First generation: Feeling at home in the settlement and the nation as prerequisite for becoming
citizens
Having developed a relational sense of belonging, refugees also felt that they belonged to
the settlement and the nation on account of feeling at home. Some elderly first generation
refugees mentioned that they felt at home in their immediate surroundings; they felt close
to and at ease with their neighbours and wanted to stay where they were. Not only was
a feeling at home an important prerequisite for a sense of belonging (Duyvendak, 2011:
36), refugees also saw it as an important reason for applying for citizenship. A 61-year old
first-generation refugee man with 11 children, who worked as a catechist for the Catholic
Church in Ulyankulu, said:
“[The meaning of citizenship] is to feel at home. The people who I find here
are my relatives. We live with them like brothers and sisters with the indige-
nous population” (F61).
First generation refugees felt at home in the settlement and felt too old to start a new life
somewhere else. Repatriation and relocation were therefore not their preferred options
even when parts of their families had decided to repatriate in 2008/09. A 67-year old
first-generation refugee man, whose daughter had repatriated to Burundi along with her
husband and in-laws, mentioned:
“I lived here for all those years, and now I am old, I got no energy to cultivate,
that’s why I saw it to be good to apply for citizenship. I can’t go back to
farming again” (F7).
To feel at home also meant to be a normal person in their surroundings. Therefore,
citizenship was a natural and logical option for them since they were living contently in
Ulyankulu, the same way as Tanzanian citizens, and they saw the Tanzanians as friends.
A 77-year old refugee man, who had been a teacher in Burundi prior to coming to
Ulyankulu in 1972, explained:
1One of his sons was among the select few who had already got his citizenship certificate in Dar es
Salaam. Unfortunately, I could not interview him since he was travelling at the time of field work.
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“To see the way I live here; I am a normal person. We stayed here for a long
time. We are living here happily. We live together like friends” (F82).
Some other elderly refugees felt at home in the settlement since they perceived it as a
peaceful place in contrast to Burundi. They believed it is still not safe to go back to their
country of origin. Furthermore, they said that they had “no place to live in Burundi” (F8)
– meaning that they lost their land there and even their families and friends due to war,
displacement and old age. A 59-year old refugee man with eight children3, who taught
Catholic religion in primary school, said:
“I was living here [in Ulyankulu/Tanzania] very well; there is no peace there
[in Burundi]” (F9).
Some refugees said that they belonged to Tanzania because they were educated ac-
cording to the Tanzanian curriculum. A VETA-teacher, who had been transferred to
Ulyankulu from Katumba settlement, explained:
“I applied because my whole education I did here; I know nothing about Bu-
rundi; I was very young when I came here” (F10).
Some refugees mentioned that they are satisfied with where they were at that moment,
and that they belonged “here” (“hapa hapa” or “humu humu” (for example F2, quoted
again in Section 6.2.3 below)). They had become “mwenyeji” – a local person who be-
longed to the place. In their pragmatic view, living contently in one place meant that
they belonged to it, without explicit considerations of adapting to Tanzanian language,
culture and education, living peacefully with their Tanzanian neighbours, or without
mentioning push factors from Burundi. These refugees also saw their naturalisation in
pragmatic terms. They believed that they were citizens and not refugees anymore because
the government or the UN said so. One could say that the action of having applied for
Tanzanian citizenship had, at least in nominal terms, confirmed their attained sense of
belonging. Some said they are now “Tanzanian” because they applied for citizenship (e.g.
interview with F11).
2This first generation refugee had seven children of whom three lived outside of the settlement. His sons
had married Tanzanian women, while his daughters had married amongst the refugees. One of his sons,
who worked in Tabora town, subsequently agreed to meet for an interview (F17, cited below).
3Including the orphaned children of his late brother, who died in the war in Burundi in 1972
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Again, for some refugees confirming their sense of belonging by applying for citizen-
ship was a pragmatic decision to protect their families. These refugees engaged in future-
thinking and emphasised the next generation: their children should be citizens in order
to be free and because it would be dicult for them to return to Burundi. The village
leader of Kaswa (see Section 6.1.1) and the VETA-teacher quoted above, explained:
“From being a refugee, for myself, the meaning of becoming a citizen is to be
free and to be able to send my children to school and for them to be citizens
also when I die” (F5).
“Because I remained in Tanzania; it is better for me and my family, for my
whole life. Even for my children, even Kirundi – it is dicult for them” (F10).
Some elderly refugees, who lived in the settlement since 1972, said that they liked to live
in Tanzania because they were satisfied with the government or because the government
took care of them. It seems that these refugees appreciated and were grateful that for
decades they had been welcomed and hosted in Ulyankulu. This might still be a legacy
of President Nyerere’s policies, as he once welcomed them as ‘guests’ and not (unwanted)
‘refugees’. Two first-generation refugees said (also quoted above):
“Since 1972 the government was taking care of me from that time until now,
so that’s why I feel like a Tanzanian” (F7).
“I am satisfied with the government – I feel like I am at home. I am satisfied
with the leaders of this government” (F6).
For them, these feelings of belonging were a reason for applying for citizenship. They
could imagine becoming de jure citizens since they saw the government as being legiti-
mate.
All of these refugees were fully ready to become Tanzanians and believed that they be-
longed to Tanzania. They did not feel like refugees anymore. For some, feeling at home
came about by having become used to the surroundings of the settlement and having in-
teracted with the host population for decades. This feeling led to a localised sense of
belonging. For others however, their feeling of home related to the Tanzanian nation as
a whole. They contrasted their sense of belonging to Tanzania with a lack of knowledge
of Burundi and a belief in adverse circumstances in their country of origin. Furthermore,
their sense of belonging to Tanzania came about by being educated according to the Tan-
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zanian curriculum and by having been hosted by the Tanzanian government. For all these
first generation refugees, reasons for applying for citizenship in 2007 were articulated as
a confirmation of their existing sense of belonging to Ulyankulu and the nation. As one
refugee said, voting rights, for example, are a confirmation that they have finally “become
like them” (F9), like Tanzanians.
Uncertainty of belonging due to lack of de jure citizenship rights
A few refugees were confused about their feelings in relation to their status as Tanzanians
or refugees. They found themselves in a liminal position for dierent reasons. The VETA-
teacher quoted above said that he still felt like a refugee since he was lacking citizenship
rights.
“Somehow, because there are some rights I do not have as a Tanzanian, like to
vote and be voted and also not to have access to further education...it makes
me somehow like a refugee. Even the place we are living – this is a settlement.
Perhaps if I go out of this place – perhaps I forget about refugeeness. When
I was in secondary school, few knew that I was a refugee; the principal and
headmaster. But students? No. I speak Kiswahili like the others, so it is
dicult to dierentiate me” (F10, in English).
He also mentioned that he could not go to his father’s funeral in Burundi without a
passport or ocial documentation. The father had repatriated to Burundi in 2008 and
passed away a few years later. The respondent feared losing his job if he went there. While
a localised sense of belonging or a sense of belonging to the nation were sucient reasons
to feel Tanzanian for the refugees above, this person emphasised that he did not fully feel
Tanzanian since he still lacked de jure citizenship rights. The lack of de jure citizenship
rights mattered for him more in the controlled spatiality of the camp, which made him
feel like a refugee. Outside of the settlement within Tanzania, he had become a de facto
citizen, who could blend in due to his language skills. In an interview with an Ulyankulu
Secondary School teacher, held in front of his house in the presence of another teacher,
he emphasised that he still felt like a refugee due to the lack of de jure citizenship rights:
“Let me laugh first before I say anything. Of course, you know there is a
certain creature, a bird, so I can answer you by saying that I am still a bird
[...]. I’m not allowed to have rights like a Tanzanian. There are some loans
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from the government; I am not allowed to join it. Also I am not allowed to
be employed as a permanent teacher. So you can see I am still in a dilemma
position. And we still have some barriers. If you want to go outside as a
passenger with some luggage, maybe for business, [...] maybe for three or
seven days; if you are late you have to report to the district oce. You have
to report to any district oce at the place you are visiting” (F12, in English,
emphasis added).
De jure citizenship rights were highly important in his personal life (see below). The
dierence between these answers and the ones above may stem from the fact that both of
these respondents worked for the government as teachers and were therefore more visible
to and dependent upon the government. They were evidently under more pressure than
others to follow its regulations in order not to lose their jobs.
Uncertainty of belonging as a result of membership of an ethnic or national minority
Another respondent, a pastor at a church in Ikonongo, experienced confusion and uncer-
tainty for a dierent reason. He explained (in English):
“I myself still think I’m hanging in two ways. Here in Ulyankulu there are
two groups. There are people who applied for naturalisation and there are
a second group who remain looking for another option. They wait or they
applied to go for resettlement. I am among them. I did not apply for natural-
isation. I still wait for resettlement [to a] third country – if there is a country
who can take refugees to go to settle for their whole lives, I am among them.
I wrote an application to UNHCR, they received my letters. They opened
my files [and] told me – you just wait [...] until the time is coming to process
resettlement.
[...] Nowadays, I cannot say I am a Burundian. I am not. Because my sta-
tus, from the beginning I was a half-cast of mixing bloods between Tutsi and
Hima. My father was Mangeni tribe from Muscat, Saudi Arabia. My father
was a business man in Burundi. He married a wife from Tutsini tribe. My
wife was mixing blood between Tutsi and Himani tribe. That is why I am
still waiting. I don’t have a large family in Burundi – how can I go there. And
my father died. I don’t know where my relatives are” (F13).
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This refugee was amongst the few who had not chosen either option – repatriation or
naturalisation. These refugees chose to remain refugees in the hope of being resettled to a
developed country. Long (2010) mentions that refugees in various settings have perfected
strategies to gain eligibility for resettlement by the UNHCR. In Ulyankulu some refugees
have gone to great lengths to be considered for third-country resettlement. They travelled
to and spoke with people in other camps in order to find out about the dierent possi-
bilities. However, the 1972 caseload was generally not deemed in need of resettlement
(according to an interview with UNHCR Ulyankulu, I4) and those who were resettled
left the settlement a long time ago.4
The refugee cited above did not apply for citizenship since he did not feel that he be-
longed to the group of people who chose naturalisation. His example showed that the
emerging sense of belonging amongst refugees had a collective dimension – for him, be-
longing to Tanzania presupposed belonging to the community of Hutu refugees, who
had opted for naturalisation. On the other hand, possibly because they had a joint cause,
those who applied for resettlement also knew each other and some collaborated in their
eorts to fight for resettlement.
Advantages of de jure citizenship
Most respondents said that they already felt Tanzanian, that they would not like to go
back to Burundi and that they would then “be able to vote” or “be free” in general. Only
a few respondents urgently needed citizenship in practical terms. A secondary school
teacher (also quoted above) said (in English):
“There are many important points [why it is important to gain citizenship].
The first is to be known as a citizen of Tanzania and also to receive human
rights as other Tanzanian citizens. Tanzanians have the right to ask for loans
[to go to university], which can support them to have further studies. But
on my side as a refugee, as the one who is still waiting for a certificate of
naturalisation, I cannot be accepted to have those loans. [...]
The second is that it can help me to transfer from one place to another in
this country. Because nowadays you cannot be allowed to go to live any place
4World-wide only 1%of refugees are resettled to developed countries because these countries only accept
a small number of people, under their own conditions, to enter every year (Long, 2010).
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without the permission of the commander of settlement, the [...] “mkuu wa
makazi”, the leader of this camp. Before you go there, you have to ask the
permission [...].”
[The third is] if you are a citizen, of course you will be a permanent worker.
[...] Without getting a naturalisation certificate, you cannot be allowed to be
a worker outside of this camp. [...] Of course, myself, I would like to do so
[to work outside of the camp]. I have one child here, he is my son. He suers
[...]; it is a kind of cancer. I was in Muhimbili hospital two years ago. They
wrote me a letter to be a worker near to the hospital. Since I am a refugee, I
wrote a letter to the DED [district executive director], my employer, to give
me a transfer but he replied to me, I am not allowed to move out of the camp
because I am still a refugee. I still have the letters here and also the answers
that I got” (F12).
In terms of employment, another respondent, a primary school teacherwho had taught
at the school for 32 years, mentioned similar advantages for citizenship5.
“[I applied for citizenship] because I studied here [...] here I can live in peace.
I have every reason to apply. You get sad because the government still doesn’t
give contracts and pension but everything else is fine; I can live in peace so I
feel like a Tanzanian. [...] [A citizen is] a person who lives in a country with
peace and with all rights, fundamental rights. I will be very happy; I will not
get these problems from the job [any longer]” (F14).
The second conversation supported some points mentioned in the first: citizenship
would translate to old-age security and job security. The first conversation, however,
showed a personwhowould benefit in various additional ways from obtaining citizenship.
Citizenship would not only improve finances, education etc., for him it was a matter of
life and death. Judging from seeing this young boy with cancer, he would not have had
much time to live from the time of the interview without going to a specialised hospital.
While the UNHCRand the government gave citizenship certificates to 749 refugees inDar
es Salaam, others had to await their fate. This case showed that it would be necessary to
give citizenship to both first generation and second generation refugees.
5At the time of interview, he was the only refugee teacher left at the school from initially five, who had
been transferred to other schools or had already passed away.
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In summary, most first generation refugees developed a familiarity with and localised
sense of belonging to the space of the settlement and the people there, including Tan-
zanians, through their everyday encounters. The settlement became their home. Some
emphasised a broader sense of belonging to theTanzanian nation. They still perceived Bu-
rundi as an unsafe place, in contrast toTanzania. For all, their attained sense of belonging
was a prerequisite to apply for naturalisation. Some refugees still felt uncertainty about
whether they belonged to Tanzania or were still refugees. For some of these refugees de
jure citizenship was crucial since they worked for the government and thus had limited
room formanoeuvre. Others, who did not feel part of the refugee community for example
due to their ethnicity, used their agency to fight for resettlement.
6.2.2 Second generation
Having considered feelings of belonging among the first generation, it is necessary to com-
pare them with those of the second and third generation. Second and third generation
refugees felt a sense of belonging to Tanzania in pragmatic terms since they were born
in Tanzania and they did not know Burundi at all. One respondent, who had recently
obtained a Bachelor degree (see Section 6.3.1), explained why it was a problem not to
know the country of Burundi very well: he could not speak French – the ocial teaching
language in secondary schools in Burundi – and even Kirundi was dicult after having
been educated in Tanzania in Swahili and English.
“Myself, I enjoy being a Tanzanian; I can’t say that I am a Burundian, I have
not even been in Burundi a single day; Tanzania is a peaceful country, peo-
ple are allowed to go here and there; the education format is easier than the
Burundian. For us born in Tanzania, we know Kiswahili and English. Once
we go to Burundi, we need to know French; we need to know Kirundi deeply.
Those who repatriated who were studying at Ulyankulu Secondary School
have failed to study because of the study environment – the system of educa-
tion etc” (S4, in English).
Others, such as a 30-year old mother of four children in the village of Mapigano (S5),
summarised their reasons by saying that they did not “feel” Burundi, they “felt” Tanzania-
a feeling related to being familiar with surroundings and people, to feel at home. Belong-
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ing did not need a further explanation – being born in Tanzania was enough to explain it.
A tailor and pastor in Kaswa mentioned in an interview in front of his house in the pres-
ence of his wife, a tailor, who did not want to be interviewed, and some of their children:
“I feel like a native Tanzanian because I was born here” (S6). In relation to the proposed
naturalisation, the same respondent showed another pragmatic way of belonging: he felt
Tanzanian because “the president announced it” (S6). Similar to the first generation, sec-
ond and third generation refugees, such as a man selling mattraces on Ulyankulu market,
also said that they were “already used to the environment” (S7) and that it was therefore
best to stay.
Comparing these answers to the first generation, the second generation refugees did not
mention that theywere grateful toTanzania for hosting them, nor did they emphasise that
they felt at ease with their neighbours. While for them it was also important to “feel at
home”, they saw their relationship with Tanzanians as more natural and inevitable than
the first generation. Furthermore, second and third generation refugees had dierent
push-factors from Burundi than the first generation – e.g. emphasising not speaking the
language instead of underlining that there was peace in Tanzania. Second generation
refugees also did not emphasise that they wanted to feel like ‘normal’ citizens. They felt
fully adapted already. They were born and educated in Tanzania, so there was no need
in emphasising this aspect.
Second and third generation refugees did not emphasise belonging as a local phe-
nomenon but as a national one. For most second generation refugees it was not as impor-
tant to stay in Ulyankulu as for some elderly first generation refugees. Since the second
generation felt at home in the nation, moving out of the settlement was less intimidating
as well as physically less burdensome than for the elderly. However, as some answers in-
dicate (see quote by S5 in Section 6.3.1), women were less mobile than men due to their
children rearing responsibilities.
When it comes to advantages of de jure citizenship, which was seen by the first genera-
tion as a confirmation of their belonging, second generation refugees mentioned it rather
as an additional advantage than a prerequisite. For example, they mentioned that they
had a disadvantage by obtaining a school leaving certificate, which still stated “Burun-
dian” as their nationality. A 17-year old male student in Form 4 of Kanindo Secondary
School explained:
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“I would be happy [to be a Tanzanian]. When you finish Form 4, your certifi-
cate shows that you are a Burundian; if people see that you are a Hutu, they
will not employ you outside of the settlement and if possible, they will send
you back to the settlement” (S8; see also S9 below).
Other respondents mentioned that citizenship was important in order to feel free. A
third generation refugee (also quoted above) said:
“If you are a citizen you can be free you can decide to do whatever you like
instead of breaking the law of the government. So you can decide whatever
you want because you are free, you have rights. But if you are not a citizen,
there are other rights you don’t have, for instance to choose a leader. So if you
are a citizen you can easily choose and enjoy the cake of the nation” (S7).
Furthermore, in an interview at her house, a tailor, mother of four children, explained:
“To me, the advantage of being a citizen is to be able to move from one place
to another without fear; and to live in freedom; I can decide myself what to
do and not the government” (S10).
Similarly, a male 16-year old Form 4 Kanindo Secondary School student mentioned:
“No, I feel free; I have felt free since the beginning. But the problem is that
our certificate says that we are refugees, it says ‘Burundian’ ” (S9).
One respondent, a 25-year old man working in a dispensary in Ikonongo, mentioned
that a main advantage of citizenship was that it would facilitate the possibility of taking
part in bringing about political change:
“I would like to vote. I am not allowed to vote or to select the leader. I am
clapping my hands when the president goes into oce even though I didn’t
do anything – I cannot do anything if I don’t like the president. [...] If I want
to talk about rights, I would talk until sunset – even if I get several university
degrees, I would still be recognised as a refugee, so the most important one
is to be able to vote – the other rights follow” (S11).
Some second generation refugees thus mentioned formal advantages of being citizens,
like the right to vote and other fundamental rights. One respondent (see S7 above) equated
citizenship status to “not having to break the law anymore”. This answer shows that
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refugees perceived breaking the law as inevitable in order to get by and to substitute lack-
ing citizenship rights.
Uncertainty of belonging
Among the second generation, just like the first generation, some refugees said that they
were not sure whether they were refugees or citizens, Burundians or Tanzanians. The
young medical attendant quoted above said:
“In that sense I must feel like [a refugee] because I don’t have the answer that
I can be a Tanzanian or not” (S11).
In the presence of the respondent above and a refugee pastor from the village of Taba
(F16), a doctor at the same dispensary added:
“I really feel like in the middle. [...] Yes, of course [I applied for citizenship].
You can live in the place you were born but you can also be naturalised. Our
parents are from Burundi but we are born here. We are not sure where we are.
[...] We are not sure yet – are we Tanzanian or Burundian?” (S1)
The first person quoted above felt like he was still a refugee because he did not yet
hold the citizenship certificate; he did not yet have formal proof of being a citizen. Here
citizenship was seen in nominal and formal terms. The parents of the second respondent
did not choose naturalisation but decided to repatriate to Burundi. The fact that a part
of the family now lived in Burundi caused some uncertainty to his sense of belonging, but
nevertheless he said he felt like a Tanzanian.
These second generation refugees had dierent reasons for feeling uncertainty about
their belonging compared to the first generation. They did not quote ethnicity as a reason,
for example. Some second and third generation refugees may have been too young to
be in direct contact with the practical consequences of lacking such rights. While the
problem of not having secured employment contracts and pensions also befell second
generation refugees, respondents did not mention it. Second generation refugees believed
that freedom and rights were important in their lives (see above) but they did not quote
the lack of it as a reason for uncertainty. Especially the second generation developed
dierent skills and methods to deal with the lack of citizenship rights, such as freedom
of movement, as will be discussed in the next section.
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While inter-generational considerations caused first generation refugees to apply for
citizenship in order to ensure that their children would be safe, for second generation
refugees, inter-generational concerns caused uncertainty. Not having been able to regis-
ter for citizenship themselves (their parents did so), and having parents who decided to
repatriate was confusing.
In summary, most first and second generation refugees felt that they were already Tan-
zanian citizens and not Burundian refugees any more. In general, however, first gener-
ation refugees announced a more localised sense of belonging than the second genera-
tion. Second generation refugees thought it was not necessary to justify or negotiate
their sense of belonging – they thought it was natural to feel Tanzanian if you were born
there. Having been educated in Swahili and English were factors that underscored their
sense of belonging. Some refugees of both generations still felt uncertain about where
they belonged, for dierent reasons. The first generation mentioned rights and ethnicity
as factors, whereas for the second generation it was the lack of an ocial status and the
fact that their parents had repatriated to Burundi.
6.2.3 Diasporic culture and belonging
Belonging: longing for home?
The experience of refugees has sometimes been implicated in the concept of diaspora, a
term that originally related to the Jewish Diaspora (Cohen, 2008; Safran, 1991; VanHear,
2006). Displacement is not perceived as an individual experience but one that stems from
a cataclysmic event that traumatises the group as a whole, creating a central historical
experience of victimhood (Cohen, 2008: 1). Safran (1991) argued that a central feature
of such a diaspora is its relationship to the homeland, including a vision or myth about
an idealised ancestral homeland. Descendants should return to it when conditions have
improved. At the very least, other scholars mentioned that a characteristic of a diaspora
is a ‘longing for home’, or a ‘homing desire’ (Brah, 1996), even where they do not actively
want to go back. It seems logical to suggest that the first generation has a stronger homing
desire than the second generation who is already accustomed to the way of living in the
host country. However, in Ulyankulu, even elderly first generation refugees did not have
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such desires. In a short interview at his 50th wedding anniversary celebration to which I
was invited, the husband said:
“Since 1972, I have never gone [back to Burundi] to see it there; that is why I
applied for citizenship. [He starts laughing]. [...] They have bad disturbances
[vurugu]. When they see a child, they kill it...even cats and mice! That is the
Burundians’ war!” (F15)
In a long interview at his house, another elderly refugee man (70-years old) explained
the situation in Burundi when he fled and was overwhelmed by his emotions.
“I have not gone back to Burundi. [...] It is not to be spoken about [...] –
many were killed in a bad way [he starts to cry]. Anybody was killed [...].
My parentswere killed for instance because Iwasworking for the government.
[He walks away shortly to wipe away the tears and returns]. I am sorry, my
tears mean – my children, my elder brothers and sisters were killed. No-one,
who lives here, was really faced by thewar; but I was right there. The people at
the top cannot tell the story in depth. Other people [...] will not tell the truth.
The government leaders try to hide the truth. But those who were there at the
time, they know the truth. In 1961, Iwas a soldier. I participated in thewar for
independence [...] Wewere fighting under the son of Rwagasore, who brought
peace. He was the son of a king. [...] He tried to gather us [the soldiers] and
insisted that we look after the nation. The soldiers should not work for their
personal gain but to shed the blood of love for the nation. The government
could not help the people. The president wasMikaeli Michombero, who was
starting the war [later Bagaza]. He was killing everybody until the people
“wa chini” [people in lower positions]. They were killing the people from
their own government. [...] PresidentMichombero announced to the soldiers
that all Hutus should be killed who could give orders to other people. Those
Hutu who remain should be servants who go to fetch water and other tasks
without questioning.
Those who went back to Burundi [in the repatriation in 2009] – they came
back to Tanzania... They may cause another war – those, who went back to
Burundi.
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I don’t have any ideas [mawazo] of Burundi. Those who are really refugees
have passed away – why I am still here I don’t know. Even at Road 13, the
youth look like old people – I don’t know why they get old quickly; maybe
they have a bad diet or very hard work” (F2).
In these and other interviews one can see that first generation refugees still had the
situation of war in their mind when thinking of Burundi. They had shared memories of
the war and therefore did not like to go back to the place. They believed that if they went
back to Burundi, another war could ensue – this time about land. The respondent above
spoke about those Burundian refugees who had recently repatriated but returned to the
settlement as illegal migrants because they experienced conflict in the home country. First
generation refugees did not like to be reminded about the situation in their country of
origin because they found a place of peace in Tanzania and wanted to stay there until the
end of their lives.
As the respondent above said, nowadays, he was one of the few in Ulyankulu who still
remembered the situation in Burundi6. Most people of his age had passed away. As ar-
gued by Geschiere (2009), African urban elites have an ongoing relationship with their
village of birth due to the importance that is attributed to their ancestors’ graves. A sense
of belonging to that village is therefore related to being rooted in the soil. A sensible
argument to make therefore is that refugees in Ulyankulu may have had a strong relation-
ship to their village of birth in Burundi but over time their sense of belonging shifted to
Ulyankulu: they started burying their ancestors at one of three graveyards that were built
at dierent times at Roads 28, 10 and 13. Communal places for burying the deceased
of Tanzanian descent (such as Sukuma) were oered at Road 28. These insights support
the argument that while the first generation has surely maintained a stronger connection
to Burundi throughout the years than the second generation, their ‘homing desire’ or a
‘longing for home’ is likely to have decreased over time until theywere prepared to become
Tanzanians.
6Nowadays, a maximum of ten percent of the people in Ulyankulu are first generation refugees and
among those, only few fled Burundi in their adult years. The estimate of ten percent is obtained from the
fact that at the time of the surveywas conducted by UNHCR in 2007, 22%of the people were first generation
refugees in the three settlements of Katumba, Mishamo and Ulyankulu. Since many of the first generation
refugees repatriated or passed away since then, and there were many new babies born in the meantime, the
percentage of first generation refugees cannot be higher than ten percent.
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Second generation refugees in Ulyankulu were also not keen on returning to Burundi
and denied all connections. As a secondary student (see Section 6.2.2) explained: “I don’t
even think about [going to Burundi]” (S9). A refugee woman (see Section 6.2.2) said:
“No I’ve never been to Burundi even one day. I do not know how to go there
and what to do there, while I do not know the place. No [I don’t like to go
there because] I cannot go to a place that I don’t know” (S5).
Generally, second generation refugees had only limited knowledge and curiosity about
their country of origin. To the question “do you know where your parents came from in
Burundi?” several respondents – a female secondary school student and the respondent
above – answered:
“There in Burundi? No, I really don’t know the place” (S15).
“That I don’t know because I was not born there” (S5).
There is, of course, a possibility that these answers stemmed from a fear of admitting
connections to Burundi. Refugees knew from school lessons that connections to Burundi
were seen as a security threat or even as illegal by the government: they learned that it was
the citizens’ responsibility to “ask refugees to refrain from any unlawful acts (oences)
like banditry, smuggling, keeping weapons and ammunition, rape and even unlawful cor-
respondence with their home countries (emphasis added)” (see Annex 5 – Excerpt of
Civics Book for Forms III and IV, Ch.4: Responsible Citizenship).
The hypothesis stating that first generation refugees have a stronger sense of belonging
to the home country than the second generation can be refuted. First generation refugees
did have memories about the place of origin. However, even first generation refugees
did not have a homing desire or a longing for home. Most refugees did not have much
interaction with Burundi: they had never been there or never planned to go back. While
developing a ‘pragmatics of belonging’ to the Tanzanian nation, refugees lost a diasporic
sense of belonging to Burundi.
Maintaining Burundian culture?
While first and second generation refugees did not seem to have a longing for their country
of origin, the following section shows to what extent they have maintained, incorporated
or transformed traditions from Burundi into their everyday lives in Tanzania.
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Referring to dierences between their places of origin and Tanzania, an important
aspect was the adaptation to the crops found in Tabora. In a conversation with a doctor
at a dispensary and a pastor (see Section 6.2.2), they said:
“Here [in Tanzania] the culture is dierent from the culture there [in Bu-
rundi]” (S1).
“The crops are dierent...There they had food; the weather is enough and
the rivers; the life there is dierent. A big portion of the food is ugali7 [here]
– there it is fruits – there were a lot of bananas, here they have ugali and
beans [maharage]. Good potatoes and fruits were available there. Here in
Tabora, we were faced with very dierent vegetables etc. – we found that it
was dierent from Burundi – we couldn’t cook very well” (F16).
Being asked about ‘utamaduni’ (culture), they said that therewere some ocial cultural
shows on certain Tanzanian holidays, with dancers from Burundi and an international
audience. In contrast to jadi (ancestral obligations), utamaduni refers to national culture
as promoted by the government with a modern connotation, in distinction to local termi-
nologies (Jerman 1997:69). Since it was expected that refugees would eventually return to
Burundi, dances were used to support their culture. Later, refugeesmainly learned Tanza-
nian dances in school in order to “reinforce national discipline” (ibid.: 288), as discussed
in Chapter 5.
“A long time ago we had our culture [here in Ulyankulu] – the government
allowed us to use the Burundian culture in elementary school, we had tradi-
tional dances – the Deutsche Welle also played this; even the UN was happy
about that. They [the dancers] were people fromKigwa – now theywent back
to Burundi. On 7/7 and 8/8 (Saba-saba andNane-nane, Tanzanian holidays)
they were having [agricultural] exhibitions at VETA to show our dances; [...]
now it is very quiet; maybe [until] three years [ago] they did this [...]” (F16).
While one of the respondents quoted above thought that Tanzanians and Burundians
had the same behaviour, another respondent explained that there were many dierences
in customs between the various Tanzanian and Burundian ethnic traditions. He men-
tioned the topics of circumcision, and various customs of marriage and partnership.
7Ugali is a form of corn mash, which is very common as a main dish in Tanzania with vegetables and
other sides.
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“The behaviour [between Tanzanians and Burundians] is the same [...]” (S1).
“Burundians go quite straight; the Tanzanians aren’t like that. [...] They have
about tenwives here; we only have one. Here theymarry under 18, there itwas
not allowed. For example the Wagogo, they practise women’s circumcision –
we don’t have that. There is no male circumcision in Burundi but when we
entered in Kigoma – we were surprised. Here, a man can go with a girl for a
few days to his home [before marriage] – there it wasn’t possible; for example
the Fipa – they [the couple] stay at the father’s place [for some time] – in the
father’s room. Here you canmarry your cousin [and there you cannot]. There
the father is not allowed to visit the daughter’s house after marriage [but here
he can visit]. About hospitality [karimu]: we have a culture of inviting friends”
(F16).
These answers showed some general remarks about adaptation to (agri-)culture, or-
ganised cultural events and some broad dierences in customs of dierent ethnicities.
Another conversation showed how a refugee woman dealt with the cultural dierence be-
tween her and her Tanzanian husband, who had passed away. When they married, she
converted fromCatholicism to Islam, his religion. When askedwhether she still practiced
Burundian customs, she explained:
“Yes, I was used to it; I continued to do so [to kneel before the husband, a
custom in Burundi]. It shows respect, isn’t it...It even reduces the chance of
him liking other women [...] I am the only wife. [...] There are a lot of
customs but others were despised so we are not practicing them. You should
forgive me to not following the customs of Usambara; we were there only
short time. I cannot give an explanation of Burundian customs because I was
born here; I only know the customs here” (S12).
Not being fully familiar with either Tanzanian or Burundian customs, she practiced
a mix of the two. In Ulyankulu generally, Kirundi was spoken in private but there were
few instances of hearing the language in public. Exceptions were some Burundian songs
that were sung in a church. However, the service wasmostly held in Swahili (or in English,
since I was present) and at least half of the songs were sung in Swahili. This is remarkable
since church life has been one of the main communal activities that Burundians take part
in.
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Discussions and observations concerning traditions and ‘culture’ showed that they
changed over time. When coming to Tanzania, refugees adapted to their new surround-
ings in their everyday lives in pragmatic ways, while only maintaining some of the tradi-
tions from Burundi.
6.3 Pragmatics of Belonging: Claiming de facto Citizenship
6.3.1 Moving and travelling outside of the settlement
An important third aspect of the ‘pragmatics of belonging’, next to relating to the host
population and feeling at home is that refugees have claimed de facto citizenship rights,
such as the right to education, to work and to vote, especially when outside of the set-
tlement. The action of becoming mobile within Tanzania in itself is a political act since
refugees have thereby transgressed the government’s provisions.
Lacking de jure citizenship rights such as freedom of movement and work permits,
refugees were hiding their refugee status through various pragmatic means. In this sec-
tion, aspects of language, ethnicity, documentation, intermarriage and fake names are
considered. Asked for their own reasons for hiding their status, respondents confirmed
that it was important to claim belonging to the Tanzanian nation in order not to be dis-
criminated against or humiliated.
One reason for becoming mobile and moving outside of the settlement was education.
Among the second generation especially, many went to secondary school until O-level.
In Ulyankulu, the first public secondary school opened in 1999 teaching Forms 1 to 4 –
before that people had to request to go to secondary schools outside of the settlement.
Students who achieved good grades were sent to government secondary schools in order
to complete Forms 5 and 6, a prerequisite for university. Private secondary schools did
not exist in the settlement. The doctor quoted above, a second generation refugee, who
had been born in Ulyankulu in 1973, said:
“[I studied] in [a government] secondary school inMpanda [in Rukwa region
outside of the settlement]. For non-citizens it was a problem to go outside –
out of 70, there were about 4 or 5 who could go to secondary school. There
was no secondary school in Ulyankulu at that time; I passed Standard 7 and
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was selected to go to Mpanda. Then I went to NzegaMedical School for two
years. I got a temporary position in Kitete in 1999; in 2000 I started in Bakota
dispensary” (S1).
The refugees were keen to oer their children a good education. The demand for sec-
ondary education in the settlement was so high, that even after the first secondary school
was built in Ulyankulu in 1999, many children were sent to public schools around the
settlement because there was not enough space in the settlement. In court hearings in
Ichemba, parents who were accused of having failed to ensure attendance of children in
schools were mostly Sukuma and not refugees – which could be a further indicator for
the importance refugees assigned to education.
In contrast to these children, who were sent with consent by the government, wealthier
families claimed the right of sending their children to study in private or public schools
elsewhere in the country without specific permission to do so. Themedical attendant (see
Section 6.2.2) explained:
“I studied at Keza elementary school [in Ulyankulu]. Standards 1 to 5. Then I
moved. I studied Standard 6-7 in Mwanza town. I passed Standard 7. Then I
started Form 1 inMwanza. There I did Form 1 and Form 2. At the time of the
census [in 2006], I was there in Mwanza, not here. Form 3 and 4 I did at the
secondary school in Kashishi [near Ulyankulu]; I came here to help my par-
ents to register. I got 26 points – Division 4. Then I went to teacher’s college
[outside of the settlement]. [However, in the end] I didn’t go to that college
because I didn’t like to be a primary teacher. Then I went back to Mwanza
to study at Bismarck-Hospital – Muslims were running it. I went there for
one year but they didn’t oer a certificate. There was another dispensary in
Busweru [in Mwanza]. I started working there for 6 months. In May 2011 I
came here for a visit and I was told that there is a small dispensary at Road
43. Then I started to work here. Now I have worked here for one year and
three months” (S11).
A university graduate (see Section 6.2.2), who I was introduced to me by UNHCR
Ulyankulu and whose family owned a business in Kaswa, mentioned:
“First of all, I studied in nursery school in 1994. Then I joined primary school
in 1995 until 2001, and then in 2002, I joined secondary school, Ulyankulu
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Secondary School. We were under the evening class; we learned secondary
education at evening time. A few years [later], the system ended. Me and my
fellow students we decided to shift to another school, we started afresh. After
shifting to another school, only few managed the costs; secondary schools
were very expensive. MyMommy has some kind of capital, so she sent me to
a private school, namely Uchama Secondary School, where I finished Form 4
in 2006. After finishing Form 4, of course I got good marks; the government
selected me to go to Form 5 and 6 to a government school, namely Geita
Secondary School. I finished Form 6 in 2009. I came back to my home place;
I met with REDESO. After Form 6, REDESO announced the opportunity to
sponsor one fresher to join undergraduate studies. I got that opportunity. At
University of Dodoma until now. Now I am a graduate” (S4, in English).
However, not all students were as fortunate. A waiter (see Section 6.1.3) said: “I went
to elementary school in Milambo [in Ulyankulu]. My parents couldn’t send me [to sec-
ondary school] because of money.” However, he thought education was important: “Yes,
I would go [to secondary school], there is no life without education” (S3). Those refugees
who could aord it have therefore become increasinglymobile and havemanaged to claim
a right to education.
Besides education, health has been another reason to travel outside of the settlement.
A refugee woman (see Section 6.2.2), who had attended school until Standard 7 and got
married thereafter, said she had not travelled very much:
“In Tabora I went to the hospital only. It depends on if the child is over-
whelmed [by fever] and they tell you to go to Tabora or Urambo [instead
of being treated at Ulyankulu Health Centre] and you have to add [infuse]
blood, you must go!” (S5)
Therefore, even those first and second generation refugees who did not have other par-
ticular reasons, desire or finances for travelling, had to go outside of the settlement some-
times for health reasons and claimed their right to do so.
While travelling outside for health reasons and education may have been of short du-
ration, some refugees moved outside of the settlement permanently due to marriage. A
secondary school student interviewed in Kanindo village and a woman, who was intro-
duced by the Imam of Ulyankulu mosque (see Section 6.1.3 and 6.2.3), revealed:
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“[My brother] studied at VETA in Nzega. Afterwards it was easy to get a job
[there]. [...] Hewas hiding his identity. He says he isMchagga orMnyamwezi.
[...] Kinyamwezi he can speak because he lives inMwanza. [...] He married a
Tanzanian. [...] My sister is a tailor – she learned at VETA Tabora. [...] She
is hiding her identity to others but not to the husband” (S9).
“I was born here [in Ulyankulu] and I married in Tanga. My children are all
Sambara. [I came here] in 1997. I met [my husband] here in 1997. He was
working for a tobacco company. At the time, there was another company
called Dimon” (S12).
The cities that the relatives of the first respondent and the second respondent moved
to are located far away: Mwanza is more than 350 km north of Ulyankulu and Tanga
more than 900 km east of Ulyankulu on the coast. While being married to Tanzanians,
the brother and sister of the first respondents were ‘hiding their identity’ to others besides
the family. They said they had a Tanzanian ethnicity, such as Nyamwezi, whose language
they spoke. The second respondent married a man from the coastal region. When he
passed away, she moved back to her family in Ulyankulu.
“I moved back there because I was born here, I have family here; I like the
place. [But] I cannot say that I belong here; I feel like Tanga is the best place
for me because I also have family in Lushoto. [...] But I am already used to
the environment. Even if there is a problem, I can deal with it. I like it here”
(S12).
Since she could not obtain a passport or proof of Tanzanian citizenship while being
married, she applied for citizenship in the settlement. She did not feel like a refugee
because she “did not flee”. However, her sense of belongingwas influenced by hermarried
life in Tanga.
Some of the respondents above, who were married outside of the settlement, originally
went there in order to study or to work. Some other respondents also mentioned that
they moved outside in order to work there. The medical attendant quoted above (Section
6.2.2) mentioned:
“Whatever region I choose [when the settlement will be closed], I will go to
Dar es Salaam. [...] I just like a dierent climate/atmosphere. I was already
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there. [...] I was doing business with fruits. I was a middleman buying at 500
[TZS] and selling at 700 [TZS] – you get a surplus/profit. [I know] a lot [of
people there], also family” (S11).
Besides the reasons above, some refugees also travelled outside of the settlement or
even the country in order to go to church or to preach. A pastor of a Baptist church in
Ulyankulu (see Section 6.2.1) explained:
“I don’t have any links to Burundi but in Mishamo, there are my fellow pas-
tors. We have a connection. And also in Katumba [I have connections] be-
cause we work together. We lead the churches. [We communicate] by using
mobile phones. If I need to visit them to supply the gospel I go there. And
they come here to preach the word of God” (F13).
All examples cited showed increased mobility of refugees around the country for var-
ious reasons. The government has not been able to control the refugees to stay within
the settlement. Most refugees above have moved within the country by their own choice,
and agency. They have claimed the citizenship rights they were lacking informally. Their
sense of belonging to the nation, which they developed in pragmatic ways by familiaris-
ing themselves with their surroundings and the host society, enabled them to develop the
necessary knowledge, skills and relationships to claim these rights. Especially second
generation refugees moved to other places in Tanzania in search of work, marriage and
education. While their home was still Ulyankulu, they developed a sense of belonging to
their new place of residence as well.
6.3.2 Hiding refugee status, Hutu ethnicity and Burundian nationality
In order to be able to study outside of the settlement, go to the hospital, marry or work
outside, many refugees were hiding their ocial refugee status. In other words, in order
to claim de facto citizenship rights outside of the settlement (such as the right to work),
refugees needed to hide their refugee status, Hutu ethnicity and Burundian nationality. As
suggested in theory (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2), refugees indeed seek invisibility where
they hide and obscure activities that the state prohibits. It is argued here that the act
of claiming such rights is an important third dimension with which refugees assert their
‘pragmatics of belonging’. Here concepts of language, ethnicity and documentation are
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discussed. As could be seen above, especially for the second generation it has become
rather natural to ‘be Tanzanian’, so for them to hide their ocial status was not dicult.
However, the first generation also found ways to blend in.
Using language to assert claims to being Tanzanian
When moving in and out of the settlement, many refugees learned to behave like ‘prag-
matic chameleons’ (cf. Malkki 1995a), adapting to their surroundings. This was possible
since many were able to speak Swahili very well and oftentimes (at least) two other lan-
guages: for example Kirundi and Kinyamwezi. The medical attendant (see Sections 6.2.2,
6.3.1), explained:
“My parents live close to the Sukumaland, so I learned it myself by talking
to them. In church in Kashishi [next to Ulyankulu], we were praying and
preaching in Kisukuma – even the bible was in Kisukuma” (S11).
The university graduate (see Section 6.2.2., 6.3.1), whom I met and interviewed several
times in the course of the field work, clarified:
“I feel like a refugee once I am here but when I moved out of here, for study
or business reasons, I feel like a Tanzanian; I don’t have a sign saying I am a
refugee, I master Kiswahili better than the Tanzanians” (S4, in English).
First generation refugees, by contrast, did not necessarily speak Tanzanian ethnic lan-
guages:
“I talk to dierent people [in my everyday life]. We talk to them. For example
with the Sukuma but I don’t talk Kisukuma. I still learn Kisukuma. We teach
each other the language [Kisukuma/Kirundi]. I can greet and ask for water”
(F9).
While the second generation spoke Swahili better, the first generation had betterKirundi
language skills. A mother of nine children (see Section 4.3.3) explained that her children
did not speak Kirundi very well:
“[...] I can’t be sad [about that]; we live here. It is not that I am teaching [the
children] about culture in Burundi because I came here when I was two years
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old, even I don’t know. The children call their grandmother ‘bibi’ and their
sisters ‘dada’. The Burundian words they don’t even know” (S2).
A 19-year old female VETA-student confirmed this: “We speak Kiswahili [at home];
Kirundi I only speak a little bit” (S13). Refugees have adapted to their surroundings in
order to assert their sense of belonging to Tanzania in pragmatic ways. They needed to
do this in order to become de facto citizens.
Claiming a Tanzanian ethnicity to hide being Hutu
Being accepted as a de facto Tanzanian citizen could be more dicult when a refugee did
not speak a Tanzanian ethnic language. But even those refugees (especially the first gen-
eration) generally hid their status when outside the settlement or to strangers by saying
that they are of the “Ha” ethnicity (singular Muha, plural Waha) from Kigoma speaking
Kiha (as already noted for town refugees by Malkki, 1995). Kiha is close to Kirundi; the
languages are not easily distinguishable from each other. Once a student told me that she
was Ha but later her teacher revealed to me that she was born in Ulyankulu to Burundian
parents.
A first generation refugee teacher (F10, see Section 6.2.1) explained how he hid his
ethnicity in the past: “I was asked for my tribe but I cheated. I said I am a Pimbwe,
the tribe of the prime minister. They live in Mpanda.” Asked whether he speaks the
language of the Pimbwe, he said: “No, but I speak Kinhangaza, Kiha, Kiruandese and
Kirundi.” Apparently, even those who did not speak another Tanzanian ethnic language
(besides Kiha) preferred to say that they were of a certain Tanzanian ethnicity besides Ha
– possibly because it was known that many Burundians disguised themselves as Ha or
because there were not many speakers of a certain ethnicity who could reveal the truth.
Hiding one’s ethnicity should not be necessary any more if citizenship was given to the
refugees. While already feeling like Tanzanians, the refugees believed that their ethnicity
would not change. As the VETA-teacher quoted above explained:
“I am a Hutu – the original ethnicity cannot change but the nationality can
change” (F10).
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An 18-year old female secondary school student (second generation refugee) believed
that the Hutu would be accepted as a new Tanzanian ethnicity once they were granted
citizenship certificates.
“Then I will belong to them; now it is not possible to say that you are Hutu
because you will not get employed” (S15).
Another first generation refugee, a secondary school teacher (see Section 6.2.1), ex-
plained that his ethnicity would not change if he became a Tanzanian citizen.
“You know tribes come from God; no one who can change a lizard to be a
snake. Lizard, do you know a lizard? To be a snake. Or a snake to be a fish.
[He laughs]. Tanzanian but originally he is what. [He laughs]” (F12).
From these observations one can note that refugees still felt like Hutu (or Tutsi), even
if they already felt integrated in Tanzania, have travelled, have registered for citizenship
and/or generally felt that they belonged to the country of Tanzania, rather than to Bu-
rundi. Both first and second generation respondents agreed that their ethnicity would
not change once they would be Tanzanian citizens. One could deduce that in multi-
ethnic Tanzania, integration does not depend on ethnicity – one can be integrated as
a Tanzanian in cultural, political and economic ways even with a non-Tanzanian ethnic-
ity. However, the strong belief in one’s ethnicity without questioning reveals a certain
ethnic essentialism. Furthermore, the fact that the naturalisation initiative was put on
hold was in part based on a fear of the Hutu ethnicity being based on violent subjectivi-
ties (Das et al., 2000). Indisputably the wars in Burundi and Rwanda depended on ethnic
essentialism, which was fostered during colonial times (Mamdani, 2001).
Documentation to hide refugee status or Burundian nationality
This section analyses what kinds of documentation refugees used and how they employed
it to hide their refugee status and Burundian nationality. This, in turn, was crucial in
order to claim the right to work outside of the settlement, and to live as de facto citizens.
Being able to claim these rights, was an important dimension of refugees’ ‘pragmatics of
belonging’. In order to understand the usefulness of documentation in Tanzania, current
use of documentation in the nation is discussed below. In general, documentation remains
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limited as the majority still do not possess birth certificates and passports. However, for
certain services it is necessary to possess such documents.
Documentation for Tanzanians
The first type of documentation serves to confirm civil status. This type is covered by the
Births and Deaths Registration Ordinance (Cap. 108). However, registration of births
and deaths is only compulsory if at least one parent is European, American or Asian, or a
Somali (Rutinwa, 2005). The first document of identification in a person’s life is the birth
certificate (cheti cha kuzaliwa). However, not many people in Tanzania own one: “[...]
Only 16 per cent of under five children are registered across the country; and [...] only
7.7 per cent have birth certificates” (Simbaya, 2013). The government now encourages
people to register their children by reducing the cost – it will be free of charge for babies
under 5 years and TZS 10,0008 for older children; and by threatening not to issue any
other certificates if one lacks a birth certificate (ibid.).
Other ways of identifying civil status include marriage certificates (cheti cha ndoa),
which everyone obtains who gets married in a church, a mosque or through a government
ocial, as well as death certificates. Besides, there are (unocial) certificates of baptism
(cheti cha ubatizo) throughChristian churches, whichmay serve as identification for some
purposes, as well as School Leaving Certificates of primary or secondary school (cheti cha
kumaliza shule ya msingi au sekondari), which every graduate obtains.
The main document confirming legal status in Tanzania is the passport (pasi). How-
ever, only wealthier people possess passports because they cost and because a voting ID
(see below) suces as identification in most cases besides travelling abroad. Recently,
through the reinvigoration and attempt at harmonisation of documentation within the
East African Union, Tanzania has oered the option of a national ID card. The National
Identification Authority (NIDA) collected biometric information of 2.6 million Dar es
Salaam residents. It also issued the first ID cards to 46 government ocials in February
2013 and to 220,000 civil servants and a few selected citizens later in 2013 (Mwachang’a,
2013).
8TZS 10,000 equalled approx. GBP 4 (precisely 3.94 at an exchange rate of 0.0004 of 30 November,
2012).
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Furthermore, many people use their voting ID card (kitambulisho cha kupigia kura)
for identification. According to interviews conducted by The Guardian in Dar es Salaam,
many citizens use their voting cards to secure credit facilities from financial institutions,
open a bank account, register their property, enter into business agreements and conduct
other activities, e.g. to pay school fees for relatives (Ochieng, 2010). Only 11% of Tan-
zanians (16% in urban areas and 4% in rural areas) own bank accounts according to a
survey conducted in 2006 (FinScope, 2007). Since 2008, however, mobile banking has be-
come increasingly popular9. A mobile banking account can be obtained by registering
your SIM-card for mobile banking. Previously, it used to be possible to register without
showing proof of identity. In 2013, however, the government announced that it was then
necessary to register with an identity card, and that all unregistered cards would be dis-
continued to prevent misuse. Many people have, according to the government, used fake
names to obtain SIM-cards (Semberya, 2013).
Documentation for refugees
When it comes to certificates of civil status, although a directive was issued to register
and document all refugees in Tanzania, it was not implemented due to a shortage of reg-
istration clerks and funds (Rutinwa, 2005). The registration of marriages was voluntary.
The Refugees Act, 1998 remains silent on the issue of civil registration altogether. Births
were recorded by the hospitals where babies are born and also by the UNHCRfield oces.
Deaths occurring in hospitals were recorded by the government and UNHCR. However,
many refugees did not report the deaths of their relatives. Not possessing a death certifi-
cate could cause problems for survivors wishing to claim their rights in both countries of
asylum and in the country of origin (ibid.).
In Ulyankulu settlement, births and deaths were normally registered through the vil-
lage leaders’ administrations. Since registration for citizenship, all newborn babies were
registered at the UN oce in order to give them the possibility of naturalisation as well.
While refugees did not own birth or death certificates, many did have marriage certifi-
9M-pesa is a system of microfinance pioneered by Vodaphone (M-Pesa, in English: M-Money), but now
also available from the firms Tigo (Tigo-Pesa) and Airtel (Airtel Money). It is used by many people (as of
2013 M-Pesa has more than 5 million subscribers, according to TeleGeography, 2 May 2013). It oers the
option of transferring money and airtime (credit) through ordinary mobile phones. Shops oering to upload
and withdraw money using this system are available everywhere in the country.
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cates. Ocial marriage certificates were issued through churches as well as the mosque
(see Plate 6.1).
Concerning documentation to confirm legal status, refugees did not possess any such
documents. Furthermore, only refugees who came to the country on an individual basis
obtained a document confirming their refugee status. Others had nomeans of confirming
it. Ocially, under the Tanzania Passports and Travel Documents Act, 2002, refugees
were allowed to hold a Certificate of Identity or a Geneva Convention Travel Document
in order to travel outside of Tanzania. This could be obtained by the Director of Refugee
Services in Dar es Salaam.
Plate 6.1: Marriage Certificate issued in Ulyankulu
Source: Author (August 2012)
In contrast to Tanzanian citizens, ocially refugees could not possess voting IDs, a
Tanzanian passport or a national ID card. Whether refugees will be issued with the new
Tanzanian national ID card will be seen in the future.
Despite the general lack of documentation, however, many refugees in Ulyankulu did
possess mobile phones and therefore used mobile banking. SIM-card registration could
be completed in Tabora town. Before 2013, this used to be possible without proof of
identity. Now, however, the refugees would either have to stop using the service or use a
fake proof of identity in order to obtain it. The mobile banking service of M-Pesa was
oered by several shops in Ulyankulu.
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Refugees who were married to Tanzanians were not entitled to citizenship. While for-
eigners married to Tanzanians were allowed to hold a dependant’s pass enabling him/her
to reside anywhere in the country, this right was not accorded to refugees (Rutinwa, 2005).
However, children born out of such a union were ocially entitled to hold citizenship of
Tanzania (Citizenship Act, 1995).10
Given the dearth of documentation, some refugees were hiding their status and sought
access to certain rights through fake documentation. An 18-year old tailoring student
at VETA with a mother from Ulyankulu and a father from Kigoma said that she had
travelled to dierent places in Tabora region, that she felt free and that she held a voting
card. When asked where and how she got the card, she said:
“[I got it] in Sikonge, last year. [...] I said that I am from Sikonge. My aunt
married there; I went there to visit her” (S14).
As a child born to a Tanzanian and a refugee, she would have actually been entitled
to citizenship and therefore also to hold a voter ID. However, this presupposes that she
would make an individual ocial application for naturalisation by descent. Saying that
she was from Sikonge was not a legal way of obtaining the voting ID. This case shows
how easy it could be for refugees to obtain documentation simply by claiming that one
was a descendant of a Tanzanian citizen.
The ease of hiding one’s status and nationality could also be seen in the fact that many
refugees changed their names over time. When refugees were registered to obtain a plot
of land at the Settlement Commander’s oce in Ulyankulu in 1972-1973, their names
were recorded in a book. When checking the names of the same individuals nowadays
(first generation), one could notice that many used dierent names in their daily lives to
those that were originally recorded. Furthermore, in this book of 1972-73, many of the
recorded names were typical Muslim names. These refugees therefore probably used fake
names from the beginning, since Burundians are mostly Christian.
Most refugees did not possess a Burundian passport. In a conversation with a doctor
and a pastor (see Section 6.2.3), the doctor said: “I don’t have a passport of Burundi” (S1),
and the pastor added: “I think you are not allowed to have a passport” (F16). Finally, the
10Citizenship Act, 1995, Part III, 9(2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (3), any person of full age
and capacity born outside the United Republic whose father was at the time of the birth of that person a
citizen by descent may, on making an application in that behalf to the Minister in the prescribed manner, be
naturalised as a citizen of the United Republic.
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first respondent concluded: “We are not allowed to get a passport to go outside of the
country. We can go to Burundi but not for long” (S1). Both respondents thus believed
that they were not allowed to have a passport. Their freedom of movement was not only
restricted within the country of Tanzania, they also believed they could not travel to an-
other country. This showed a clear lack of information because, as discussed above, travel
documents could be obtained by refugees. Furthermore, travelling outside the country
by refugees was possible: the elite of Burundian refugees fled in 1993 and settled in other
countries, such as Belgium (Turner, 2010).
Some other refugees in certain positions in Tanzania obtained passports even after flee-
ing from Burundi. This option is called “repatriation without return” (Long, 2010: 22).
One respondent, a religious leader, fled from Burundi to Tanzania (Ulyankulu) when he
was a child and later moved outside of the settlement to open his own parish. In contrast
to most respondents in the settlement, he said that he travelled to Burundi many times to
see his relatives but also to go to church in the capital of Burundi, Bujumbura. Due to his
profession and since he was travelling frequently, he was requested to have ocial docu-
mentation and thus decided to get a Burundian passport. With this passport, he needed
a residence permit in Tanzania, which needs to be renewed every two years. However,
when the opportunity of naturalisation arose, he applied for Tanzanian citizenship.
“For us it is not dicult; it was requested by the bishop. I have a Class C
permit for researchers and missionaries; I renew it here in Tabora every two
years. We [Burundian refugees] try to become Tanzanians because we pay
$500 [every two years] for the residence permit. That’s why we applied for
citizenship. Like this [as an individual migrant, not part of the refugee mass
naturalisation], it is very dicult to become a Tanzanian citizen because you
have to pay $5000 [for a passport]. We applied for citizenship because we are
not going back to Burundi; I hope to be buried in Tanzania” (F17).
Considering this respondent, it can be inferred that refugees have only obtained a pass-
port when it was necessary for their jobs. Interestingly, this refugee was able to shed
his refugee status and become a legal documented resident outside the settlement. By
contrast, refugees inside the settlement and many who moved outside of it illegally did
not know of such options. Seeking any form of documentation was not facilitated or
promoted. Of course, this respondent only had this option since he had the financial sup-
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port to renew his residence permit every two years and because he needed the passport
to travel both to Burundi and abroad.
In summary, refugees developed various pragmatic strategies in order to hide their
refugee status, their ethnicity and their Burundian nationality. They used their language
skills to be credible Tanzanians. Furthermore, their language skills helped them to cred-
ibly claim to be part of a Tanzanian ethnicity, since admitting to be ‘Hutu’ would be
perceived equally to being Burundian refugee or migrant. Some refugees reinforced their
claim to beingTanzanian by documentation, such as illegally obtained voting IDs. Hiding
one’s statuswas necessary in order to claim the right towork outside of the settlement and
to become de facto citizens. A few individuals, who were in respected positions outside
of the settlement, ocially received Burundian passports and residence permits. Those
who obtained Burundian passports were thus not hiding that they were Burundians but
they legally shed the refugee status.
Reasons for hiding the refugee status
By hiding their refugee status when outside of the settlement, refugees reinforced their
ability to claim de facto citizenship rights. They believed that they would have better
employment chances or were able to get a government loan that way.
A first generation respondent explained that, in order to be eligible for a government
loan to join a college or university, one needed to show the School Leaving Certificate.
Since this certificate stated refugee children’s nationality as ‘Burundian’ (see Plate 6.2),
they were hiding their nationality: “That’s trick in life. You are faking the certificate”
(F17). While faking names and certificates is fairly common even amongst Tanzanians,
their reasons are dierent. For example, Tanzanians sometimes conceal their clan names
because it could reveal their ethnicity. In contrast to the situation of the refugees, for
Tanzanians this only has informal or indirect implications: being of a certain Tanzanian
ethnicity could not hinder one from obtaining a government loan, for example. A sec-
ondary school student linked the School Leaving Certificate directly to employment:
“I would be happy [to receive citizenship]. When you finish Form 4, your
certificate shows that you are a Burundian; if people see that you are a Hutu,
they will not employ you outside of the settlement and if possible, they will
send you back to the settlement” (S8).
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In that light, it is also problematic, that the census in August 2012 recorded all refugees
as ‘Burundians’. Independently of the School Leaving Certificate, the first respondent
mentioned above explained that it was dicult to get permission to work outside of the
settlement. However, hiding bore the risk of “getting into trouble” (e.g. being deported,
arrested or sent back to the settlement). A first-generation refugee man with a shop in
Kaswa, who also ran for elections to be the chairman of the village in late 2012, explained:
“If I want to work outside [of the settlement], the process gets too long. It
means you already got your birth certificate and other documents, so you
try to be employed as a Tanzanian. But when you are hiding, if you get into
trouble, you will not be free” (F18).
While these respondents aimed at getting employment or education through hiding
or faking their identity, others did it in order not to be discriminated against. A female
student of Kanindo Secondary School (second generation refugee) said that she had lived
in Tabora before as a student. When asked how she felt when living there, she explained:
“Sometimes theTanzanians can detect thatwe came from the settlement; they
can distinguish us. Sometimes they discriminate / separate us [kutenganisha].
[...] When we were there as a group of students, some people started asking
us, ‘What tribe are you?’, and when she [a Tanzanian girl] knew she [a girl
from Ulyankulu] belongs toWaha, they found people who speak Kiha so that
they can listen to us. They ask us about our tribe – we feel disgust about these
questions and we fear to sit with them and discuss, every day they asked. [...]
At the time in Tabora, students [frommy class] were followingme home; they
were asking me these questions... [...] Students were trying to separate us
students from the settlement from them. Even the government is separating
us, so that we cannot work outside of the settlement” (S15).
The university graduate (see Section 6.2.2) responded to the question of whether he
told others that he was Burundian:
“No, we fear humiliation. Only the top administration knows. 100% don’t
tell that they are refugees. We fear to be exposed. You need an identity card.
Us students, we go illegally. Some students are sponsored by the government
but the government doesn’t know that they are refugees” (S4).
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Plate 6.2: Secondary School Leaving Certificate
Source: Author (July 2012)
Considering the refugees’ increasing mobility and their enhanced ability to hide them-
selves in various ways, it is not surprising any more that one respondent, the medical
attendant quoted in Sections 6.2.2 and 6.3.1 above, did not want to apply for any of the
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options of citizenship, resettlement or repatriation. He preferred to travel and to hide his
refugee status:
“Because young people like to travel [to dierent cities and do business etc.]
so I didn’t see the importance [of registering] because I realised that that they
would see me in a computer. [...] I applied in the second round. They said
that those who are in town and know they did not register should come to
Ulyankulu to register. The commander of settlement announced as mass in-
formation in every village that they should come and register; otherwise he
or she would be recognised as an illegal immigrant or refugee. They said peo-
ple who didn’t register will see fire [utaona cha moto]. In 2009, in the last
process, I applied. Me and my young brother, we applied for citizenship. The
UNHCR people said that we should come” (S11).
This kind of answer is reminiscent of the town refugees of Kigoma in Malkki’s study
who neither wanted to be refugees nor citizens but preferred to keep their options open
(Malkki, 1995a: 164). In the case of the refugees of Ulyankulu settlement, however, most
refugees, especially the second generation, felt that they belonged to Tanzania and ap-
plied for citizenship since going back to Burundi was not an option for them. The motive
behind hiding their refugee status, Hutu ethnicity and Burundian nationality was that
they were not allowed to be outside of the settlement, and not because they wanted to be
outside of any categorisation.
In summary, even though there was always a risk of being caught, refugees were hiding
their ocial status, ethnicity and nationality for various reasons. They aimed to obtain
benefits from the government and they did not want to be discriminated against. Hid-
ing their refugee status helped them to claim the rights necessary to become de facto
citizens even outside of the settlement. Refugees have thereby asserted their ‘pragmatics
of belonging’ in three dimensions. First, they have cooperated and integrated socially
and economically with their Tanzanian hosts. Second, over time they have established a
sense of home in the settlement and within the nation. Third, they have become mobile
beyond the settlement within Tanzania, which was possible through their hiding strate-
gies. However, they not only hid their nationalities to others – they sometimes also forgot
about their refugee status themselves. Their ‘pragmatics of belonging’ reduced the uncer-
tainty of living without an ocial status by informally becoming part of the Tanzanian
nation.
231
6.4 pragmatics of waiting
6.4 Pragmatics of Waiting
While having been pragmatic in their sense of belonging, refugees have also developed a
‘pragmatics of waiting.’ This is a pragmatic way of dealing with the time they have been
waiting for citizenship. This waiting time, as argued in Chapter 2, has been an eect of
the temporal control exerted by the Tanzanian government over refugees, which is created
by continuously adjourning its decisions on their de jure integration (also discussed in
Chapter 5, Section 5.1.2). In the first section it is argued that the temporal control exerted
has had adverse eects on refugees and local Tanzanians in the settlement. Second, the
ways in which refugees and local Tanzanians have dealt with that control are discussed. It
is reasoned that they have used their time pragmatically in twomain future-orientedways:
a ‘business-as-usual’ approach and a more pre-emptive approach. Thirdly, it is argued
that the pragmatics of waiting also has a spiritual dimension and has been supported by
former government ocials and religious leaders, who eectively bridged the gap between
refugees and citizens.
6.4.1 Hardships during the waiting time
The temporal power exerted over refugees, i.e. the adjourning of decisions on the fate of
the refugees in Ulyankulu, has had adverse eects on life in the settlement on the whole.
Most refugees, such as the university graduate also quoted above, have faced hardships
during the waiting time:
“[...] In this waiting period, we divided the money: half is for the house, half
for the business. Business has been slowing – for the whole of Ulyankulu.
Others have been aected in agricultural matters. It was in 2011, there was
a big hunger in Ulyankulu because people feared to move here, people did
not cultivate here, they did not cultivate for example cassava and maybe rice
– those food crops which take a long time. Now people have been educated;
there was no implementation of things announced, people go on cultivating”
(S4).
In fact, refugees were told not to grow long-term crops such as cassava anymore. There-
fore, only dried cassava is sold on the market (in contrast to fresh cassava), which can be
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stored for a long time (see Plate 7.3 below). Furthermore, since the government planned to
close the settlement in 2006, roads have not been maintained; and one school was closed
completely (Igombe Secondary School). In Ulyankulu Secondary School, the first grade
(Form 1) has been overcrowded as a consequence. At Kanindo Secondary School, only
one class remained open in 2012, with more than one hundred students. Refugee teach-
ers did not have contracts any more, not even temporary ones like before. All community
development programmes, whichwere promotedwithin the district by the district govern-
ment, such as HIV/AIDS prevention and women’s development schemes, were stopped in
the settlement. Cultural activities, such as the agricultural fair normally held on the 8th
of August, were discontinued as well. While these factors should have constituted strong
push factors to leave the settlement, most refugees still saw the settlement as their home
and as a safe place, and they were fighting for their right to stay, as argued below.
Plate 6.3: Eects of Control of Cassava Cultivation: Dried Cassava Sold on the Market
Source: Author (November 2012)
6.4.2 Pragmatic waiting: Business as usual, resistance and preparations for the future
As could be seen in Section 6.2, most refugees felt at home in Ulyankulu; they already felt
like Tanzanians. Those for whom the citizenship certificate did not carry a direct practi-
cal meaning stayed with hope. These refugees dealt with tasks in their everyday lives in
a pragmatic way and applied a business-as-usual approach. In other words, instead of
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building up anxieties about their future, they employed a ‘pragmatics of waiting’: they
filled the waiting time with their day-to-day activities despite the temporal control ex-
erted. Two elderly first generation refugees said:
“I feel safe; I know in the end of the days we will get them [the certificates]”
(F6).
“I have an expectation, faith and hope. I feel happy, good and stay happily
while waiting for the government’s decision” (F8).
Most refugees went on with their usual activities: they were studying, farming, and
they were doing business within and outside of the settlement. One secondary school
student explained that, while waiting for citizenship: “At the moment I am waiting for
results from school. I am studying” (S9). An older respondent (first generation) said: “I
am farming, I reap, I eat, I am just waiting. Maybe I will be given the certificate so I am
staying with expectations” (F9). Their daily lives thus did not change while waiting for
citizenship. While aiming to achieve their goals in life, they were largely unperturbed by
the temporal control exerted.
These refugees formed a resistance against the relocation – refugees and Tanzanians
have been fighting for a ‘right to stay’ in Ulyankulu, the right to go on with their lives
‘as usual’. Tanzanians did not accept that the government wanted to send them out of
the area as they believed they have a right to stay where they were since they were cit-
izens. Both refugees and Tanzanians have taken part in building permanent houses in
the settlement, which was forbidden by the government (see Annex 4; and Section 6.4.3
below). Some of them have resisted against the cuts of social services and have pressured
the government to provide at least most basic services. The former ward representative
of Kanindo explained:
“Yes, you know there were no toilets at the market. The people have gone on
strike and kept the taxes in order to pressure the government. So the govern-
ment sped up the process of building the toilets. They are very new. [...] This
year, they are building the house of a doctor and a theatre; that project comes
from the MHA and the UNHCR. The toilet was the only project established
since 2006 on part of the district council” (C3).
Furthermore, some refugees, who had repatriated to Burundi, came back to the settle-
ment as their prospects were not satisfactory in Burundi (see also Section 5.1.3 above).
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They had got into conflict with those who had occupied their land in Burundi in the
meantime. Transgressing the prohibition to come back to the settlement after deciding
for repatriation, they were therefore also fighting for their ‘right to stay’.
Other refugees have employed a second type of pragmatism during the time of wait-
ing by individually preparing for the future. When the settlement would be closed, they
wanted to have a place to live. One respondent (also quoted above) revealed that his fam-
ily had planned to build a house outside of the settlement:
“The plan of my Mum is to [...] find a house where we can move; we will
move to the prepared area. That is the plan” (S4).
Another respondent mentioned that some families had already moved to another re-
gion in order to avoid being forced to move. They neither got the cash grant nor the
citizenship certificates that were envisaged for those who relocated. As the medical atten-
dant (also quoted above) explained:
“Some people already moved to Kigoma, Mwanza andMorogoro. About six
families I know who moved to Morogoro last year or the year before, they
wanted to get money to move from UNHCR but they didn’t get it. They also
didn’t get the citizenship certificate. [...] Some even just started when they
got to Morogoro. They wanted to move soon without waiting until the gov-
ernment would force them. Some [destroyed their houses here in Ulyankulu]
and some didn’t – they sold their houses to other people – Warundi and Wa-
sukuma also” (S11).
However, not all were able to prepare for the closure of the settlement while waiting,
even if they wanted to. An elderly first-generation refugee mentioned:
“I will not be able to build a house somewhere else. I have problems with
my legs so I have no thoughts of moving; I will not be able to build a house
somewhere else; I am just waiting” (F7).
The afore-mentioned future-oriented refugees did not resist government policies com-
pletely but tried to condition their outcome in their favour. This constituted indeed a
dierent instrumental way of dealing with the waiting time. These refugees aimed to
improve the final outcome of government’s decisions on the adjourned policies. For ex-
ample, they collectively organised writing an ocial letter to the government, in which
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they stated their discontent with the conditions of the relocation. Instead of demanding
for the policy to be reversed in total, they complained about the limited financial assis-
tance promised to them and asked for more support.
Both types of refugees described above did not become apathetic subjects to the tempo-
ral control exerted by the government. The latter have actively engaged with the policies
at hand and opposed certain aspects. In general, refugees in Ulyankulu have thus been
pragmatic in their waiting time in various ways. Most of them, first of all, employed a
business-as-usual approach and were thus not perturbed by the temporal control exerted.
Some of these refugees resisted the government’s plans collectively or individually espe-
cially in order to gain a ‘right to stay’ in the settlement. The ricochet migrants, who
returned from Burundi after a failed reintegration there, also resisted the government’s
plans. Next to asking for basic social services, a general way of resisting the closure of
the settlement and thereby to bridge the waiting time was by engaging in constructing
permanent buildings of the type that was forbidden in the settlement (see Plates 6.4 and
6.5). Other refugees, however, who had the means to do this, actively prepared for the
future and thus pragmatically dealt with the waiting time, e.g. by building permanent
houses outside of the settlement. These refugees did not resist the government’s plans
entirely but rather aimed to use the waiting time to condition the outcome of its policies,
for example by asking for adequate compensation for the dislocation from their homes.
Depending on the their means and goals in life, refugees thus pragmatically used the wait-
ing time to either resist or pre-empt the government’s plans, or to advance their general
goals in life without paying attention to the temporal control exerted by making them
wait for naturalisation.
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Plate 6.4: Making Bricks for the Construction of Houses
Source: Author (June 2012)
Plate 6.5: A ’Permanent’ House Built in 2011, Kaswa, Ulyankulu
Source: Author (November 2012)
6.4.3 Waiting with a mission
While refugees went on with their daily activities in a ‘business-as-usual’ approach or
prepared for a life outside of the settlement, one could observe that both refugees and
local Tanzanians also still invested in projects within the settlement. This can be seen
as a way to resist the closure of the settlement, as already argued above. Next to other
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buildings such as hostels and small restaurants (see Plate 6.7), it was striking how many
churches were built in recent years. The churches Tanzania Assemblies of God (TAG)
was built in 2007, The Living Gospel World Mission Church was been built in 2009, the
WorldMissionary Fellowship of theChurch ofGod of Tanzaniawas built in 2011, and the
SOWER International Church was started in 2012. Furthermore, the Pentecostal Church
(see Plate 6.6), the LutheranChurch, theAnglicanChurch, theCalvaryChurch and others
were in the process of extending their premises. While refugees and Tanzanians have been
constrained from building houses of permanent materials, this restriction did not seem
to apply to most churches. As an elder of the Anglican Church, a Tanzanian and former
government ocial, said: “The government cannot restrict us to build a church; it serves
moral and spiritual development” (C11). Religious activities formed an important part in
most refugees’ lives. Building churches and other permanent houses has become a shared
goal of refugees and Tanzanians and a means of resistance against the rules of the ‘space
of control’. This resistance, however, was only possible since the government could not
prevent it or because individual government ocials agreed to it, for example in exchange
for personal favours (as also argued in Section 5.3.2). Refugees, local Tanzanians and
some government ocials have therefore engaged in a form of conviviality, to the benefit
of all.
Plate 6.6: Construction of a New Pentecostal Church in Ulyankulu Settlement
Source: Author (November 2012)
The pragmaticway of resisting against central government’s policies during thewaiting
time, however, has had more than a material dimension. In the absence of a strong gov-
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Plate 6.7: Construction of a New Hostel in Ulyankulu Settlement
Source: Author (November 2012)
ernment presence, religious leaders, who were generally highly regarded by the refugee
community and of whom some used to be ward representatives, have attempted to fill the
void. In 2007, after the local government services were stopped, the mosque, the Catholic
Church and the Pentecostal Church therefore formed a religious union. The former ward
representative of Kaswa, now acting as the Imam of the mosque in Ulyankulu, said:
“Well, after stopping to be a diwani, we faced many problems, such as lack
of government support. We thought, how can we solve this problem? We
thought it is better to have a union to speak in one voice” (C4).
This is remarkable not only since it bridged the divide between religions and dier-
ent denominations but also because it bridged divides between Tanzanians and refugees.
While the Pentecostal Church was led by refugees, the Catholic Church and the mosque
had Tanzanian leaders. As the Imam explained:
“I have already attended many celebrations at the churches and have invited
people from dierent faiths here” (C4).
Overall, faith enjoyed increased importance in this protracted refugee situation. In
fact, one second-generation refugee, a tailor and pastor (also quoted in Section 6.2.2),
mentioned that he related the presence of Burundian refugees in Tanzania to a mission
to preach the Gospel:
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“[...] Because we serve God who created heaven and earth we know that dur-
ing this time we are given by Tanzania we should work on the Gospel so that
it is easier to go to Mwanza to preach and to open churches so that we plant
the belief of God because [it was prophesised] that to preach the news of the
Gospel was God’s reason to take us from Burundi to come to Tanzania. So
[we were dispersed] to make it easier now for us to preach here and there. But
through our [...] prophecy [kwa kiunabii], the time will come where some
will depart albeit some will remain. But there might be some who will go
to Burundi even if we get citizenship. Because one man went to Burundi, a
prophet, who told them: who is ready to go to preach in Tanzania? There
were pastors and servants of God and not one was ready. Then he said, be-
cause you’ve refused to go voluntarily I will send you there, so this is the point
at which war ensued to disperse us here and there to preach the Gospel” (S6).
He thus reinterpreted history: refugees were not in Tanzania because they were forced
to flee from conflict but rather to preach the Gospel. In his opinion, the relocation to
other regions thus also served the purpose of preaching the word of God.
Since religious life was of high importance in the settlement, the religious union could
be seen as a crucial symbol for an extended ‘conviviality’ between all inhabitants of the
settlement, including refugees and Tanzanians of various religions and denominations,
and even former government employees. They all resisted the central government’s policy
of closing the settlement and they did their best to maintain social services and fight for
a ‘right to stay’.
In summary, the waiting experience was multi-faceted. Themain eect of the temporal
control over refugees was the slow dismantling of social services and local government’s
practices to the detriment of all. However, refugees dealt with thewaiting time in dierent
pragmatic ways. Some refugees were going on with their daily activities in a ‘business-as-
usual’ approach while maintaining hope and the expectation that they would eventually
gain citizenship. Others have been resisting elements of the central governments’ policies.
This could also be seen as a pragmatic way of dealing with the time of waiting – an
instrumental way that aimed to improve the outcome of government’s decisions while
waiting. Some dealt with the waiting time by using their agency to build houses outside of
the settlement. By this, they aimed to pre-empt the implementation of the government’s
formerly proposed plans.
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The most visible form of resistance was the building of churches and other permanent
buildings. This served to oppose, on the one hand, the imminent closure of the settlement
fighting for a ‘right to stay’, and, on the other hand, the provisions of control in the set-
tlement, a common goal by refugees and Tanzanians. It is argued that some government
ocials and refugees have developed a degree of conviviality, which made these develop-
ments possible. An extended sense of conviviality could also be detected in the fact that
refugees and Tanzanians have worked together in order to fill the void of governmental
services provided. For this purpose, a religious union was formed. It bridged the gap
between three religions/denominations in the settlement but also between refugees and
citizens. Again, instead of building up anxieties about the ultimate government’s deci-
sions, refugees and Tanzanians cooperated in a pragmatic way in order to use their time
productively, to reinforce their sense of belonging, and to improve life in the settlement.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter demonstrated how refugees employed a ‘pragmatics of belonging’ and a
‘pragmatics of waiting’ in Ulyankulu settlement. The first section showed, first, a rela-
tional dimension of creating a pragmatic sense of belonging. Despite the spatial and legal
separation between refugees and citizens, an integration process was going on between
refugees and local Tanzanians. While evading government control, refugees interacted
with Tanzanians in various ways: through cooperation in their daily lives, through trade,
and through intermarriage.
A second dimension of the ‘pragmatics of belonging’ was a sense of feeling at home in
the settlement and the Tanzanian nation, which refugees developed over time. The first
generation had a more localised sense of belonging, for example due to loss of mobility,
but both the first and second generation felt at home in the Tanzanian nation. Despite
lacking de jure citizenship rights, most refugees already felt like Tanzanians. However,
some still felt uncertainty about their belonging to Tanzania, due to the lack of formal
recognition by the state, or because of a lack of recognition by other refugees within the
settlement. For only a few, such as those working for the government, the citizenship
certificate would be of actual practical importance. First generation refugees had long
got used to the traditions and (agri-)culture in their environments. Harbouring negative
memories of Burundi, they did not want to go back and did not maintain a diasporic
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“homing desire” (Brah, 1996). The fact that deceased refugees were buried in Ulyankulu
may have supported their feeling of belonging to the place. Second generation refugees
denied any connection to Burundi.
A third dimension of the ‘pragmatics of belonging’ implied the claiming of de facto
citizenship in Tanzania. Most refugees found ways to live similarly to citizens by circum-
venting the government’s rules. Refugees moved outside of the settlement temporarily as
well as permanently. While outside of the settlement, they hid their refugee status, their
ethnicity and their Burundian nationality for employment reasons and in order not to be
discriminated against. For some first and many second generation refugees hiding their
status was an easy task since they spoke Tanzanian ethnic languages fluently and knew
how to obtain Tanzanian identity documents. When outside of the settlement, they did
not only ‘hide’ being refugees, they also felt more like citizens and less like refugees them-
selves. Not being labelled ‘refugees’ thus had consequences for their sense of belonging.
In the absence of citizenship rights, both first and second generation refugees resorted to
a ‘pragmatics of belonging’ through their own agency in order to feel at home and like
citizens.
Refugees were not only pragmatic about their sense of belonging; they also dealt with
the waiting time in pragmatic ways. Although they were enduring hardships, they went
on with their daily activities with a business-as-usual approach and some, who had the
means, engaged in future-thinking by preparing for the formerly proposed relocation to
other regions. Those who wanted to continue with their lives as usual resisted the for-
merly planned relocation. The most visible signs of this were the many new permanent
buildings in the settlement – constructing this type of building was ocially not allowed.
Constructing such buildings could be seen as a way of fighting for the ‘right to stay’ in the
settlement. This was only possible because individual government ocers did not entirely
oppose it. As argued in Chapter 5, a degree of conviviality was attained between govern-
ment ocers and the inhabitants of Ulyankulu. Other refugees used the waiting time by
pre-empting the government’s plans. They tried to improve the outcome of the ultimate
decisions of the government. In the absence of important government services, religion
and faith played an enhanced role. By forming a religious union, Burundians and Tanza-
nians bridged gaps between and beyond denominations in order to live in conviviality in
an extended sense.
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The settlement became the ‘home’ of the refugees, within and beyond which they have
used their agency in order to live the lives they wanted to live. This agency was employed
in overt and hidden ways. Sometimes, the hidden way of transgressing governmental pro-
visions was paradoxically used to take part in state institutions. The extent of integration
achieved by the refugees, however, triggered new security concerns by the government and
was thus perpetuating a complex interplay of control and agency. The camp, instead of
only being a ‘space of control’, was reinterpreted as a ‘space of agency’, a space where
time was used creatively and belonging was created and lived actively by refugees and
local Tanzanians.
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CONCLUS ION
“[...] Inasmuch as the refugee unhinges the old trinity of state/nation/territory – this apparently
marginal figure deserves rather to be considered the central figure of our political history.”
— Agamben, 1995
7.1 Empirical and Theoretical Contributions
7.1.1 Findings and empirical contributions
This thesis investigated how Burundian refugees’ developed a ‘pragmatics of belonging’,
de facto citizenship and a ‘pragmatics of waiting’ during a time of heightened uncertainty
in the protracted refugee situation of Ulyankulu settlement. This pragmatics enfolded
in interplay between control and agency. The aim of this examination was to find out
about the perspectives of dierent actors concerning belonging and citizenship, and to
understand the possible points of contention but also convergence that arose amongst
and between them. This analysis also shed light on the creation and eects of refugee
policies – which were in tension between control and the agency of local actors.
The findings of this thesis were presented in three chapters. Chapter 4 examined in
depth howUlyankulu settlementwas governed since its creation in 1972, how its economy
developed and what the refugees’ role was therein. This chapter also traced the evolution
of refugee policy inTanzania over time since the country’s independence in 1964. Chapter
5 further explored some of the issues raised in the previous chapter. In order to govern
the settlement, which forms of control were exerted through refugee policies, how were
these enacted on the ground and how were they contextualised by narratives. Chapter 6
ultimately allowed a change of perspective and got to the crux of the argument: how did
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refugees experience the situation, to what extent did they develop a sense of belonging in
the host country and what were their ideas about their citizenship?
Using literature, interviews and other material from the field, Chapter 5 showed that
on the local level the development of the settlement underwent four phases of governance
considering both the time before and after the refugees arrived. An analysis of these
phases is significant in order to understand how the relationship between refugees, lo-
cal Tanzanians, international organisations and the government evolved over time. The
changes that the settlement experienced in the past four decades were indeed not only
drastic but also significant in order to contextualise and comprehend today’s situation
of this protracted case. Three main arguments were made in this chapter: first, current
policies aiming at controlling refugees go back to colonial times. Second, refugees have
reached the state of de facto citizens within the confines of Ulyankulu settlement in a
second phase of governance, which started in 1985. Third, due to their historical connec-
tions to the land, Tanzanians have continuously moved to the settlement. This was an
important prerequisite for the refugees’ on-going local integration.
While analysing secondary historical material, this thesis made, first, an empirical con-
tribution by linking today’s discourses to a longer trajectory. It was therefore shown how
Ulyankulu was governed before the refugees arrived in Phase 0. A discussion of this early
stage is important since the refugee policies proposed by the Tanzanian government in
recent years, such as the relocation, can in fact be traced back to measures of environ-
mental damage and population control implemented in colonial times. To reiterate what
happened during this Phase, the area of Ulyankulu was first ruled by the Nyamwezi Chief
Mirambo in the end of the 19th century and then vacated during British colonialism in
the 20th century due to infestation with tse-tse flies. The analysis of this stage is also
essential since it links the presence of Tanzanians in the settlement today to their own
history in Ulyankulu. The presence of these Tanzanians in the settlement was observed
during fieldwork and is ocially not recognised. Being extremely sparsely populated, it
was decided to use the area of Ulyankulu as a refugee settlement in 1972, after the UN
reduced the tse-tse fly population by aerial spraying.
Since the arrival of refugees in 1972, three main phases of governance can be charac-
terised. An exploration of secondary material and interviews concerning Phase 1 showed
various incipient control measures over the environment and the refugee population since
the opening of the settlement. During this set-up phase, the settlement was strongly sup-
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ported and supervised by international agencies and the Tanzanian central government.
A grid-like road structure was built to accommodate the new arrivals and to create a ba-
sic ‘legibility’ of the space. Criteria for land allocation to refugees depended on place of
origin in Burundi, in part for security reasons. To counter the eect of floods, a part of
the refugees were resettled in 1978 in a new settlement, Mishamo (Rukwa region).
Another empirical contribution from this chapter was made by the analysis that the
settlement moved towards a less controlled space in Phase 2. This phase started in 1985,
when refugees became self-reliant. Local government structures were created, which re-
sembled the Tanzanian administrative system. Relating refugees’ behaviour to national
policies, such as that of ‘self-help’, showed that refugees were treated like citizens during
this time within the settlement. This is despite the fact that Tanzanian policies became
more restrictive during that time especially in terms of freedom of movement. Refugees
participated in improving social services and they were integrated in the local and the in-
ternational economy. Ulyankulu became a regional hub in economic terms and refugees
contributed substantially to food security in the region. The Tanzanian government re-
ceived taxes from the refugees. Local Tanzanians started to claim back their ‘right to stay’
in Ulyankulu due to their historical attachment to the land. The economic and social in-
tegration that refugees reached during that period, partially reached by refugees’ own
agency and encouraged by Tanzanians who moved to the settlement, started to blur the
separation between refugees and citizens and contributed to their cooperation. Refugees’
citizenship aspirations and their current feelings of belonging need to be gauged against
this historical backdrop; i.e. their continuing and increasing integration over time. Pho-
tographs taken during the time of fieldwork aimed to underline the arguments made in
this part.
Only in 2007, did a major shift occur when the Tanzanian government started to en-
force the idea to ‘end the refugee chapter’ in Ulyankulu. In this third phase, refugees
in Ulyankulu settlement were supposed to repatriate or relocate to other parts of Tan-
zania and be naturalised. This initiative also marked the start of non-maintenance of
the camp as local government structures were dismantled and the settlement was to be
closed. International organisations were called back to the settlement but their role was
limited to monitor the processes of repatriation, relocation and naturalisation. During
this stage, the settlement population was administratively invisibilised. Analysing this
administrative invisibilisation of the settlement is an important empirical contribution
246
7.1 empirical and theoretical contributions
as it is a novel observation, which has not been mentioned elsewhere. It was a contro-
versial topic at the time of field work and threatened to have disadvantageous eects on
the refugee population. Lacking representation, local Tanzanians then felt ignored and
invisibilised, whereas refugees and Tanzanians alike were not able to access development
services through the local government structure anymore. Instead of creating a new dis-
trict called Ulyankulu, as it was previously planned, Ulyankulu became part of Kaliua
District, whose capital is located further away from the settlement than the former dis-
trict capital of Urambo. However, the overall policy was still in the context of population
control (through the formerly proposed organised process of relocation and local integra-
tion) rather than abandonment.
One could say that the degree of control in the settlement space varied over time. Es-
pecially during the second phase, it most closely resembled a rural Tanzanian space, and
control related mainly to movements inside and outside of the settlement. During the
third phase, by closing the settlement, the space was supposed to be dissolved altogether.
However, the idea of closing it was not implemented due to resistance from various sides,
including refugees.
Furthermore, this chapter showed that Tanzania experienced an important shift from
an ‘open door’ policy under President Nyerere in the 1960s and 1970s towards a more
restrictive one in the 1980s and 1990s as enshrined in the Refugees Act, 1998 and the
National Refugee Policy 2003. This shift occurred as a result of the changing domes-
tic economic and political environment, as well as of the mass influx of refugees from
the genocide in Rwanda and ethnic strife in Burundi in the 1990s and subsequent prob-
lems with these new arrivals. During the first multi-party elections in 1995, anti-refugee
rhetoric was spread and refugees were increasingly seen as a security threat instead of
as welcomed guests. This shift also signified an increasingly restrictive interpretation of
Tanzanian nationalism, which conceptualised ethnic groups from outside of Tanzania as
a threat.
The empirical contributions of Chapter 5 relate to the findings concerning the types,
reasons and eects of government control over refugees in the settlement, but also to the
tensions that existed locally between processes of exclusion and belonging.
A controlled space that segregated refugees and citizens served to exclude refugees from
citizenship rights. Exceptional legal provisions ensured that refugees did not enjoy the
same rights as Tanzanian citizens: they could not make use of freedom of movement
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within the country, they were not allowed to work outside of the settlement or to vote
in Tanzanian elections. How were these provisions enacted locally? Empirical material
gained through participant observation at an event I attended turned out to be symbolic
of the protracted situation in Ulyankulu. It revealed a central tension between exclusion
and belonging – on the one hand, the event demonstrated a separation between refugees
and Tanzanians and unequal power relations enforced by governmental and international
actors, and it invoked a sense of suspension of time andwaiting through a restriction of in-
formation. Paradoxically, on the other hand, performances that the refugees had learned
in school also showed the refugees’ belonging to the Tanzanian nation. Furthermore, in-
terviews revealed that military control enforced a ‘space of control’ through sporadic acts
of repression. These acts of repression occurred at various times during the settlement’s
history. They served to create an artificial separation between refugees and Tanzanian
citizens, which was enshrined in refugee policies. This is an important empirical contri-
bution as it shows that control was directed towards both Tanzanians and refugees (see
discussion of Sukuma invasion in 2010 and ricochet refugees in 2012).
The main reason cited by various government actors for the control exerted over the
space of the settlement was national security. All government actors conjured up the
mantra of security in order to defend their relative stances on current refugee policies.
Interviews suggest that the government feared losing control over the situation. This fear
implied being alarmed about the refugees posing a threat to security, for by allegedly
carrying weapons. But it also implied fear of impurity of the nation, i.e. the fear that
refugees would become indistinguishable from Tanzanian citizens. The fear of losing
control over the refugees’ bodies is linked to a fear of the Hutu’s ‘violent subjectivities’.
This fear persisted even though numbers of crimes in Ulyankulu were not any higher than
outside of the settlement. Eventually, the central government shifted from a concern with
purity to preferring to invisibilise the settlement. Therefore, the government proposed to
relocate refugees in a controlled way to other regions. Security concerns were also a key
driver for proposing the relocation of refugees – in order to prevent a ‘Burundian enclave’.
However, regional governments did not agree with this policy and it was therefore put on
hold in 2011.
Another empirical contribution is the finding that some local government ocials be-
came so embedded in the everyday life in the settlement that they developed a degree
of conviviality with the refugees. Control was exerted with some discretion by some
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government ocers, who varied the extent to which they implemented the government’s
rules. Since these ocials considered the settlement as their home, the discretion they
employed in implementing the government’s rules is attributable to more than a mere
lack of resources or corruption. They were interested in staying in Ulyankulu themselves
and cooperated with refugees. While allegedly accepting personal favours for their dis-
cretions, they allowed the segregation between refugees and citizens, between settlement
space and surroundings, to weaken.
Chapter 6 made several empirical contributions about the way refugees have developed
a sense of belonging to the local area and the Tanzanian nation, how they were claim-
ing de facto citizenship rights on a day-to-day basis, and how they dealt with the time
of uncertainty. I argued that refugees, despite living in a settlement and being ocially
excluded from citizenship, developed a ‘pragmatics of belonging’, which includes a dimen-
sion of integration with Tanzanians, a dimension of feeling at home (in the settlement
area and in the nation more generally) and the dimension of being able to claim de facto
citizenship rights outside of the settlement.
The empirical findings showed that refugees and Tanzanians were closely integrated
with each other; they were cooperating, trading and intermarrying. Their mutual recog-
nition helped the refugees to gain a relational pragmatic sense of belonging to the local
area of Ulyankulu but also to the Tanzanian nation. Refugees moved outside of the set-
tlement despite the government’s provisions. Local Tanzanians also moved inside of the
settlement, cooperated and traded and intermarried with the refugees. This is an im-
portant empirical contribution since it supports the argument that they should not be
considered as refugees any more but in fact, as citizens.
Interviews also show that by living in Ulyankulu for a long time, refugees have gained
a sense of familiarity, which created a feeling of home. Most first and second generation
refugees felt Tanzanian and not like refugees. Refugees did not long for living in Burundi;
on the contrary second generation refugees had never been there nor had an interest in go-
ing there; and the memories of first generation refugees forbade them to speak about the
country in positive terms. This, again, is an essential empirical contribution since it sup-
ports the claim that refugees have developed a pragmatic sense of belonging to Tanzania,
which is irreversible.
Another significant contribution was made by showing how refugees moved outside
of the settlement and claimed de facto citizenship rights there, which were normally re-
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stricted to de jure citizens. These rights included the right to vote, to work and to receive
government loans. As mentioned in Chapter 4, within the settlement area, refugees were
mostly already treated like citizens: they were educated by the Tanzanian government ac-
cording to the Tanzanian curriculum and they were taxed like other Tanzanian citizens.
Outside of the settlement, refugees had to resort to hiding their refugee status, ethnicity
and nationality by acting and speaking like Tanzanians. They adopted various Tanzanian
ethnicities on an individual basis since the Hutu were not accepted as a Tanzanian ethnic
group. These hiding strategies allowed them to claim the aforementioned de facto citizen-
ship rights. Some refugees explicitly stated that they were conscious of what citizenship
means in terms of ‘rights’. Again, these findings support the argument that refugees de-
veloped a ‘pragmatics of belonging’ and that it was only the formal status that they were
lacking in order to become citizens. Despite exceptional legal provisions, temporal con-
trol and acts of repression, the refugee settlement, as a space, was in reality breaking
down due to inside and outside processes; and the demarcation between Tanzanians and
refugees has ceased to exist.
Finally, an empirical contribution is made by analysing how refugees dealt with the
temporal suspension of time created by the government by using their time productively
and instrumentally in a ‘pragmatics of waiting’. Some engaged in a business-as-usual ap-
proach, while others individually pre-empted the government’s policy of relocation and
prepared for the future by, for example, building houses outside of the settlement. How-
ever, instead of giving in to the central government’s demands of closing the settlement,
many refugees and local Tanzanians were building houses, hostels and churches in the
settlement and thereby resisted the plan of closing the settlement and relocation collec-
tively. This was possible due to a degree of conviviality, i.e. an exchange of favours in
a shared space, between the refugees, local Tanzanians and local government ocials.
Refugees were not interested in openly revolting against the (central) government as they
have long worked on gaining a ‘right to stay’. The government, on the other hand, lacked
the resources to control the refugees in an all-encompassing way and local ocials also
benefited from such cooperation on an individual basis.
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7.1.2 Contributions to conceptions of belonging and citizenship
This thesis aims to make a contribution to understanding the ways refugees can develop
a sense of belonging to the host state over time in a protracted refugee situation and the
process of becoming de facto citizens under circumstances of control in the space of a
refugee settlement.
The central premise of this investigation is that refugees lack de jure citizenship and
initially upon arrival also lack any form of de facto citizenship. Refugees, as discussed in
Chapter 2 and Chapter 5, are indeed excluded from citizenship by international statutes
and national policies. Following the definition of citizenship by Marshall 1983 [1950],
this is because they have neither the rights nor duties that would allow them to be full
members of the host nation. Even when seeing citizenship as a ‘set of practices associ-
ated with participation in politics’ as Aristotle formulated it, refugees in settlements are
hindered from enacting such practices by the remote spatiality of such settlements, rules
that apply within these spaces and the restrictions on freedom of movement outside of
such settlements. Migrants, it was maintained, are seen as a threat to the nation-building
process within a framework that is methodologically nationalist (cf. Glick-Schiller, 2002).
The problem for migrants and refugees is that citizenship is contingent on belonging to
the nation, which, in Tanzania also includes belonging to certain ethnic groups within
the nation. Citizenship becomes conflated with nationality as well as ethnic notions of
belonging.
Theoretical insights into exclusion from citizenship should be complemented and ex-
panded by the empirical findings in Chapter 4 and 5 (see also Section 7.1.1). The Tanza-
nian state feared impurity of the nation and therefore separated refugees from citizens.
However, empirical findings also showed that these exclusionary notions of citizenship
enshrined in refugee policies were in tension with other local processes in Ulyankulu.
While the government separated refugees and Tanzanians via various methods in their
everyday lives, it also collaborated in turning them into citizens via schooling and taxing
them (cf. Gellner, 1983). Furthermore, some government ocials lived in the settlement
for extended periods of time, which allowed them to develop a degree of conviviality
(Nyamnjoh, 2007) with the refugees. At the discretion of some government ocers, sim-
ilar to Lipsky’s (1980) street-level bureaucrats, certain rules weakened in the settlement.
Another tension was that while the government’s aim was to control refugees, sometimes
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this goal led to controlling its own citizens as well – such as when sending the Sukuma
invaders out of the settlement by military force in 2010.
Invisibility, it was argued, can function as a control measure to exclude refugees from
citizenship. However, processes of visibility and invisibility can be continuously in ten-
sion. As shown in Chapter 2, settlements can in fact have enhanced visibility, which in-
creases the likelihood of receiving international aid (cf. Kaiser, 2006: 598). As the case of
Ulyankulu shows, the naturalisation initiative served to renew visibility of this group of
refugees in the light of the international community, so that foreign funds would support
the naturalisation and relocation of refugees, as well as the development of the receiving
regions. This initiative occurred after refugees had already obtained self-reliance for 22
years since 1985 and had thus not been a priority group to the international community.
In 2011, the entire initiative was put on hold, mainly due to tensions between the regional
and central governments of Tanzania. Since the settlement was supposed to be closed,
it was administratively invisibilised in 2012, when the district capital became Kaliua in-
stead of Ulyankulu. Although it was not completely abandoned (the MHA, UNHCR
and TCRS had a renewed presence in the settlement), essential services were withdrawn.
While this invisibilisation had unfavourable consequences on the refugees, they were at
the same time seeking invisibility themselves by hiding activities that the state prohib-
ited. While working outside of the settlement, for example, invisibility was used as a
shield since they lacked legal protection (cf. Polzer and Hammond, 2008). As Polzer and
Hammond (2008) point out, however, refugees can also subvert or resist their invisibil-
ity. The development of a ‘pragmatics of belonging’ and a ‘pragmatics of waiting’ (see
below) is indeed a way for refugees to seek visibility in the eyes of the nation state and
its citizens. Although refugees in Ulyankulu had to hide to claim citizenship rights, their
ultimate aim was to become de jure citizens themselves in the future instead of remaining
liminal, invisible beings. Theoretically, this analysis adds to the understanding of acts of
visibilisation and invisibilisation as multi-faceted phenomena, which can be carried out
by various actors simultaneously at the international, national and individual level.
Refugees themselves have developed a sense of belonging and have engaged in what
I call the ‘pragmatics of belonging’. As elaborated above, in Ulyankulu settlement, they
have cooperated with fellow citizens and gained a degree of trust (Calhoun, 2003). Speak-
ingwithTanzanians and being educated inTanzanian schools has enabled refugees to feel
Tanzanian. Thereby they gained a first, relational, dimension of the ‘pragmatics of be-
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longing’. Thus, local Tanzanian citizens played their role in turning refugees into citizens
as they recognised them as belonging to their country (cf. Sassen, 2003) – they cooper-
ated, traded and intermarried. They have also gained a sense of home, of familiarity, over
time – a second dimension of the ’pragmatics of belonging’. This sense has come about by
engaging in day-to-day activities of the camp, including cultivation, trading, child rearing
and burial. Burial was found to be particularly important in African contexts (Geschiere,
2000). The camp has become a safe haven (Duyvendak, 2011) in contrast to the insecu-
rity experienced (by the first generation) in Burundi. The dimension of the ‘pragmatics of
belonging’, which explains the emerging sense of home in the settlement, closely resem-
bles the process of ‘emplacement’, which was explained in relation to returnee refugees
in Ethiopia (Hammond, 2004).
They thereby gained a feeling of belonging to the Tanzanian nation which helped es-
pecially the second generation to claim de facto citizenship rights on an individual basis
when outside of the settlement, which is the third dimension of the ‘pragmatics of be-
longing’. These rights were normally reserved to de jure citizens, such as the right to vote
and to work outside of the settlement. As mentioned above, they were able to claim these
rights by hiding their refugee status, Hutu ethnicity and Burundian nationality. By this
behaviour, in contrast to urban and town refugees elsewhere (Malkki, 1995a; Sommers,
2000), refugees in Ulyankulu aimed to become de jure citizens in the future instead of
remaining liminal beings or refugees. By acting in these ways, they have also renegoti-
ated the ‘space of control’ into a ‘space of agency’. However, it could be seen that the
mechanism of refugees’ ‘citizenship self-making’ intersected with the mechanism of ‘be-
ing made’ (Ong, 1996). As mentioned above, within the area of Ulyankulu settlement,
refugees were being made citizens in part through the government, which oered school-
ing and demanded taxes from the refugees just as from de jure Tanzanian citizens. The-
oretically, the understanding of citizenship in this thesis supports seeing citizenship as
both a process (Sassen, 2003), implying dierent actors, and a legal status (Marshall,
1983 [1950]), and applies this to the case of refugees in rural refugee settlements. It was
shown that this understanding is shared by both refugees and the government.
This understanding of belonging is theoretically novel since it does not hinge on an
understanding of refugees as aiming to return ‘home’, such as a (refugee) diaspora (Van
Hear, 2006) that longs for their home country, city or village (Brah, 1996; Mercer et al.,
2008; Cohen 2008). It also does not refer to a group which is in continuous preparation
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for repatriation (e.g. Palestinians in Lebanon; Sanyal, 2011), or which is hyperpoliticised
due to internal factions and close relations to the political field of the country of origin
(Turner, 2010). It neither supports the idea of a group which forms its own nation in
exile in an ethnic quest for purity (Malkki, 1995a) or the alternative viewpoint of what
Malkki (ibid.: 153) termed the “pragmatics of identity”, i.e. urban refugees that refused
to be categorised, an idea which possibly also finds application in the instance of urban
refugees living in fear of being detected (Sommers, 2000).
The ‘pragmatics of belonging’ instead defines the instrumental process of individuals’
sense of belonging in the relational space of the camp, who are future-oriented and there-
fore want to stay in the host state for pragmatic reasons (cf. Dewey, 1929). They thereby
defy the adverse circumstance of living in a camp without citizenship in a quest for famil-
iarity and security and achieve a way of living similar to citizens. Analysing this situation
also counteracts the invisibility of successful cases of (de facto) integration (Polzer, 2008).
The structure of the camp thus on the one hand aims to prevent refugees from becom-
ing citizens by creating a separation between them and local Tanzanians. On the other
hand, however, it forms citizens by educating and taxing refugees and by allowing them
to feel ‘at home’. Through their agency, refugees can reinforce their citizenship claims
both inside and outside of the settlement. While the claiming of political and civil rights
happens on an individual basis, a sense of belonging to the camp and to Tanzania is a
collective phenomenon in a social network of other refugees living in the camp and inter-
acting with local citizens.
7.1.3 Contributions to conceptions of waiting
Another theoretical contribution was made by arguing that while refugees are subject
to temporal control, they can deal with this in various ways. The ‘pragmatics of wait-
ing’ shows that, in contrast to theories that emphasise feelings of uncertainty due to
disruptions, deceleration or suspension of time (Jereys, 2010; Griths, 2013), time is
also a resource for refugees, which they use productively. Through this pragmatism, they
are also able to defy a suspension in time and feelings of uncertainty while waiting for
citizenship. The year of 2012 was a time of heightened uncertainty since the naturalisa-
tion initiative was put on hold. Refugees did not know whether they would be citizens,
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refugees, be relocated elsewhere in Tanzania or even be involuntarily returned to Burundi.
They were indeed eectively stateless. Therefore, it was the best suited time to investigate
how refugees, who had over time become de facto citizens and were even on the way to
becoming de jure citizens, would react to this indefinite suspension of their future plans
and aspirations. As shown in Chapter 6, refugees employed various strategies to deal
with this suspension – they went on with a ‘business-as-usual’ approach, whereas others
employed future thinking in order to pre-empt the government’s decisions. Although the
settlement was supposed to the closed and it was prohibited, refugees and local Tanzani-
ans continued constructing new buildings in the settlement in order to fight for their ‘right
to stay’. Furthermore, the conviviality that had developed between government ocials
and refugees on the ground was expanded to a religious union.
Theoretically, this thesis also hints to an intersecting crisis of refugeeness, ethnic and
national belonging. While the Tanzanian government welcomed refugees with open arms
after the country’s independence in 1964, it developed an increasingly restrictive attitude
vis-a-vis refugees over time. Refugees were re-defined from ‘guests’ to ‘others’ due to a
shift to multiparty politics and the pressure of having to host a large influx of refugees
in a short period of time. In some way, this marks an insistence on a new Tanzanian
nationalism, supporting amulti-ethnic nation. On the other hand, it reflects the exclusion
of certain ethnicities that are not part of the Tanzanian ‘ethno-national core’ (Wimmer,
2006) and are indeed feared for their violent subjectivities (Das et al., 2000). It remains to
be seen whether the Hutu will be accepted as a Tanzanian ethnicity or how the dilemma
of the eectively multi-layered Tanzanian citizenship (Yuval-Davis, 1999) will eventually
be solved for refugees.
7.1.4 Contribution to debates about the `refugee camp'
This thesis aims tomake a contribution towhether and how control over refugees in terms
of exclusion from citizenship as enshrined in national policies can manifest, how it is
perpetuated over time in a rural settlement in a protracted refugee situation and how this
is justified. Ultimately, it was found that while Ulyankulu settlement had characteristics
of a ‘space of control’, considerable tensions existed on the ground between exclusion and
belonging. Characterising the space that refugees live in was found to be crucial since a
substantial number of refugees in Africa live in camps and rural settlements.
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Refugees live in such spaces since camps allow governments and international organ-
isations to care for and control the refugee population. In addition, rural settlements
oer the additional possibility of helping refugees to become self-reliant. However, since
it is not always possible to resettle refugees or to voluntarily repatriate them, the only op-
tion becomes to locally integrate them. Some empirical analyses of refugee situations do
hint at a successful de facto integration of refugees with the host communities. However,
cases of successful de jure integration of refugees inAfrica including citizenship are scarce.
Furthermore, many camps and settlements have been characterised by insecurity either
emanating from the refugees themselves or from the outside, endangering the refugees.
It was found that Ulyankulu settlement did not fit the previous theorisations of the
camp as a “security island” (Ramadan, 2009a), as a “space of hospitality” (Ramadan,
2008), or as a space of myth-making (Malkki, 1995a). It would also not be accurate to
call Ulyankulu settlement a “space of exception” (Agamben, 2005) since this theorisation
does not oer a framework for analysing in-depth the control exerted in the settlement. It
also does not oer space for analysing the relations between refugees and citizens inside
and outside of the settlement, or the influence of international policies. Furthermore,
refugee settlements are not built for homines sacri, i.e. beings that can be killed but not
sacrificed (Agamben, 1998), but for refugees that are supposed to be protected until they
can return home.
Thus, it was argued that exceptional legal provisions are just one form of control.
These legal provisions need to be permanently and eectively enforced in order to up-
hold the status quo in vast rural refugee settlements without material borders. Physically,
the space is thus controlled by creating legibility of the road structure (Scott, 1998), in
temporal ways by adjourning permanent decisions (Bourdieu, 2000), e.g. on the granting
of citizenship, and through sporadic military acts of repression (Scott, 1985) inside and
outside of the settlement.
However, it was argued that the settlement is not only a ‘space of control’. While
it is seen as such by the government and international policy-makers, refugees are re-
interpreting this space in their everyday lives. For them, it is indeed a ‘space of agency’, in
which they routinely transgress the control exerted. This sometimes happens according
to their basic needs but also according to their individual plans in life. They have em-
ployed agency by spatially questioning and transgressing the settlement space, by using
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the time of waiting for the government’s decisions productively and, in the meantime, by
developing a sense of belonging.
Ultimately, Ulyankulu is a ‘space of control’ and a ‘space of agency’ concurrently. Al-
though refugees often face the consequences of control, this control has not been all-
encompassing or eective. Furthermore, sometimes control was in the interest of the
refugees, for example in the form of ‘self-help’, which induced refugees to build schools
and other buildings, andwhen the government protected the refugees against the Sukuma.
As has been argued in the empirical chapters, control has weakened in Ulyankulu by an
emergent sense of conviviality between various actors in the settlement, including some
government ocials. This was the result of broader processes, for example of local Tanza-
nians moving to the settlement. Although certain government ocials have retained their
status as authorities, they granted refugees room for manoeuvre allegedly by accepting
personal favours. Given thematerial control in the settlement, the increased scale of build-
ing permanent houses, hostels and churches, a shared goal by refugees and Tanzanians,
can be seen as a form of resistance against the closure of the camp, which is part of a
struggle for the ‘right to stay’, as mentioned above. Seeing the settlement as both a ‘space
of control’ and a ‘space of agency’ is theoretically novel since it shows both top-down and
bottom-up processes, it shows tensions between exclusion and belonging, and it analyses
both on various levels and in interaction with each other, which has not been done in the
same way before.
7.2 Implications for Policy
The first two implications spelt out in this section are directed towards the Tanzanian
government in the first instance as it is the sole institution that can directly influence
the situation of refugees residing in its territory. The third recommendation is directed
towards the UNHCR and other international organisations involved in refugee politics.
1. Dissolving the ‘space of control’
First, the ‘space of control’ as it was upheld for 40 years, became a construct, which was
not legitimate in the eyes of the refugees; neither in the eyes of local Tanzanian citizens
or even local government ocials. Refugees and local Tanzanians have transgressed the
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boundaries of the settlement in multiple and irreversible ways. On the one hand, local
government ocials have turned a blind eye to these processes and have allegedly person-
ally benefited from this situation. On the other hand, refugees and local Tanzanians did
not wish a drastic spatial change, i.e. they wanted to stay in the settlement area. There-
fore the dierent actors have developed a way of living together in conviviality, in which
the settlement area was still controlled through spontaneous acts of repression but the
agency of refugees was not completely curtailed. It may seem convenient to uphold the
‘space of control’. However, it would be more fruitful for most actors involved if it was
dissolved and turned into a genuine living space without boundaries. The government
would not need to use resources to patrol the borders of the settlement and engage in
acts of repression, while refugees and local Tanzanians would not have to live in fear of
eviction or punishment for transgression of borders.
2. Recognise Burundian refugees as belonging to Tanzania
As shown above, refugees have developed pragmatic ways of belonging as well as of wait-
ing, a form of dealing with the temporal control imposed on them. The ‘pragmatics of
belonging’ has been reinforced in their recognition from other Tanzanian citizens, who
have cooperated and even intermarried with refugees. Refugees in Ulyankulu, who were
predominantly in the second generation, have not longed for Burundi since their ‘home’
has become or has always been in Tanzania. Refugees have been educated in the Tanza-
nian curriculum; they have sought further education in this system themselves and they
have engaged in varied and taxed economic activities. They have thus used their time
in pragmatic ways. For their economic achievements they have been recognised collec-
tively, e.g. as the third biggest tobacco growers in the region (by international tobacco
companies), as contributors to food security (by the UNHCR) and as a tax base (by the
government). A formal recognition of their own sense of belonging and their contribution
to Tanzania is wanting – on a collective basis, permanent residence should be considered
a minimum measure of recognition, and citizenship should be an option for those who
urgently need it.
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3. Develop an international standard of dealing with protracted refugee situations
Based on this protracted situation and evidence of some other such situations (e.g. in
Uganda, Zambia, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Algeria and Kenya) it is possible to spell out
some tentative ideas of internationally promoted policy options. As follows from the first
recommendation above, the idea that a camp or settlement can be turned from a ‘space
of control’ into a genuine living space for refugees and local citizens without boundaries
or exceptional laws should be contemplated throughout the period of hosting refugees.
In cases where mass repatriation is not recommended, where refugees themselves are self-
reliant, want to stay and work in the host country and would like to become citizens, and
where local host communities have lived in peace with the new arrivals, this option could
resolve tensions and spare resources.
The time to abandon exceptional rules could be when refugees have reached self-
suciency. Contrary to what happened in Tanzania, this should also coincide with the
granting of formal recognition as legal residents or citizens of the host state (see second
point above). Otherwise, as it happened in Tanzania, refugees are pushed back into a
state of uncertainty; and opposition to formal integration may arise by the government
at a later stage, e.g. for political reasons.
7.3 Ideas for Further Research
Urban refugees
This thesis analysed the situation of refugees in rural settlements. However, while men-
tioning the fact that many refugees havemoved to urban areas and settled there, the scope
of this thesis has not allowed interviewing many such persons who live in those areas.
Some studies, like Malkki (1995a) and Sommers (2000) and others have succeeded in
gaining insights into urban refugees’ lives. However, within the Tanzanian context, there
are not many such studies and the situation may have changed in the meantime.
There is no recent estimation of the number of refugees in urban areas (Asylum Ac-
cess Tanzania 2011: 2). In fact, these self-settled refugees have attracted less research
than assisted refugees in camps (Kibreab, 1996). A survey with 122 adult and mainly
Congolese refugees indicates that reasons for leaving a camp were personal or general in-
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security, outbreak of diseases, insucient services and lack of employment. Among these
refugees, only 3% had a permit to temporarily leave the camp, 31% had left a camp with-
out obtaining the necessary permit, and 65% had never lived in a camp (Asylum Access
Tanzania, 2011). Willems (2003), who conducted an anthropological study with Burun-
dian, Rwandan and Congolese refugees in Dar es Salaam, explains that these refugees
rely on their own social networks to find opportunities for work. This is either in the
informal sector as hairdressers, tailors, or daily labourers (see also Sommers, 2000), or
they receive financial support from friends and relatives in Tanzania and abroad. While
coping with the circumstances by supporting each other, they are, according to Willems
(2003), not adapting to the host culture, except in respects in which adapting could have
consequences in endangering their personal safety – e.g. not speaking Swahili.
The TCRS declared an increased interest in helping those who live in Dar es Salaam
and other urban areas (interview with I5). The UNHCR has also widened its scope to
oer protection to urban refugees in its Policy Statement on Refugees in Urban Areas,
1997, which was replaced by the UNHCR Policy on Refugee Protection and Solutions in
Urban Areas in 2009 (UNHCR, 2009b). A global analysis of UNHCR’s largest refugee
operations in urban areas was commissioned in 2012 but it does not include a study on
Tanzania (Morand et al., 2012). A coherent national policy on urban refugees is still
lacking (Pangilinan, 2012). Since refugees in urban areas are not given a plot of land to
cultivate and do not enjoy basic protection in terms of education and health facilities,
they may live in a more precarious situation than those in rural settlements. According to
Sommers (1999) four categories of urban refugees reside in Dar es Salaam: a few refugees,
who are legally living in the city, those who have moved out of camps and are not covered
by protection, asylum seekers and those who claim to be refugees but are really economic
migrants. Research should be conducted with each of these groups.
Intra-household gender dynamics
This thesis, while looking mainly at inequalities between citizens and non-citizens in the
public sphere, does not provide an in-depth analysis of intra-household gender dynamics.
It is suggested here that gender dynamics influence the nascent sense of belonging to Tan-
zania since women engage less in travelling than men. As could be ascertained through
participant observation and interviews, women in Ulyankulu settlement bear multiple
responsibilities of child-bearing and rearing, cultivating and selling on the market. Men
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also engage in cultivation, and they are in charge of buying on the market and trading
outside of the settlement. Further research could shed light on how day-to-day tasks and
roles are negotiated and resources administered within the household. This could be ex-
amined both in the settlement as well as in urban areas, where roles may be assigned
dierently.
Citizenship as status
This thesis has analysed citizenship as a practice and how it is claimed de facto by refugees.
As was the original aim of this thesis, one could conduct a follow-up study on those who
already obtained citizenship documentation, i.e. de jure citizenship as a status. While in
2012 it was not recommended to do research with those 749 people who had already got
citizenship certificates, this situation could change in the future if more refugees are given
the chance to obtain citizenship certificates. Also, there have been other situations in
which refugees were granted citizenship, such as the Somali Bantus in Tanzania in 2000. A
follow-up study with these new citizens could shed new light on the relationship between
belonging and citizenship. New insights in belonging and de facto vs. de jure citizenship
could also be attained by analysing the situation in other camps and settlements in Africa,
where refugees have lived in protracted exile.
7.4 Outlook
In light of the fact that the naturalisation of the Burundian refugees was put on hold,
it would be intriguing to know what will happen to this population in the near and in
the distant future and whether they will obtain a legal status soon. The new constitu-
tion that is currently under review would, however, be a step in the wrong direction, as it
does not grant jus soli citizenship rights. While under the current jus soli laws, refugees
born in Tanzanian would theoretically be entitled to citizenship (even though this has
not happened in practice), the new constitution eliminates such rights altogether. Cur-
rently, the plight of the Burundian refugees is on-going. Even though they developed a
pragmatics of belonging, the current situation is hardly satisfying in the long run. Within
the settlement, refugees have long been treated as de facto citizens, they have increasingly
interacted with citizens, and a degree of conviviality with some government ocials has
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developed. Outside of the settlement, refugees also claim de facto citizenship rights but
their actions always bear the risk of being detected. Being pragmatic about the waiting
time is the most sensible response to temporal control. However, control measures to
enforce the government’s policies can also be expected in the future. It is possible to
imagine that refugees will start resisting such policies on a larger scale if their demand
for a permanent ‘right to stay’ is not heard soon.
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7.4 interviews
Interviews: Table of Respondents
Note about coding: In order to enhance both readability in the text and anonymity of
respondents, it was decided to code government ocials with the letter ‘G’, employees of
international/humanitarian organisations with ‘I’, respondents working for the media as
‘M’, any other Tanzanian citizens interviewed with ‘C’, first generation refugees with ‘F’
and second generation refugees with ‘S’. Numbering follows the order in which a quote
of the respective respondent appears in the text. The following table reveals information
on the respondents’ occupation, gender (m/f), general place of interview and month in
which it occurred.
Respondent Place Date
month/year
Code
Government, International Organisations and Media
Government Ocer, m Uyowa 11/2012 G1
Government Ocer, m Ulyankulu 06 and 07/2012 G2
Government Ocer, m Mwendakulima 11/2012 G3
Government Ocer, m District Commission,
Kaliua
11/2012 G4
Government Ocer, m Ulyankulu 11/2012 G5
Government Ocer, f District Commission,
Urambo
08/2012 G6
Government Ocer, m Immigration, Tabora 08/2014 G7
Government Ocer, m Prime Minister’s Oce,
Dar es Salaam
06/2012 G8
Government Ocer, m Regional Commission,
Tabora
07/2012 G9
Police Ocer, m Regular police, Ulyankulu 11/2012 G10
Police Ocer, m Operational Police,
Ulyankulu
11/2012 G11
Police Ocer, f District, Tabora town 08/2012 G12
Police Ocer, m Region, Tabora 08/2012 G13
Government Ocer, f Ministry of Home Aairs,
Dar es Salaam
06/2012 G14
UNHCR employee, f Dar es Salaam 02 and 04/ 2012 I1
UNHCR employee, m Ulyankulu 06/2012 I2
TCRS employee, m Ulyankulu 07/2012,
04/2014
I3
UNHCR employee, f Ulyankulu 07/2014 I4
TCRS employee, m Dar es Salaam 06/2012 I5
Journalist, m The Guardian, Dar es
Salaam
06/2012 M1
(continued)
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7.4 interviews
Respondent Place Date
month/year
Code
Other Tanzanians
Farmer (retired),
Nyamwezi, m
Ulyankulu 11/2012 C1
Priest, Tanzanian, m Ulyankulu 07/2012 C2
Farmer, former
Government Ocer, m
Ulyankulu 11/2012 C3
Imam, former Government
Ocer, m
Ulyankulu 11/2012 C4
Trader, m Tabora town 07/2012 C5
Student, m Ulyankulu 11/2012 C6
Trader, m Tabora town 07/2012 C7
Business man, m Tabora town 07/2012 C8
NGO worker, m Tabora town 07/2012 C9
Farmer, m Ulyankulu 11/2012 C10
Church elder, former
Government Ocer, m
Ulyankulu 11/2012 C11
First Generation Refugees
Farmer, m Ulyankulu 08/2012 F1
Farmer (retired), m Ulyankulu 11/2012 F2
Farmer, m Ulyankulu 07/2012 F3
Farmers, m (joint
interview)
Ulyankulu 11/2012 F4
Village leader, m Ulyankulu 08/2012 F5
Farmer (retired), m Ulyankulu 07/2012 F6
Farmer (retired), m Ulyankulu 07/2012 F7
Farmer (retired), m Ulyankulu 07/2012 F8
Farmer (retired), m Ulyankulu 07/2012 F9
VETA teacher, m Ulyankulu 11/2012 F10
Farmer, m Ulyankulu 07/2012 F11
Secondary School teacher,
m
Ulyankulu 07/2012 F12
Pastor, m Ulyankulu 06/2012 F13
Primary school teacher, m Ulyankulu 08/2012 F14
Farmer (retired), m Ulyankulu 07/2012 F15
Pastor, m Ulyankulu 06 and 08/2012 F16
Priest, m Tabora town 08/2012 F17
Refugee man, m Ulyankulu 07/2012 F18
(continued)
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7.4 interviews
Respondent Place Date
month/year
Code
Second and Third Generation Refugees
Doctor, m Ulyankulu 08/2012 S1
Farmer, f Ulyankulu 11/2012 S2
Worker, m Ulyankulu 11/2012 S3
Graduate student, m Ulyankulu 07/2012 S4
Farmer, f Ulyankulu 06/2012 S5
Tailor, m Ulyankulu 06/2012 S6
Businessman, m (3rd gen.) Ulyankulu 07/2012 S7
Student, m Ulyankulu 11/2012 S8
Student, m Ulyankulu 11/2012 S9
Tailor, m Ulyankulu 06/2012 S10
Doctor, m Ulyankulu 08/2012 S11
Farmer, f Ulyankulu 11/2012 S12
Student, m Ulyankulu 11/2012 S13
Student, f Ulyankulu 11/2012 S14
Student, f Ulyankulu 11/2012 S15
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APP END IX
A.1 Progress in Local Integration in Selected African Countries
Refugees mainly from
(country of origin)
Host state Comments Location: Camps, Set-
tlements, Urban areas
North Africa
Palestine, Sudan, South-
Sudan, Somalia (UN-
HCR, 2014f)
Egypt Refugees not able to nat-
uralise, unless a refugee
is married to an Egyptian
or has an Egyptian par-
ent. Palestinian refugee
men married to Egyptian
women are not allowed to
obtain citizenship due to the
1959 decision of the Arab
League that Palestinians
should not get citizenship
in other countries in order
to preserve their identity
(Manby, 2010).
Saloum camp near
Egyptian-Libyan
border; refugees oth-
erwise in urban areas
(UNHCR, 2014f).
Western Sahara/Sahrawis
(Manby, 2010), PRS
(Kuhlman, 2002), Syri-
ans, Malians (UNHCR,
2014f)
Algeria Sahrawis have no possibil-
ity to naturalise and stay in
isolated camps due to a po-
litical failure to resolve the
question of state existence.
Return to Morocco is possi-
ble (Manby, 2010). The situ-
ation is unresolved since 38
years. Malians are hosted by
Algerian families along the
border. Syrian and Malians
assisted by the Algerian Red
Cross (UNHCR, 2014f).
4 camps for Sahrawis
near Tindouf
(Loescher and Mil-
ner, 2005, UNHCR,
2014f); other refugees
in urban areas.
Mali (UNHCR, 2014f) Mauritania Local integration is gener-
ally not possible in North
Africa (UNHCR, 2014f).
Mbera camp; urban ar-
eas (UNHCR, 2014f).
(continued)
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Refugees mainly from
(country of origin)
Host state Comments Location: Camps, Set-
tlements, Urban areas
Syria and others (UN-
HCR, 2014f)
Libya Local integration is gener-
ally not possible in North
Africa. Refugee status deter-
mination in progress; Mem-
orandum of Understanding
with the UNHCR is pend-
ing (UNHCR, 2014f).
Detention sites, ur-
ban areas (UNHCR,
2014f).
Cote d’Ivoire, Syria (UN-
HCR, 2014f), DRC, Iraq
(UNHCR, 2010c)
Marocco UNHCR advocates for
temporary protection
(UNHCR, 2014f).
Urban areas (UNHCR,
2014f).
East Africa
Somalia, South Sudan,
Ethiopia (UNHCR,
2014d); Sudanese and So-
mali → PRS (Kuhlman,
2002)
Kenya No right to asylum, no pos-
sibility to naturalise, camps
run byUNHCR.No refugee
law before Refugee Act of
2006. 2010 Constitution
might provide new oppor-
tuntities (Manby, 2010).
Kakuma camp, five
Dabaab camps: Da-
gahaley, Ifo, Ifo 2,
Hagadera, Kambioos
(UNHCR, 2014g).
DRC, Burundi (UNHCR,
2014k)
Tanzania 1981: Naturalisation of
25,000 Rwandans (but only
few got their certificates;
Gasarasi 1990). 2003:
3000 Somali (Chogo set-
tlement). Possibly 171,600
Burundians will be locally
integrated who wish to be
naturalised (since 2007)
(Fielden, 2008). No possi-
bility of naturalisation for
Congolese.
Nyarugusu camp,
Kanembwa camp,
Ulyankulu, Katumba
and Mishamo set-
tlements (UNHCR,
2014k)
DRC, Sudan (flight in
both directions) (Fielden,
2008), Sudanese → PRS
(Kuhlman, 2002)
Uganda Local settlement scheme
and land - self-reliance
(Fielden, 2008) but no
provision for naturalisation
(Manby, 2010).
Rhino Camp, Imvepi,
Madi Okollo, Ikafe
(closed), Palorinya,
Pakelle, Kiryandongo,
Kyangwali, Kyaka
II, Nakivale and
Oruchinga (Joint
Assessment Team
2005).
(continued)
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Refugees mainly from
(country of origin)
Host state Comments Location: Camps, Set-
tlements, Urban areas
Central Africa
Republic of Congo,
Chad, DRC (Fielden,
2008, UNHCR, 2014a)
Gabon No formal refugee camps,
refugees have identity doc-
uments but citizenship dif-
ficult, Chadian refugees in
eastern Gabon successfully
integrated (Fielden, 2008).
Not mentioned (UN-
HCR, 2014a)
Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Chad, DRC and
IDPs (UNHCR, 2014j)
Eritreans→ PRS (Milner
and Loescher, 2011)
Sudan Transitional Solutions
Initiative (TSI) with UNDP
andWorld Bank to promote
self-reliance of refugees in
Eastern Sudan (UNHCR,
2014j).
9 camps (UNHCR,
2014j)
Sudan, CAR (UNHCR,
2014b)
Chad UNHCR works with the
Commission Nationale
d’Accueil, de Reinsertion
des Refugies et des Patries
(CNARR) to encourage
the adoption of refugee
law to increase civil status
documentation of refugees
(UNHCR, 2014b)
12 camps for Su-
danese refugees
(Breidjing, Iridimi,
Djabal, Touloum,
Am Nabak, Mile,
Kounoungou, Gaga,
Zafingel, Treguine,
Abga-dam, Koukou-
Angarana) and vari-
ous other locations
(2014b), five camps for
CAR refugees (Moyo,
Haraze, Dosseye,
Gondye, Amboko)
(UNHCR, 2014b)
(continued)
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Refugees mainly from
(country of origin)
Host state Comments Location: Camps, Set-
tlements, Urban areas
West Africa
Liberia (Fielden, 2008)
(PRS, Kuhlman, 2002)
Cote d’Ivoire No camps until 1995,
then only one camp until
2002. Most refugees settled
in Zone d’Acceuil des
Refugies (ZAR) with land
and employment rights
(Kuhlman, 2002). Tabou
refugee transit centre was
closed and 24,000 Liberians
locally integrated; Nicla
refugee camp will be an
Ivorian village, to be called
Zaaglo (Fielden, 2008). Still
no solution for 3,400 Liberi-
ans who are aected by
cessation clause (UNHCR,
2014c).
IDP camps, Nicla
camp, settlement in
ZAR, Danane and
Toulepleu transit
centres (UNHCR,
2014c)
Sierra Leone, Cote
d’Ivoire (Fielden, 2008)
Liberia Main people of concern are
Ivorians who fled from post-
election violence in 2010
(UNHCR, 2014e); 3,563
Sierra Leonian refugees re-
main who might be locally
integrated (Fielden, 2008).
Bahn, Saclepea, New
Yourpea, PTP, and
Solo camps (UNHCR,
2014e)
Liberia (Fielden, 2008) Sierra Leone Eight rural camps, local in-
tegration possible (Fielden,
2008); 4100 refugees remain
in the country of whom
2700 are locally integrated
(UNHCR, 2014l).
8 camps (Fielden, 2008)
(continued)
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Refugees mainly from
(country of origin)
Host state Comments Location: Camps, Set-
tlements, Urban areas
Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire
(UNHCR, 2014l), and
Sierra Leone (Fielden,
2008) Sierra Leoneans
→ PRS (Kuhlman, 2002)
Guinea Sierra Leonean and
Liberian refugees have
cultural similarities and
common local languages
and ethnicities; some 200
Sierra Leonean refugees
remain on the old site of
Boreah camp, 400 refugees
assisted to integrate in
urban areas (Fielden, 2008);
UNHCR assists 3,500
Liberians that are aected
by the cessation clauses,
6,500 Ivorians assisted with
basic services in Kouankan
II camp (UNHCR, 2014l)
Old site of Boreah
camp (Fielden, 2008),
Kouankan II camp
(UNHCR, 2014l)
Liberia, Togo, Rwanda,
Ivory Coast (UNHCR,
2014l); Liberians in
Ghana → PRS (Dick,
2002)
Ghana Naturalisation allowed but
practical diculties (Dick,
2002). Assisted return of
Liberians in camps since
2008 following peace in
Liberia (Manby, 2010).
Buduburam Refugee
Settlement, Krisan
Camp, Klikor camp,
self-settled in Accra
(Agblorti 2011)
Mauritania (Manby,
2010)
Senegal Anyone from a neighbour-
ing country who has lived
in Senegal for five years
can opt for Senegalese
nationality without further
conditions. Many Mau-
ritanians resisted taking
Senegalese citizenship be-
cause they feared losing
claim to Mauritanian citi-
zenship. Others accepted
Senegalese citizenship for
facilitated travel and work.
In 2007, a new government
in Mauritania oered repa-
triation to these refugees.
Senegal promised citizen-
ship to Mauritanians who
chose not to return (Manby,
2010).
Not mentioned (UN-
HCR, 2014l)
(continued)
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Refugees mainly from
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Host state Comments Location: Camps, Set-
tlements, Urban areas
Southern Africa
DRC since 1970s (Fielden,
2008; UNHCR, 2014i),
further from Burundi,
Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra
Leone (UNHCR, 2014i)
Angola Permanent residence per-
mit, announcement to
grant legal local integration
in 2006 (Fielden, 2008).
The protection space for
refugees has been reduced
in recent years; UNHCR
makes visit to Immigra-
tion Detention Centres
and promotes voluntary
repatriation (UNHCR,
2014i).
Kuito camp and
Huambo camp men-
tioned in the press
in 1999-2001, but no
mention by UNHCR
today (UNHCR, 2014i)
Angola, Rwanda (UN-
HCR, 2014i)
Zambia Citizenship dicult to
attain but Zambia Initiative
support micro-finance
schemes (Fielden, 2008).
In Zambia, a new refugee
law was under discussion
in 2002 to make it possible
for long-staying refugees—
including many Angolans—
to apply for citizenship but
the bill did not pass. The
1970 Refugee Act in place
does not allow for natu-
ralisation (Manby 2010).
The Government of Zam-
bia has agreed to integrate
10,000 Angolan refugees
and some Rwandans locally.
Criteria and programmes
for local integration have
been published and 4,200
refugees have applied for
residency permits. (UN-
HCR, 2014i).
Meheba and
Manyanyama set-
tlements (Bakewell,
2000; UNHCR, 2014i)
(continued)
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Refugees mainly from
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Host state Comments Location: Camps, Set-
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Angola (UNHCR, 2014i) Namibia Angolans have refugee
status while others refugees
are asylum-seekers; local
integration possible for An-
golans; solutions dierent
due to ethnic and political
anities (Fielden, 2008).
Angolans’ refugee status
ceased in 2012. UNHCR
promotes local integration.
With decreasing numbers in
Osire camp, UNHCR took
over to assist the refugees
from WFP. UNHCR’s pres-
ence to phase out in 2015
(UNHCR, 2014i).
Osire camp (UNHCR,
2014i)
Angola (Manby, 2010),
Namibia, Somalia, Zim-
babwe (UNHCR, 2014i)
Botswana In November 2006, after
many delays, Botswana Pres-
ident Festus Mogae agreed
to grant of citizenship to
183 long-term Angolan
refugees still resident in
Botswana (Manby 2010).
Increasing numbers live
in Dukwi camp due to a
strict encampment policy
(UNHCR, 2014i).
Dukwi camp (UN-
HCR, 2014i)
DRC, Rwanda, Burundi
(UNHCR, 2014i)
Mozambique In Mozambique, the 1991
Refugee Act explicitly
provides for naturalisa-
tion of refugees on the
same terms as other for-
eigners (Manby, 2010).
50% of refugees live in
Maratane camp. Refugees
enjoy freedom of movement.
UNHCR works on refugee
status determination in or-
der to prevent statelessness
(UNHCR, 2014i).
Maratane camp (UN-
HCR, 2014i)
(continued)
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Refugees mainly from
(country of origin)
Host state Comments Location: Camps, Set-
tlements, Urban areas
Not mentioned (UN-
HCR, 2014i)
Lesotho Lesotho’s 1983 Refugees
Act allows a refugee to
apply for naturalisation
after six years (12 months
before the application and
five more years) (Manby,
2010). The country hosts 37
refugees and asylum seekers
and UNHCR pushes for
unconditional citizenship
according with national
legislation (UNHCR,
2014i).
No refugee camps
mentioned (UNHCR,
2014i)
Refugees: Angola,
Burundi, DRC,
Rwanda, Somalia
Asylum seekers:
Bangladesh, DRC,
Ethiopia, Somalia,
Zimbabwe (UNHCR,
2014h)
South Africa South Africa’s system
ocially provides for a
status transfer from refugee
to permanent residence
and then to naturalised
citizenship. After five years
of continuous residence in
South Africa from the date
that asylum was granted,
the Immigration Act allows
for the granting of perma-
nent residence to a refugee
if he or she will remain a
refugee indefinitely. But as
of 2008, no refugee had
been granted citizenship
by this process due to a
10-year time delay and that
the laws were only in place
in 2000-2003 (Manby, 2010).
As of December 2011,
Angolans, Burundians, DR
Congolese and Rwandese
and Somalis have been
recognised as refugees with
freedom of movement,
work permits and access to
basic social services. Doc-
umentation problems still
persist though (UNHCR,
2014h).
No camps, urban
refugee locations
(UNHCR, 2014h)
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Burundi, the DRC and
Rwanda (UNHCR,
2014i)
Malawi UNHCR will use an ap-
proach to deliver basic ser-
vices to refugees in Dza-
leka Camp, psychological
support upon arrival. Trans-
port to the camp is a chal-
lenge. There is a strict
encampment policy. UN-
HCR supports refugee sta-
tus determination eorts of
the government (UNHCR
2014i).
Dzaleka camp (UN-
HCR, 2014i)
Great Lakes region,
Horn of Africa (UN-
HCR, 2014i)
Zimbabwe UNHCR supports eorts of
voluntary repatriation and
resettlement. It helps ensure
that basic needs of refugees
are met (UNHCR, 2014i)
Tongogora camp (UN-
HCR, 2014i)
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A.3 Refugee Act, 1998, Sections 1617: Residence in Designated Area
16.Designated area
(1) The Minister may, by notice in the Gazette, declare any part of the United Republic
of Tanzania to be a designated area.
(2) The Director of Refugees Services shall appoint a settlement ocer to be in charge of
such refugees settlement or of such reception, transit or residence area for asylum seekers
or refugees.
(3) Every settlement, reception, shall include all the land and buildings within the settle-
ment, reception, transit, or residence boundaries or enclosure and also any other land or
buildings belonging or attached thereto and used by the asylum seekers or the refugees.
(4) In any writ, warrant, instrument or other legal document in which it may be necessary,
to describe a particular designated area by reference to the name of the place or townwhere
it is situated, or other definite description suchwrit, warrant, instrument or legal document
shall be valid and sucient for all purposes.
Provided that geographical boundaries shall clearly be spelt out in the declaration and es-
tablishments referred to in subsection (1) of this section respectively.
17.Requirement to reside in a designated area
(1) The competent authority in consultation with the Minister or the Director may by
order, require any asylum seeker or refugee or group or category of refugees to whom this
section applies who is within his area to reside within a designated area whether or not
such area is within the jurisdiction of competent authority.
(2) The competent authority in consultation with the Minister, or the Director may re-
quire any asylum seeker or refugee or group or category of refugees to whom this section
applies who is within a designated area within such competent authority’s area to move to
or reside in any other designated area whether within such competent authority’s area or
not.
(3) Any asylum seeker or refugee to whom an order made under this section applies who–
(a) fails to comply with such order; or
(b) fails to move to or take up resident in a designated area in accordance with such order
within reasonable time; or
(c) having arrived at a designated area, in pursuance of such order, leaves or attempts to
leave such area, except in pursuance of some other order or permit made under this section,
shall be guilty of an oence against this Act.
(4) The competent authority or the Director as the case may be, may vary, revise or cancel
any order or requirement made by him under subsections (1) or (2) of this section.
(5)(a) No asylum seeker or refugee shall be allowed to leave a designated area as directed
under this section unless he has sought and obtained a permit from Director or Settlement
Ocer as the case may be, and, subject to such terms and conditions as the Director or a
Settlement Ocer may prescribe in the permit.
(b) No asylum seeker or refugee may be allowed to be out of a designated area for more
than fourteen days unless the Director has allowed in the permit a longer period upon
which an asylum seeker or a refugee may stay outside the designated area.
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(6) Any asylum seeker or refugee to whom a permit or travel document has been issued
under this section who fails to comply with the terms and conditions thereof shall be guilty
of an oence against this Act.
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A.4 Announcement: Prohibition to Build Houses in the Settlement
Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania Ofisi ya Waziri Mkuu
Tawala za Mikoa na Serikali za Mitaa
Telegrams: Mkuu Wilaya
Telephone: 0732 988332
Fax: 0732988484
Email: dc_urambo@yahoo.com
Mkuu wa Makazi
Makazi ya Ulyankulu
S.L.P. 1948
Tabora
9.02.2009
Yah: Kusitisha ujenzi wa majengo ya makazi
Tafadhali husika na kichwa cha hapo juu.
Kufuatia mchakato wa kuwarudisha wakimbizi wote kurudi nchini kwao na kufungwa kwa
makambi na makazi yote nchini, makazi ya Ulyankulu inahusika.
Kwa kuwa makazi hayo yatafungwa na hakutakuwa na mkinbizi yeyote atakayebaki ndani ya
makazi Wilayani na Mkoa wa Tabora kwa ujumla, nakuagiza kutoa tangazo la maandishi
kwenye vijiji, taasisi za kidini zisizo za serikali na serikali kuwa shughuli zozote na ujenzi wa
majengo ya aina yoyote, umesitishwa kuanzia tarehe 01/02/2009 isipokuwa kwa kibali maalum
cha MKUU WA WILAYA majengo pekee ambayo yamepata ruhusa ya kuendelea na ujenzi ni
Chuo cha VETA pekee. Agizo hili ni pamoja na majengo yanayoendelea kujengwa, yasimame.
Kuhusu watanzania wanaoingia makazi bila utaratibu, andaa tangazo rasmi la kuwataka
waondoke na wasiingie eneo la makazi na kununua ardhi wala nyumba kwani kwa kufanya
hivyo watakuwa wamekiuka sheria. Matangazo yote mawili viongozi wa vijiji na taasisi zilizo
ndani.
Nakutakia utekelezaji mwema.
Kassim M. Majaliwa
Mkuu wa Wilaya
Urambo
[Original text, author’s illustration]
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United Republic of Tanzania – Prime Minister’s Oce
Regional and Districts Government Administration
Telegrams: District Commissioner
Telephone: 0732 988332
Fax: 0732988484
Email: dc_urambo@yahoo.com
Settlement Ocer
Ulyankulu Settlement
S.L.P. 1948
Tabora
9.02.2009
To stop building houses in the settlement
Please refer to the heading above.
Following the process of repatriating all refugees back to their home country and closing all the
camps and settlements in the country, [this announcement] applies to Ulyankulu settlement.
Constituting a settlement that will be closed and will not host any refugee who will remain inside
of the settlement, in the Districts and the Region of Tabora in total, I command you to take this
announcement to the villages, religious institutions, which are not part of the government, and
the institutions of the government, which have anything to do with the building of houses of any
type, in order to halt construction starting from the 1st February 2009 unless allowed by a special
permit of the district commissioner. The only buildings that can still be constructed are those of
VETA vocational training school only. This directive also concerns buildings, which are in the
process of being constructed. This process should be discontinued.
About the Tanzanians, who enter the settlement without patience, prepare an ocial announce-
ment to ask them to leave and to not enter the area of the settlement and to neither buy land nor
house since to do so means breaching the law.
Any of the two announcements [are directed] to the village leaders and the institutions, which
are inside of the settlement.
I wish you a good implementation.
Kassim M. Majaliwa
Mkuu wa Wilaya
Urambo
[Translation: Author, 2013]
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A.5 Excerpt of Civics Book for Forms III and IV, Ch.4: Responsible Citizenship
Importance of Citizenship (p.53)
1. A citizen receives legal rights for belonging to a certain country, and is protected as
a citizen of that country.
2. It is the legal way of being recognised as a person belonging to particular country.
3. The country receives loyalty from its citizens.
4. A person gains legitimacy to makes decisions in the country. For instance, citizens vote
for leaders or can be voted for as leaders.
5. A country can also impose its authority upon its citizens to carry out its policies for
the development of the nation.
6. A country gets revenue from its citizens through taxes paid by them.
Duties and and Civil Responsibilities of Citizens
(...)
Responsibilities towards special groups (p. 56–58)
(i) Victims of HIV/AIDS, (II) Women, (III) Disabled people/handicapped
(iv) Refugees: These are people who are forced to leave their homeland and live in other
places. This forced migration can be due to various social or political problems like war,
drought or famine. Tanzania has experienced refugees from Rwanda, Burundi and DRC.
Refugees lack houses, nutritious food, social services like education and health services and
suer from loneliness as a result of family disintegration.
(v) Orphans, (VI) The Youth, (VII) Street Children, (VIII) Elderly People or the aged, (IX)
Children
Responsibilities of Citizens to Refugees (p.60)
Citizens should:
(i) Give them basic needs as they arrive. Basically this involves giving them food, clothing
and shelter.
(ii) Give them basic social services like water, medical care and education for their chil-
dren.
(iii) Ask refugees to refrain from any unlawful acts (oences) like banditry, smuggling,
keeping weapons and ammunition, rape and even unlawful correspondence with their
home countries.
(iv) Prevent refugees from destroying our environment. This involves preventing them
from clearing forests for firewood or practising poor farming methods.
(v) Co-operate with the government and non-governmental organisations, including the
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), in taking care of refugees until
they go back home.
[Original text, author’s illustration]
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A.6 Initial Interview Guide for Refugee Respondents (English)
The Past (1)
• When did you come to Ulyankulu and why? Please give a short history of your life up to
now.
Life in Ulyankulu (2)
• What work do you do here? What did you work in Burundi?
• What is your family situation?
• How do you spend your free time?
• In what political, economic or cultural activities do you participate in Ulyankulu?
• Are you satisfied with your life in Ulyankulu? How would you improve it, if you could?
• What do you value in your life / in Ulyankulu?
Relations to Tanzanians (3)
• In your daily life who do you talk to?
• Do you have personal or economic contacts to Tanzanians?
Citizenship (4)
• When you chose naturalisation, why did you do so? Why did you not decide to repatriate?
• If you receive citizenship, what will change for you?
• If you have to relocate, where would you go? Why? Would you like to relocate?
Belonging (5)
• Do you feel like you belong to the region of Tabora? Or to Tanzania? Or to Burundi? To
your colline in Burundi? To Ulyankulu?
• Do you feel like a Hutu? A Tanzanian? A Burundian? Somebody from Tabora? A refugee?
A citizen?
• What factors make you feel like you belong? Could possession of land be a factor for be-
longing?
• Do you think these questions would be answered dierently by your par-
ents/children/wives/husbands?
Diasporic Identity/Relations to Burundi (6)
• What are your connections to Burundi? (Economic/ personal links/ visits/ phone calls/ feel-
ings)? What is your relation to these people?
• Do you know people in other settlements and camps? What is your relation to these people?
• Do you know people who live outside of the camps and settlements? What is your relation
to these people?
Contacts (7)
• Do you know people who already got their citizenship certificates? Could you give me their
phone number(s)?
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A.7 Initial Interview Guide for Refugee Respondents (Swahili)
Wakati uliopita (1)
• Ulikuja Ulyankulu lini? Na kwa nini? Unaweza ukatupa/ukaeleza historia fupi?
Maisha ya Ulyankulu (2)
• Unafanya kazi gani hapa? Na kabla Burundi?
• Hali yako ya kifamilia ikoje?
• Unatumiaje muda/wakati wako wa ziada? (Shughuli za kiuchumi, kisiasa, kiutamaduni)
• Umeridhika na maisha ya Ulyankulu? Unaona yaboreshwe vipi?
• Ni vitu gani kwenye maisha unavyoona ni bora hasahasa hapa Ulyankulu?
Mahusiano na Watanzania (3)
• Katika maisha yako ya kila siku unaongea na kina nani zaidi? Una mawasialiano nao?
Uraia (4)
• Kwa nini ulichagua kuwa raia? Kwa nini ulichagua hivyo na sio kurudi Burundi?
• Unapenda kuhama? Kama unatakiwa kuhama unapendelea kuhamia wapi? Kwa nini?
• Kama ukipatiwa uraia wa Tanzania unaona mabadiliko gani?
Kujihisi kama Mwenyeji (5)
• Unajesikiaje kuwa wewe ni mkazi wa Tabora? Wa Tanzania? Wa Burundi? Wa colline? Wa
Ulyankulu?
• Baado unajihisi kama mkimbizi? Mhutu/Mburundi/Mtanzania au mtu kutoka Tabora?
Kwa nini?
• Ni sababu zipi zinakufanya ujihisi hivyo?
• Labda ni kuwa na ardhi?
Mahusiano na Burundi (6)
• Una mahusiano gani na Burundi? Ya kiuchumi/binafsi/au unatembelea mawasiliano kwa
simu?
• Kuna watu unajuana nao wa kambi au makazi nyingine? Una uhusiano gani na watu hao?
• Unafahamiana na watu wanaoishi nje ya makazi? Una uhusiano gani na watu hao?
Kuwasiliana (7)
• Unafahamu watu ambao wamekwisha pata uraia na vitambululisho vya uraia? Una uhu-
siano gani na watu hao?
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Uongozi wa Tarafa ya Ulyankulu — Leadership of Ulyankulu Division
Katibu Tarafa (Division Ocer)
Mkuu wa Makazi ya Ulyankulu
Settlement Ocer
Mkuu wa Kituo cha Polisi (Uly)
Police Commander (Uly)
Mganga Mkuu Kituo cha Afya (Uly)
Main doctor of the health centre (Uly)
Hakimu wa Mahakama ya Mwanzo (Uly)
Judge of the First Court Ulyankulu
Afisa wa Misitu Milambo
Forest Ocer of Milambo
Mratibu Elimu Kata Milambo
Education Coordinator Milambo ward
Afisa Kilimo/Mifugo Milambo
Ocer of Agriculture and LifestockMilambo
Afisa wa Afya Milambo
Health Ocer of Milambo
Ulyankulu Division: Wards and Villages
Kashishi Sasu Seleli Ichemba Kanoge Mwongozo Silambo Uyowa
Kashishi Sasu Seleli Ichemba Kanoge Mwongozo Usonga Uhindi
(Sasu) K’ngdeo Bulela Makingi Ul’anga Ibambo Nsungwa Song-
ambele
(Seleli) Ilege (Mwen-
dakulima)
Nhwande Mwanluti Uhindi Nsungwa
Iyombo Mkilingi Nhanga Utantamke Kanoge Mwen-
dakulima
(Nyasa) Nyasa Uliunga(?)
Kingwangkoko Busanda
*The original wards belonging to Ulyankulu Division besides Milambo, Kanindo and Igombemkulu within
the settlement were Kashishi, Ichemba, Mwongozo and Uyowa. Later, Sasu, Seleli, Kanoge and Silambo
were added as wards. This is why some villages were struck out in the original chart. Further villages that
appear twice are in brackets. A few were not very well readable, so these are indicated with a question
mark.
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The Market at Road 13, Kaswa, Ulyankulu
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The Market at Road 13, Kaswa, Ulyankulu 
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From top to bottom: a. Fabrics for Sale, b. Household Utensils, c. Kitenge Shop, 
d. Refugee Woman Selling Jatropha Syrup (Author, 2012) 
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From top to bottom: a. Fabrics for Sale, b. Household Utensils, c. Kitenge Shop, d. Refugee
Woman Selling Jatropha Syrup (Author, 2012)
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Religious Services: Churches and the Mosque in Ulyankulu Settlement$
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From top to bottom: 
a. Centre Baptist 
Church, Kaswa 
b. Choir in Catholic 
Church, Kaswa 
c. Pentecostal 
Church, Mapigano 
d. Ulyankulu 
Mosque, Kaswa 
Right: 
e. Pastor in Baptist 
Church, Ikonongo 
(Author, 2012) 
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Schools in and around Ulyankulu Settlement 
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a.
b.
c. d.
e.
From top to bottom: Ulyankulu Secondary School - a. In the Classroom, b. Outside Area, c.
Donor Plate, d. Lab Door; e. Secondary School in Ichemba with Water Tank (Author, 2012)
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Transport in Ulyankulu 
 
 
 
 
Plates (from top to 
bottom): 
a. Main transport 
in Ulyankulu: 
Bicycles 
b. Oxcart 
c. Fuelling the car 
d. Motorbike used 
during fieldwork 
(Author, 2012) 
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The Research Environment 
$
$
 
From top to bottom: a. As a Participant-Observer on the Market, b. House where the Researcher 
lived at VETA Ulyankulu, c. Guesthouse on the VETA Compound (Author, 2012) 
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From top to bottom: a. As a Participant-Observer on the Market, b. House where the
Researcher lived at VETA Ulyankulu, c. Guesthouse on the VETA Compound (Author, 2012)
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From top to bottom: a. Old Electricity Generator at VETA, b. M-Pesa Banking Service Shop in 
Kaswa, c. Mobile Phone Charging Service (Author, 2012) 
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From top b tt m: a. Old Electricit rator at VETA, b. M-Pesa Ba king Service Shop in
Kaswa, c. Mobile P arging Service (Author, 2012)
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A.10 Programme of Inauguration of Ulyankulu Secondary School Extension
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